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Introduction
Allow me to open with an anecdote. In July and August of 2011, I conducted
ethnographic research on the construction of ethnicity among the Lebanese-Argentine
population of Buenos Aires, Argentina. En route to Argentina from Cairo, I stopped
over in Cape Town, South Africa where I stayed in an eco- village and regularly ate at
the neighborhood's Millhouse Organic Restaurant. The staff there was mostly black.
Amandla! Having seen this powerful documentary on apartheid prompted me to seize
the moments I had in Cape Town to personally inquire of a black experience in South
Africa. The morning before I left for South America, I went to pa y for breakfast at
Millhouse and stopped to speak with a black lady tidying up the store portion of the
establishment.
“I mean, being a black woman traveling around, I'm always interested in other black
people's experiences in different countries. So, what's it like being black here?” I
questioned, feigning nonchalance.
I watched her body stiffen. Almost surely she had emotionally clammed up, too.
“What, you're doing research here or something?” She briefly stared out over the
3

porch and then continued mopping. “That's a pretty generic question. We get asked
that pretty often. I mean, it's, you know, different. It's okay.” Still mopping.
“What'd she ask you?” a younger black man at the register piped in.
“She wanted to know what it's like being black here.”
He dropped his head, shook it with a smirk and resumed counting money. Those were
neither the reactions I had hoped for, nor anticipated.
I share this experience at the outset, because this brief conversation recolored
my approach to the thesis research I would carry out on the shaping of LebaneseArgentine ethnicity in Buenos Aires. I left with three very poignant lessons. Lesson
one: if I were to get anything out of my work in Argentina I would have to learn to
ask the “right” questions, and in a manner that would allow willing participants to
divulge their perceptions on Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity with little to no resistance.
At Millhouse, I naively thought I would be privy to some fascinating data for no other
reason than the fact that I was black, like my subjects. And while certain
commonalities or even differences between researcher and subject can undoubtedly
facilitate trust—and thus “fruitful” research—ultimately, it is the way in which
interactions are initiated and carried forward that can really bear “fruit”. But lesson
two was as equally salient. Delicately posing meaningful inquiries is key; however,
reactions to whatever bait thrown out are every bit as telling. Much richness lies in
silences, defensiveness, squirming, chuckles and stalling. The in- tune researcher
knows to pay attention to body language and choice of words. But he or she also
knows to remain alert to his or her own biases when analyzing participants' responses.
And finally, there was lesson three. Whatever expectations I had developed, whatever
I thought (or hoped) I would find in the field prior to actually getting there had to be
tossed, for surely they would spoil the fruit of lessons one and two.
The argumentation of the thesis is two-pronged. First, I assert that a LebaneseArgentine ethnic identity is non-essential, and second, if and when descendants of
Lebanese heritage decide to construct a hybrid Lebanese ethnic identity in Buenos
Aires, it is a simulation of what it means to be Lebanese. This implies members of the
Lebanese-Argentine ethnic group reference and express ethnic emblems germane to
Lebanese ethnicity according to their understanding of Lebanese-ness.
I expound. For the first prong of the thesis, I adopt Livio Sansone's stance on
4

ethnic identity in Blackness without Ethnicity in which he posits that “...many people
can live quite happily without such things as ethnicity. There are certain people who
do not identify with a single given ethnic identity” (Sansone, 2003, p. 7). In this same
vein, I assert that Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity is not essential. However, in the
second prong, I extend beyond Sansone's claim to argue that when members of the
Lebanese diasporic population in Buenos Aires (which have had varying degrees of
contact with the home country, Lebanon, and its culture) do construct a LebaneseArgentine ethnicity, it is a simulation of their understanding of what it means to be of
Lebanese descent. I primarily look to Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard's study of
simulacrum and simulation for theoretical guidance as to how this process unfolds in
Buenos Aires. I test my claims with ethnographic data from the field.
By my lights, the final thesis is much richer in content than the initial plan of
study I devised. Below is an excerpt of the thesis proposal I submitted to The
American University in Cairo Middle East Studies Center a few short months before I
departed Cairo for the field in July 2011:

In my thesis I aim to explore the construction of ethnicity among the
Lebanese-Argentine youth of Buenos Aires, Argentina, aged 18 to 25, as first,
a reaction to the constructed ethnicities of previous Lebanese-Argentine
generations; second, a simulacrum of their understanding of what it means to
be of Lebanese descent; and third, a response to social, political and economic
forces in modern Argentine society. More explicitly, I seek to investigate how
today’s Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity has survived and adapted to the
assimilationist policies of the early Argentinean government, especially in
light of earlier generations’ willingness to culturally assimilate. Has there been
a recent resurgence of Lebanese traditions and customs among Buenos Aires’
Lebanese-Argentine youth? If so, in what ways has this resurgence
manifested? I will then situate my research findings within the current social,
political and economic circumstances of Buenos Aires, and discuss how these
factors affect the construction of contemporary ethnic identity among
Lebanese-Argentinean youth.
After several weeks of research in Buenos Aires—combing through the Yellow Pages
for restaurants, social clubs and dance schools; explaining my thesis research with the
polite Argentines who were intrigued enough to listen; conducting interviews with
willing participants; visiting restaurants, centers, bookstores, libraries and other
potentially relevant locations; and hitting the pavement of the capital's barrios on a
5

hunt for tell-tale signs of a Lebanese presence—I began to sense something I could
not have known while still preparing for fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt. Indeed, there were
obvious markers of an Arab, and even specifically, Lebanese presence. On more than
one occasion I observed a real estate sign with the agent's last name: Haddad. A brick
fountain and memorial had been erected in honor of renowned Lebanese poet Khalil
Gibran. (Conveniently (and perhaps deliberately) it sat close to Calle Líbano or
“Lebanon Street”.) Painted on the side of a municipal trash receptacle in my
neighborhood, Montserrat, was an advertisement for a belly dance school; it was the
nicest of the several notices I saw for the dance form plastered about the city on walls
and doors. On a plaque in the square behind the illustrious Teatro Colón was a brief
mention of the Jewish and Arab communities that had once lived in the neighborhood.
Carrefour even sold a commercialized brand of Arabic bread by the company Bimbo.
Yet, I was much more struck by what I did not find about the Lebanese-Argentine
population, than what I did.
All of these ethnic and cultural indicators seemed to dangle isolated in the
ether. When I followed their trail backwards in pursuit of a source, I did not find a
specific neighborhood with an obviously higher percentage of people of Middle
Eastern descent, unlike the barrio Once. This neighborhood was clearly the spot to
where the more recently arrived Peruvians and Bolivians gravitated. In some
interviews with participants of Syro- Lebanese or Lebanese descent, I did not detect a
particularly strong identification with the host ethnicity or culture of Lebanon. And in
the greater Argentine historical narrative—evident mostly in books, bookstores,
libraries and through conversations with Argentines not of Lebanese descent—I noted
more silences on the (Syro-) Lebanese impact than utterances. Undoubtedly, there is a
Lebanese population in the capital of Argentina (even if the national census does not
specify so). Surely, there are conspicuous signs of this population about the capital.
And logically, if there are ethnic and cultural markers present, there is potential for the
construction of a hybrid Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity. This hybrid cultural
identification is theoretically there for the taking, but who is claiming it? How do
curious second- and third- generation Lebanese assume and express their ethnic
identity? And do they claim this ethnicity in whole or in part? (Is this even a
possibility?) These refined questions are at the crux of the final thesis.
6

The methodology for the thesis is as follows: As an ethnographic study o f the
transformation of the Lebanese turned Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity in Buenos Aires,
I relied on informal interviews, visits to and observations of the Lebanese embassy,
social clubs/centers, monuments, restaurants, bookshops, a mosque, a church,
neighborhoods, museums, dance schools, a language center and the national library. I
also conducted research through online forums and social media, the Buenos Aires
telephone book, Argentine magazines and newspapers, digital databases, pertinent
websites and online radio broadcasts.
Additionally, I consulted secondary sources at The American University in
Cairo (AUC) library on the history of Argentina, Lebanon, ethnicity, simulacrum,
simulation, mimesis, migration, assimilation, and Arabs in the diaspora. My thesis
committee members, Dr. Reem Saad (thesis adviser), Dr. Hanan Kholoussy (thesis
reader), and Dr. Malak Rouchdy (thesis reader), have given invaluable suggestions on
how to better focus my research. Conversations with both Dr. Ibrahim Awad and Dr.
Ghada Barsoum, both faculty members at AUC, yielded interesting ideas on how to
approach the study of ethnicity, places to conduct research in Buenos Aires, and
potentially useful contacts abroad. Dr. Awad is a specialist in migration and lived in
Argentina for two and a half years working with the Arab League of Nations. Dr.
Barsoum wrote her doctoral dissertation on the construction of the ethno-religious
identity of Copts living in Canada. I also made use of online databases, such as
WorldCat and JSTOR, in order to access theses, articles and books written on
ethnicity, simulacrum, simulation, Argentina, and Lebanon.
The thesis is divided into four chapters; one question guides the direction of
each chapter. I begin with the inquiry, “Who were the Syro-Lebanese?”
Demographics; motives for emigrating from Greater Syria and immigrating to
Argentina, generally and Buenos Aires, specifically; as well as the creation of a
commission for immigration are all key themes. The chapter also delves into the
positivist and cultural nationalist intellectual movements, which greatly shaped the
burgeoning nation's xenophobic attitude and assimilationist policies. Finally, I round
off the chapter with an examination of how the early Syro- Lebanese adapted to their
host country.
“What is ethnicity?” directs the second chapter. I employ the theories of Max
7

Weber, Fredrik Barth, Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, Jean Comaroff and
John Comaroff, et. al., in exploring what constitutes ethnic identity. I echo Livio
Sansone's claim that ethnicity is not an essential identity, and in the instance it is not
embraced, race and/or nationality are two other satisfying ways of self- identification.
Yet, if Lebanese-Argentines do claim an ethnic identity after space and the
passage of time mean a chasm between Lebanon and Buenos Aires, how do they
construct it? And why? Chapter three addresses the notion of simulation, the process
(I hypothesize) through which second- , third- and fourth-generation immigrants of
Lebanese descent manufacture an authentic Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity in Buenos
Aires, for pride and nostalgia are powerful. “What is simulation?” I look to the work
of Pierre Klossowski, Gilles Deleuze and Jean Baudrillard in examining simulation
and its predecessor, simulacrum.
Chapter four tests my hypothesis and answers two questions: “How do I know
that Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity is a simulation of Lebanese ethnic identity?” and
“What did I see in Buenos Aires to buttress my claim?” The first part of the chapter
offers a historical, political, religious and cultural look at Lebanon. In simulacrumspeak, it gives a look at the “original”, what Lebanese-Argentines actually may
reference when constructing their own Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity. This
section aims to situate the reader to better understand my observations in Buenos
Aires. The second part of chapter four recounts what I initially encountered in the
field while in the Capital Federal, and what I found on delving a bit deeper into the
cultural landscape. From the use of social media, to dance and food and religion, this
section proffers examples of some of the many ways in which Lebanese-Argentines
are constructing and expressing their ethnic identity.
I conclude the thesis with a look at some of the profo und implications of a
Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity in Buenos Aires: Does this identity have the potential to
supersede national borders and influence the course of international politics? If this be
the case, then how so?
The final thesis is a contribution to Middle Eastern, migration, Latin
American, nationalism, multicultural, identity and assimilation studies. It provides a
detailed case of how an Arab diasporic population has adapted to its Latin American
host country, and in turn, how this host country has accommodated its Arab
8

immigrants. Additionally, this study illustrates how these populations define
themselves in relation to their home and host countries. It also explores the ways in
which ethnicities are formed and evolve, and cultures “cross pollinate” each other.
And perhaps most interestingly, the thesis joins a buzzing category of Middle Eastern
scholarship whose scope reaches beyond the geographical borders of the region to
investigate issues of migration and other cross-cultural connections the globe over.
Before I begin, the opening anecdote reminds me of the vantage point from
which I have conducted ethnographic research and have written this thesis on the
Lebanese-Argentine population of Buenos Aires. I am an African-American woman
from the south of the United States, who has traveled some, and lived here and there
beyond American borders. I accept full responsibility for my views and gladly
welcome any suggestions to reconsider angles of my approach.
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Chapter One: Who Were the Syro-Lebanese?
Chapter one details the emigration of the Syro-Lebanese from Greater Syria through
their immigration to Argentina in the late 19 th and early 20th centuries. I touch on
group demographics, motives for leaving Greater Syria, as well as reasons for
migrating to Buenos Aires. I explore the xenophobic social environment to which the
Syro-Lebanese arrived by examining positivism and cultural nationalism. These two
intellectual movements fueled discrimination and greatly steered (or, conversely, were
the manifestation of) the country's assimilationist policies towards “undesired”
immigrants. The chapter concludes with a look at how the Syro-Lebanese eventually
adapted to their new “home”.
Before diving into the historical matter, however, I provide a brief explanation
of my usage of terms in the thesis. Some scholarly works on early Arab immigration
to Argentina employ the labels “Syro-Lebanese”, “Syrian-Lebanese”, or “SyrioLebanese”, a hyphenation reflected on the ground in Buenos Aires. For exa mple, there
is Club Sirio Libanés (Syrian-Lebanese Club), Fundación Sirio Libanesa para la
Salud (Syrian-Lebanese Foundation for Health), Hospital Sirio Libanés (SyrianLebanese Hospital), and the now defunct Centro Social Sirio Libanés (SyrianLebanese Social Center) 1, in which early immigrants who claimed either Syrian or
Lebanese nationality (or neither before the partition) came together to socialize,
provide aid or charity for newer immigrants, or carry out some other function. “Sirio
Libanés” became a common blanket term in 1920s Argentina for Arab immigrants;
however, nominally it excludes those immigrants from other Arab countries, as well

1 Club Siro Libanés was founded in 1932 by Moises J. Azize, along with a group of immigrants fro m

Greater Syria. The club began and remains social in nature, providing a location for formal v isits,
conferences, sports games and celebrations. Fundación Sirio Libanesa para la Salud is an off-shoot of
Hospital Sirio Libanés, and founded in 2007 under President Ricardo Simes. It aims to “pro mote and
develop various kinds of cultural, educational and research in itiatives” fundamental to the Hospital
(Fundación Sirio Libanesa para la Salud). Hospital Sirio Libanés began as la Sociedad Damas de
Misericordia (Misericordia Wo men’s Society) under Rev. Father Elías Maria Go rayeb to tend to the
med ical, dietary and cultural needs of newly arrived immigrants fro m Greater Syria. In 1923, the
doctors of the Greater Sy rian co mmun ity met to discuss the next phase of the organization, which had
waned in previous years. It became Asociación Beneficencia Sirio Libanesa (Syrian-Lebanese)
Charitable Association), and eventually Hospital Sirio Libanés. Centro Social Sirio Libanés was
founded in 1908 as la Sociedad Siria de Socorros Mutuos (Syrian Society of Mutual A id) to aid
immigrants arriving fro m Greater Syria.
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as non-Arabs from Arab countries (Civantos, 2006, p. viii). In this work, I use SyroLebanese in instances where it is explicitly employed, or for when referring to
immigrants to Argentina who arrived before the partitioning of Greater Syria. For all
other cases I utilize the title “Lebanese” or “Lebanese-Argentine”. 2

Emigration from Greater Syria
By the time the first Syro-Lebanese immigrants reached the port of Buenos Aires,
they were mostly referred to as turcos (Turks), a misnomer that would eventually
serve them in good stead as they tried to evade the Ottoman Empire's radar
prohibiting emigration, 3 and shake off all too obvious indicators of their origin.
According to Ignacio Klich (1992), between 1888 and 1914, roughly four percent of
the 2.5 million immigrants to Argentina were from the Middle East or North Africa.
These included what would today be termed S yrians, Lebanese, Jordanians,
Palestinians and Israelis, as well as Iraqis, Egyptians, Moroccans and Algerians (p.
243). Between 1904 and 1913, the number of overall Arab immigrants to Argentina
climaxed, and then dipped during the First World War. It rose mildly around 1931
after travel became easier post-war (Civantos, 2006, p. 7). According to Akram
Khater (2001) the majority of Syro-Lebanese immigrated to Argentina after 1900 (p.
53).
Although this thesis focuses on Lebanese-Argentines, inaccuracies in official

2 Admittedly, as Dr. Kholoussy has pointed out, the issue of assigning categories here is hairy. It is a

“methodological challenge”, because my labels of “Lebanese” or “Lebanese-Argentine” for some
descendents of early immig rants from Greater Syria may be inaccurate. Even if a person’s lineage is
fro m a town in what is now Lebanon, if the area was not technically in “Lebanon” at the time their
antecedent emigrated (Lebanon as the present day state, nation, idea and cultu re), then I cannot project
a Lebanese discourse onto the descendent. Only could I if they have claimed that discourse themselves .
Therefore, my resolution has been to follow the dates and intuit the rest. If I am referring to immigrants
fro m Greater Syria before 1943 in a purely past context, I use the term “Syro -Lebanese”. Conversely, I
refer to those immigrating to Argentina after 1943 as “Lebanese”, again, in a purely past context.
However, if my context is the present, but I am referencing the past, I u se “Lebanese” or “LebaneseArgentine” or even “Syria” based on the current configuration of the Levant for the sake of
consistency. In addition to this being easier for me, I have found that those with ancestry from the
Levant tend to claim Syrian or Lebanese heritage—whether naturally or by default.
3For conscription and taxation reasons.
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Argentine record-keeping render exact figures for early Lebanese immigrants next to
impossible. There are several plausible explanations for the lack of exactitude.
Cristina Civantos (2006) cites “illegal departures, nonstandardized or inaccurate terms
used to record origins at arrival points, and return migration” as principle culprits (p.
7). Klich (1992) seconds return migration, positing that officials were much less likely
to record departures for the Syro- Lebanese who immigrated to Argentina only
temporarily, such that re- immigrations and re-emigrations may have gone
unaccounted for (p. 249). He also states that the Argentine government “defined
immigrants as second- or third-class sea travelers, thereby excluding those who could
afford more expensive fares or entered from the neighbouring countries”.
Additionally, those native Arabic speakers holding European passports (most likely
Maronite) would be counted as European immigrants, not Middle Eastern (Klich,
1992, p. 248). Finally, Estela Valverde (1992) states that many Syro- Lebanese
immigrants traveled first to Montevideo, Uruguay, and then illegally entered
Argentina via the Uruguay River—further skewing Migration Department data (p.
314).
We must also take into account the later partitioning of Greater Syria, which
became Syria in 1946 and Lebanon in 1943 (as well as Palestine/Israel and Jordan).
Early immigrants to Argentina who—today would be classified as Lebanese for their
origin of emigration, could not have categorized themselves as such in the nonexistence of a Lebanese state. Instead, they were categorized in different moments in
Argentine history as Turks, Arabs, Syrians or Ottomans (Klich, 1992, p. 249).

Demographics of Syro-Lebanese Immigrants to Argentina
Still, available sources do provide some indication of early Syro- Lebanese
demographics. The first migrants from Greater Syria were mostly Maronite, Melkite,
or Eastern Orthodox Christian; however, in smaller numbers Sunni, Shiite and
Alawite Muslims also immigrated to the Argentine state, as well as some Druze. Luz
Maria Martinez Montiel (1992) suggests Middle Eastern Christians' general affinity
for Latin American countries may have come in part due to “the possibility of living
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in accordance with their religious beliefs”, where in Latin America Catholicism was
prominent (p. 379). 4 Of Syro-Lebanese migrants, males outnumbered females, with
anywhere from only two out of ten immigrants being women, to almost twice as many
males as females making the trek (depending on sources consulted) (Khater, 2001, p.
70; Klich, 1992, p. 253). Married migrants often sent for their families once they had
saved enough for their travel fare (sometimes up to 12 years later) (Valverde, 1992, p.
314).
José Luis Sahyoun, 5 co-owner of the family-owned and run Lebanese
restaurant Cheff Iusef in the upscale, trendy neighborhood of Palermo, recounted
during our interview that his grandfather immigrated to Argentina after the Second
World War, and later returned to Lebanon for his wife and one of six children. In the
case of single Syro-Lebanese immigrant men, some married within the Syro-Lebanese
population in Buenos Aires. Iusef Sahyoun's wife, for example, had a Syrian father
and Lebanese mother. The majority of single Syro-Lebanese men in Argentina,
however, married exogamousl, meaning they married women of non-Syro-Lebanese
background.

Motives for Emigration from Greater Syria
Akram Khater (2001) says that many early emigrants from Greater Syria “expected to
land somewhere, work for a while to gather money, and return home to live the good
life” (p. 71). Yet, these migrants left for a multitude (and often a combination) of
reasons that extended beyond a search for more abundant economic opportunities.
Religious persecution and a desire for greater political freedom were among the
powerful push- factors in emigration. Here I entertain a few popular postulates in

4 Whereas a predominantly Catholic environ ment may arguably have been friendlier to Eastern
Christians rather than one of Protestant predominance, or one being areligiou s or secular, SyroLebanese Christians nevertheless felt compelled to alter their religious practices to seem mo re palatable
to a scrutinizing and xenophobic non-Arab elite.
5 Sahyoun is hijo de libanés (son of Lebanese). Amira, founder and cook of Oasis, La Cocina de Amira
(Oasis, A mira's Kitchen), a Syrian eatery of mixed patronage in the neighborhood of Montserrat, said
the term “hijo/a de” is used for first generation immigrants. Amira immig rated 19 years ago to
Argentina from Yab roud, Syria (the same area fro m where former Argentinean President Carlos
Menem's family co mes) and has four children. I am unsure whether her husband is of Syrian
background as well, nevertheless all her children are referred to as “hijos de”.
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greater detail.
Religious persecution is one theory for Syro-Lebanese emigration (Issawi,
1992; Bruckmayr, 2010; Kawakibi, 2010) —specifically, Maronites suffering at the
hands of Druze and Ottoman Muslims. However, Estela Valverde (1992) insists that
“Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims [from Greater Syria] all share the same historical
memory” (p. 314). Regardless of faith or practice, all Syro-Lebanese emigrants
supposedly believed themselves to be the victim of some sort of (religious) oppression
and violence. Perhaps there is some truth to this. Charles Issawi (1992) explains that
“[i]n the first few decades of the nineteenth century, geographical Syria, including
Lebanon, was the scene of many regional and international conflicts” (p. 13).
In 1839, the Ottoman Empire instated major reforms in attempts to quell
nationalist and sectarian tendencies, as well as shore up weakening borders. This
period was known as the Tanzimat (Reorganization). Among other changes, Sultan
Abdul Mejid “granted full religious and judicial equality to all citizens regardless of
religion”, “declared that military service would henceforth take in all Ottoman
subjects”, and “promised that taxation would be according to financial capacity and
within the limits of the law” (Hershlag, 1964, p. 31). Additionally, the Hatt-i Serif of
Gulhane 6 attempted to mitigate corruption, reform the educational, legal, and
institutional systems, decriminalize homosexuality, and promote Ottoman
nationalism. Such moves were intended to mostly integrate non-Muslim and nonTurkish imperial citizens through greater civil liberties and equal status before the
law. However, contrary to the theory that pits Muslims and Druze against Christians
under Ottoman rule (Fawaz, 1994; Angold, 2006; Sorenson, 2009; Firro, 1992),
Ussama Makdisi says that divisions within the Ottoman Empire prior to the
Reorganization period existed more along the lines o f educated and uneducated. In
“Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth-

6The Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane (or Hatt-i Sharif of Gulhane) o f 1839 is translated as “Noble Edict of the
Rose Chamber”. According to Victor Roudometof (2001) in Nationalism, Globalization and
Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans, the edict guaranteed all Ottoman
subjects “security of life, honor, and property” regardless of religion (p. 84). Trials were also to be
made public, confiscation was to be outlawed, taxat ion was to be systemized and military conscription
put in place (p.84).
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Century Ottoman Lebanon” he says, “...in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century
Mount Lebanon was demarcated at the most basic level by the distinction between
supposedly knowledgeable elites and ignorant commoners. Knowledge and ignorance
were the metaphors that defined political and social relations” (Makdisi, 2000, p.
183). Makdisi (200) reasons that, therefore, Druze and Maronites of the same class
maintained their class loyalties (as opposed to pledging allegiance to their respective
religious categories), so long as neither side made attempts to proselytize, for religion
was a private matter.
Eventually, the Tanzimat lost much of its administrative efficacy following the
Crimean War between the Russian Empire on one side, and the Kingdom of Sardinia,
the allied British, Ottoman and French empires on the other. The Charter of 1856
granted greater sovereignty for minority groups within the Ottoman Empire, which
then strengthened both the political and economic power of the Christian middle
class. By contrast, Muslims gained little either politically or economically. The
inhabitants of Lebanon reshuffled and realigned allegiances as the new order ra n
against the Tanzimat's declaration of equality among all Ottoman subjects.
Capitalizing on the confusion, the French promised protection to the Maronites and
the British courted the Druze. Ottoman officials claimed neutrality. At the suggestion
of the European powers, Lebanon was partitioned into Druze and Maronite sections, a
division which would only serve to heighten existing tensions.
In 1859, a Maronite named Tanyus Shahin led what would become known as
the Keserwan uprising against the ruling elite (both Druze and Maronite) on charges
of “excessive taxation and onerous customs” (Makdisi, 2000, p. 197). Embittered
peasants sacked and burned local sheikhs' property after demands for equality
between the classes had gone unmet. The revolt exposed fault lines along Druze and
Maronite alliances, where distinct identities for both religious groups further
congealed. The very first acts of unrest were characterized as “random and
unpredictable enough to seem more the acts of lawless men than a calculated war
against other sects” (Fawaz, 1994, p. 47). As the clashes moved south, however, they
became more deliberate in nature.
What began as a religiously diverse and tolerant society under Ottoman rule
spiraled into a country riddled with religious conflict. Strictly peasant uprisings
15

against feudal lords in the north later deteriorated into communal fighting. By the time
the conflicts spread south they had metamorphosed into rifts between Maronites and
Druze, which resulted in high Christian losses. The Druze emerged victorious;
Maronites suffered some 20,000 casualties and subsequently fled for the coast
(Issawi, 1992, p. 21). 7
Akram Khater (2001) counters the argument of religious persecution as a
plausible major push- factor for emigration from Greater Syria—at least partially. He
states that early Syro-Lebanese immigrants to Argentina—who were mostly
Maronite—exaggerated the myth of religious strife in order to garner sympathy while
attempting to build a Maronite community in the mahjar (Arab diaspora) (p. 49).
During the nineteenth century, Maronite intellectuals and elites pushed to form a
Maronite nation, and to do so required spinning a tale of “defenseless victims of
persecution, oppressed by ruthless 'Turks' who extorted money from them” (p. 49).
Khater believes the intention was to win Western support, and considers such
strategies to have worked. Maronite claims were frequently validated in Westernpublished articles written by missionaries returning from Lebanon (p. 49). He goes on
to write that “documents from the Ottoman archives show that Ottoman policy toward
the Lebanese in general, and toward their emigration in particular, were hardly
uniform or oppressive” (p. 49). Furthermore, the tone and agenda of the Ottoman
administration in Mount Lebanon changed with governors, who did not enjoy a
monopoly on power. European interference and local politics had considerably
diminished the grip they had on the populations they governed (p. 50). 8
Thus, instead of fleeing Greater Syria for religious strife, Akram Khater
(2001) proffers the idea that “[p]eople...left for the Americas because they could and
because they wanted a better life” (p. 53). And “a better life” often meant greater
economic possibilities. Charles Issawi and Ignacio Klich attrib ute Syro-Lebanese
departure from Greater Syria to economic conditions, too. Several factors in particular

7 See Maroun Kisirwani's “Foreign Interference and Relig ious Animosity in Lebanon” for greater detail
on the potential motives behind mid-nineteenth century conflicts between Maronites and Druze.
8 While this theory addresses potential inaccurate portrayals of Otto man leadership a nd treat ment of the
Maronite commun ity in Greater Syria, it does not broach the reasons behind the very real conflicts
between Druze and Maronites, and how such religious strife impacted early Syro -Lebanese emigrat ion.
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made livelihood in the region difficult, including the Egyptian withdrawal from
Greater Syria under Ibrahim Pasha, plummeting international prices on agricultural
produce, a silk industry in distress, waning importance of land routes due to the
construction of the Suez Canal and low agricultural productivity (Issawi, 1992, p. 23;
Klich, 1992, p. 246). It was during this time that the population also swelled
massively as famine disappeared, death rates fell, and birth rates rose from improved
hygienic conditions. These push- factors in tandem provided much incentive to
migrate to less crowded, more prosperous destinations (Issawi, 1992, p. 23).
But social factors played an equally crucial role in early Syro-Lebanese
migration. Issawi (1992) cites four in particular: urbanization, education, conscription,
and the formation of a middle class (p. 27). He theorizes that the growth and brilliance
of such Greater Syrian cities as Beirut, Tripoli, Ba’albak, Sayda, and Zahleh enticed
these populations to look elsewhere for even more excitement and abundant economic
opportunities. Higher levels of education likewise incited emigration, as regular
contact with French, Brits, Russians and Americans piqued curiosities about the
outside world (p. 29). For a newly formed middle class with ties to a broader world
through agriculture and commerce, changes on the international scene further inspired
outward movement. Finally, economic crises at home due to global economic
fluctuations could have pushed wealthier Syro-Lebanese to look for fortune elsewhere
(p. 29).

The Nature of Buenos Aires and the Creation of a Commission for Immigration
The capital of the country to which many early Syro-Lebanese immigrants arrived
was highly urban, very cosmopolitan and quite frenetic. Argentina was formed after
the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata declared independence from Spain on July
9, 1816. Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia then separated, and what was left became
Argentina—South America's second largest country after Brazil. Most Syro-Lebanese
immigrants arrived to Argentina via the South Atlantic Ocean on the eastern coast. To
the west, north, and northeast then, are Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay,
respectively.
Prior to 1853, Buenos Aires the port city was capital only to the province of
Buenos Aires (there are 23 provinces in total), and had approximately 663,854
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inhabitants (Wilson, 1999, p. 18). Between 1853 and 1860, it was chosen as the
capital of the entire state of Argentina. In 1880, it was federalized and made the seat
of the republic's government. (From 1996 the government granted the city autonomy,
to be known thereafter as Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (the Autonomous City of
Buenos Aires) (Foster, 1998, p. 3).) From 1880 until 1887 was a period of significant
development, as the capital's first mayor Torcuato de Alvear modernized and
beautified the city with paved streets, newly planted trees a nd expanded avenues
(Wilson, 1999, p. 26). As a result of two economic booms (1884-1889 and 19051912), by 1910 the capital had reached metropolitan status (p. 19). David William
Foster (1999) says in Buenos Aires: Perspectives on the City and Cultural Production,
that the autonomous capital of Argentina became “the major commercial center of
Latin America and the major cultural center of the Spanish-speaking countries of the
region” (p. 1). Mexican philosopher, José Vasconcelos's quote echoes a popular
sentiment on the metropolis in this age: “[B]ut day by day, Buenos Aires is turning
into the center of Iberoamerican thought; Buenos Aires is our Paris, the capital of our
America” (as cited in Wilson, 1998, p. 7).
Much before Buenos Aires capital became a world-class city, however, the
province of Buenos Aires created a commission for immigration in 1824 in the name
of national progress, in order “to make Argentina's vast territory agriculturally
productive” (Civantos, 2006, p. 6). This initial immigration project particularly
targeted Northern European immigrants, although most who entered Argentina's
borders came from Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean countries or the Middle East.
In 1826, Argentina's first president Bernadino Rivadavia even offered “free p assages,
free land and start-up money” in expectation of his ideal immigrants, a political trend
that would ebb and flow with changing presidencies (Wilson, 1998, p. 19). But it was
the explosive impact of Argentina's new railroads connecting the capital to the fertile
interior during the latter half of the 19 th century that set the country's economy in
motion, solidified Buenos Aires' status as an economic heavyweight and impacted the
direction of Argentina's immigration patterns (p. 26).
What began as an initiative to provide labor in agriculture metamorphosed into
a project to supply labor wherever there was demand. Klich (1992) says, “a country
which had neither exported wheat nor frozen and chilled beef before the 1870s sought
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to increase its work- force with foreigners” (p. 243). Argentina soon offered a plethora
of work opportunities in salting and freezing plants, Buenos Aires Customs and the
newly Native-American free pampas 9 for cattle and sheep farming (Wilson, 1998, p.
19). Eventually, workers from abroad responded to the immigration call. Jean
DeLaney (1997) says that prior to 1880, few immigrants (especially Europeans) saw
largely empty and uncultivated Argentina as a beckoning host. But with “new political
stability, technological advances, the end of the Indian wars, and surging European
demand for imported food,” manifold opportunities for prosperity created a powerful
pull to which immigrants responded (DeLaney, 1997). From 1895 until 1912,
Argentina's population doubled from 3,954,911 to 7,570,400—some 6.5 million of
whom were immigrants (Wilson, 1998, p. 19). By 1914, four- fifths of Argentina's
population was of immigrant background, with most immigrants pouring in from
Spain and Italy (p. 19). Instead of moving on to agricultural areas farther north and
west, however, the majority remained in Buenos Aires.

On the Other Side: Why Buenos Aires?
Many Syro-Lebanese who landed in Argentina went with intentions to “hacer(se) la(s)
América(s)”, much the same as other immigrants. 10 Many of these migrants often left
village life as agricultural laborers and peasants in Greater Syria to pick up jobs in
Buenos Aires in commerce—and to a lesser extent, industry. 11 In the beginning waves
of immigration “hacer America” for the Syro-Lebanese usually translated into
hawking: selling “buttons and lace, thread and needles, crosses and mementos from
the ‘Holy Land’” out of a kashshi (a trunk used for hawking, and a term derived from
the Portuguese word caixa, meaning box (Khater, 2001, p. 72; Rowe, 2010, p. 39).
Yet, peddling was feasible for early immigrants as it “did not require a great deal of

9 The plains encompassing the Rio de la Plata estuary.
10 The term “hacer la A mérica” refers to the phenomenon by which those migrants to North and South
America “made it b ig” financially. They took advantage of lucrative work opportunities to amass
wealth in their new ho me, opportunities such as in 1900s agriculture in Argentina or the oil industry in
the United States.
11 Many Syrian-Lebanese immigrants arrived to the port of Buenos Aires and continued north and
west, to cities such as Tucuman, Rosario and Cordoba. Foster says “many Middle Eas terner immig rants
settled [in the west] because of geographic similarity to their homelands” (Foster 12).
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capital, training or skill” (Khater, 2001, pp. 75,78). Other factors, such as a lack of
general support from Argentine state and society, a desire to rapidly accumulate
wealth, and challenges with procuring land may have also influenced a decision to
peddle, although peddling was often poorly viewed (Jozami, 1996, p. 70). Peddlers
had a reputation for being dishonest, because fewer expenses allowed them to
undercut competing shop owners' prices (Valverde, 1992, p. 317).
Still, the opportunities of hawking in Buenos Aires expedited upward mobility
among the Syro-Lebanese. Civantos quotes Carl Solberg in saying that, 'Levantine
immigrants in Argentina experienced spectacular economic success after 1900. By
1910 the so-called Turcos owned at least 6,900 businesses scattered throughout the
republic' (as cited by Civantos, 2006, p. 9). Most began as itinerant salesman, who
then went on to own their own shops. Today many still maintain small businesses,
such as restaurants and dance schools. While conducting fieldwork in Buenos Aires,
on a number of occasions I chose a neighborhood to explore on foot with the
expectation of finding hidden (or conspicuous) Syro-Lebanese presence. In this way
alone, I found nearly half a dozen restaurants in addition to those I had found through
an online search using Google, the online Yellow Pages, and Guía Óleo. 12
As well as small business owners, Klich (1992) reminds us that “[m]any Arabdescended politicians became legislators, governors, mayors and cabinet members,
and some of the children of Syro-Lebanese immigrants pursued careers in the armed
forces. Argentines of Middle Eastern parentage also joined the foreign service” (p.
254). A number of Syro-Lebanese have even gone on to become involved in politics
or major industry. Such is the case with former Argentine President, Carlos Menem of
Syrian background; Juan Luis Manzur, surgeon and former Minister of Health and
Environment; and Daniel Hadad, a successful businessman in media and
telecommunications (Civantos, 2006, p. 7). 13

12 Not all turned out to be Lebanese, however. Most were generally “Middle Eastern” places, one a
Syrian eatery, another a Palestinian restaurant, another Armen ian.
13 Other well-known Argentines of Lebanese and/or Syro-Lebanese descent include former and current
footballers Omar Asad, Julio Asad, Claudio Husain, Dario Husain, Antonio Mohamed, Sergio Aguero
(several of whom were nicknamed “El Turco” for their Arab origins); model Yamila Diaz; Alberto
Hassan, folklo ric tenor; Carlos Bala, children's actor; and Elias Sapag, Felipe Sapag, and Lu z Sapag, all
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But the possibility of making a fortune was not the only beckoning aspect of
Buenos Aires and Argentina, nor the reason for why some Syro-Lebanese immigrated
to the South American country. Valverde (1992) says “[m]any of [the immigrants] left
Lebanon with the aim of migrating to the United States and ended up in Argentina.
Others came to Argentina attracted by relatives who had arrived before, starting a
chain migration process that lasted several decades” (p. 314). The Syro-Lebanese
further found incentive in low travel fares from the Ottoman Empire to South
America, suasion by the Argentine government promoting immigration, and less
stringent health tests required by the Argentinean state than by other governments,
such as that of the United States. Frequently those who did not meet the United
States' health demands instead headed south (Klich, 1992, p. 269-270). 14

Assimilating in the Name of Progress
However, what did starting over mean for the Syro-Lebanese population in a rapidly
developing country chock- full of immigrants—especially, when as a group they did
not fit the Anglo-Saxon prototype, and were even pegged as undesirable and unable to
easily adapt to Argentine culture (Klich, 1992, p. 253)? The previous section states
that “[m]ost mid-nineteenth century Argentine statesmen believed that Argentine
progress depended upon populating the country with Europeans” (Civantos, 2006, p.
5). More specifically, Northern Europeans—who could successfully cultivate
Argentina's plentiful virgin soil. According to intellectuals such as Juan Bautista
Alberdi, Anglo-Saxons were “identified with the steamship, with commerce, and with
liberty, and it [would] be impossible to establish these things...without the active
cooperation of that progressive and cultivated race” (DeLaney, 1997). Yet, what began
in 1824 as an immigration project endeavoring to attract mostly Anglo-Saxons for
what was perceived as their superior work ethic, later deteriorated into an initiative

politicians fro m the same family.
14 The Lebanese diaspora is huge. Within South America, Lebanese immigrated to Brazil, Chile,
Argentina, Mexico, Colo mb ia and Venezuela in the most significant nu mbers. There are also Lebanese
populations in Ghana, Australia, the Ivory Coast, the United States, Canada, France, the United
Kingdom, Germany and many, many other countries.
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with aims to mainly whiten the population and atone for remaining mestizos 15 and
criollos 16 (Civantos, 2006, p. 6). 17 Discussing the ways in which early Syro-Lebanese
adapted to Argentine society requires examinatio n of two key intellectual movements
in Argentina during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Positivism and cultural
nationalism shaped the political, cultural, and social climates of the times—and often
colored Argentine society's attitude toward the immigrant, which in turn, impacted the
ways in which the Syro-Lebanese created “home” abroad in Argentina.

The Positivist Intellectual Tradition
As the preeminent intellectual movement of the country from the 1880s until the start
of the 1900s, positivism in Argentina developed as a derivative of the loosely defined
European positivist movement founded by Auguste Comte, and further expanded by
Emile Durkheim, Charles Darwin, John Stuart Mill, Herbert Spencer, et. al.
Positivism is fundamentally a philosophy in direct response to the metaphysical ideas
of the Enlightenment, one which posits that authentic knowledge can only be the
product of rigorous empirical observation and logical treatments. Generally, reliance
upon the scientific method supplants the use of intuition, with an aim to explain and
predict scientific outcomes. Positivism as applied to a burgeoning Argentina meant
“that national leaders should eschew abstract political principles in order to develop—
through observation and experimentation—policies and institutions in tune with the
peculiarities of their societies” (DeLaney, 1997). DeLaney (2002) provides the
following perspective on positivists in “Imagining 'El Ser Argentino': Cultural

15 A South American of mixed heritage, usually Native A merican and European.
16 A person of Spanish-speaking America of pure European descent, usually Spanish.
17 My research indicates that although this quote is true, it conflates the general un derstanding of
“race” in Argentina fro m the time of the establishment of the republic, until the mid -twentieth century.
Consider DeLaney's point that the term race during the mid -n ineteenth century “was cultural and
historical, rather than biological,” mean ing that individuals were not racially d ifferent “because of
inherited or genetic qualities...but because they belonged to different cultural, linguistic, and religious
traditions” (DeLaney, 1997). Thus, Juan Bautista Alberd i and others championed the immigration of
Anglo-Saxons—as DeLaney says—“not to imp rove the genetic stock of the national population, but to
help transform the work habits and customs of this native population” (1997). Racism as it applies to
discrimination on the basis of biological factors began in the later decades of the nineteenth century as
there was a rise in the “growing interest in racialist theories as a way of understanding the continent’s
backwardness vis-à-vis Europe” (1997).
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Nationalism and Romantic Concepts of Nationhood in Early Twentieth-Century
Argentina”:
[T]hey did share a general faith in science and the belief that the scientific
method could be applied to the study of human societies...[which] they saw as
an evolving organism that passed through set, pre-determined stages of
development. These stages were predictable and the same for all societies, but
positivists believed the progress of individual societies along this path differed.
To gain a deeper understanding of a given society, it was necessary to eschew
theory and all a priori knowledge in favour of either direct observation or the
search for objective historical facts. Equipped with empirical evidence,
Argentine positivists believed it would be possible to ascertain the underlying
laws that governed a society's particular development, and then to devise
political institutions and social policies appropriate to its particular needs (p.
643).
There are two key points in DeLaney's description of positivist logic worth noting:
one, every society possesses a unique character which must be directly observed and
classified (most satisfactorily by the scientific method); and two, with the peculiar
character of a nation ascertained, proper political institutions must be set in place to
guide society towards peak development. More explicitly, well- calculated and
deliberate steps ensure appropriate development at every stage in order to achieve the
greatest possible level of advancement.
Positivism equated a society's unique character with its national identity.
Arturo Ardao (1963) explains that “[t]he positivists of the '80's became the
protagonists of a national conscience, a positivism which provided the Argentinean
mind with the ideology to perform the extensive task of organizing a nationality” (p.
7). But in observing and uncovering a national Argentinean identity, what was the
immigrant's place? Where could positivism situate the millions of Mediterraneans,
Middle Easterners, Eastern Europeans, and others whom obviously were not the
Northern European immigrants these intellectuals thought would promote hard work
and innovation? In what ways did the Syro-Lebanese immigrant show up in this
dialogue?
In keeping with the scientific method, positivists went about classifying the
people of Argentina. DeLaney (2002) asserts that “[r]ace became a central element in
Argentine theorising about national character and destiny”, where “race” in the
positivist intellectual discourse referred to disparate linguistic, cultural, and religious
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traditions, as opposed to biological differences among peoples (p. 645). Civantos
takes a slightly different stance, however: “Positivism's reliance on natural science
approaches led to an insistence on conceptions of ethnic, racial, and biological
difference” (Civantos, 2006, p. 8). And more importantly, differences that were
perceived as “'natural, given, inescapable, and therefore moral'” (Mead, 1997, p. 646).
What then, were the repercussions of such categorizations for immigrants—once
classified, where did positivism position the non-Anglo-Saxon immigrant in the
conversation on national identity, and in wider Argentine society?
Whether biologically, culturally and/or ethnically divergent, Argentine
positivists cast the non-Northern European immigrant in the role of the “other”; at
times considering him or her as “an inferior, diseased, and contaminating presence”
within society, a social malaise to be treated (Civantos, 2006, p. 8). Yet, because of
Argentine positivism's loosely defined nature, intellectuals differed in their opinions
on how to manage the “other” in the task of nation and national identity building.
Some espoused a pseudo-democratic political system, whereby the state composed of
“enlightened elite” would impose rule rather than govern, and “citizens would
contribute to the general welfare...without challenging established political practices”
(DeLaney, 1997). Argentina's national government from 1880 until 1916 was
precisely so. The Autonomous National Party steered election outcomes through
“patronage, intimidation, and fraud,” all in the name of “order and progress” (1997).
As DeLaney explains,
The modern nation was, in their view, a political association based on
citizenship rather than an ethnocultural community based on putative ethnic
traits. Thus constructing the Argentine nation, they believed, was not a matter
of fortifying Argentine culture, religion, language, or traditions, or of
cultivating a mythic past—far from it. Rather, since this past was seen as an
obstacle to nation building, creating the nation consisted of instilling in the
Argentine people a common set of political beliefs that would bind them
together (1997).
Conversely, other positivists embraced more romantic notions of an organic
and unique national Argentine identity that should have been allowed to develop in
the absence of heavy-handed political institutions—a sentiment vaguely
foreshadowing future cultural nationalist ideals. Eventually, Argentine positivism
gave way to Argentine cultural nationalism well into the first decades of the 20 th
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century.

The Cultural Nationalist Intellectual Tradition
Cornell and Hartmann (1998) present nationalism as “the expressed desire of a people
to establish and maintain a self- governing political entity” (p. 34). Paul M. Johnson
qualifies this definition by asserting that the political community resulting from a
people’s desire for self-determination is a natural phenomenon, such that “the nation
and the state [are] co-extensive” and the people “have become conscious of their
national identity” (A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, 2005; Williams, 1999, p.
7). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy extends this claim on national identity
by positing that nationalism is “the attitude that the members of a nation have when
they care about their national identity” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2012).
Lynn Williams (1999), in her essay entitled “National Identity and the Nation State:
Construction, Reconstruction and Contradiction”, cautions us that there is no
consensus on what constitutes national identity. For some, it is a question of territory,
race, language or religion; for others, it is a matter of what members feel to be the
lines of demarcation for the national category to which they pledge allegiance (p. 7).
By contrast, Anthony Smith (1991) recognizes “the complex and abstract nature of
national identity”, but outlines five fundamental features which, he argues, are its
basis (National Identity, p. 14). Smith states that if we work from Western nationalists’
assumptions that nations are territorially bounded, share a common mass culture,
grant members reciprocal rights and duties under a legal system, and have some sort
of production system, then national identity entails a homeland or historic territory, a
common mass culture, a common economy, common historical memories and
common legal rights and duties for all the nation’s members. For Smith, national
identity is “multi-dimensional”, and can never be whittled down to one factor alone
(p. 14).
From this foundation then, we can establish that national identity is the way in
which a group of people comprising an “imagined community” 18 (often corresponding

18 “Imagined co mmunity” is a phrase coined by Benedict Anderson in his 1991 work entitled Imagined
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to geo-political borders) finds or constructs a powerful overarching commonality—be
it a shared language, ethnicity, history, political orientation, heritage, culture, or a
combination of these—such that they seek self-determination. For prominent cultural
nationalists, such as Manuel Gálvez, Ricardo Rojas, Mario Bravo, Ernesto Mario
Barreda, and Emilio Ortiz Grogne, Argentinean national identity equaled the
burgeoning Argentine race. In this intellectual tradition, as in positivism, race was
most often “cultural and historical rather than biological...a term denot[ing] a people
bound together by common historical memory, language, shared mental and
emotional traits” (DeLaney, 1997). Cultural nationalist Arturo O'Connor opined that
“[r]ace [was] nationality,” which determined “political evolution, sociability, religion,
philosophy, science, art, morality, history and traditions” of a people (1997).
However, DeLaney (1997) says that the ways in which “individual thinkers defined
the putatively emerging [Argentine] race and what qualities they privileged—shared
descent, language, religion, personality traits—varied enormously”. For instance,
Manuel Gálvez defined the Argentine race as Latin, and more explicitly, Spanish.
Rojas believed the Argentinean race to be a steadily developing amalgam of European
and autochthonous characteristics, which would culminate in a civilization he called
“Eurindia” (1997). How leading cultural nationalists of the time chose to define the
emerging Argentine race would affect which immigrants were absorbed or
marginalized in wider Argentine society, and thus, immigration “was at the heart of
the debate as to who constituted the true Argentine” (Wilson, 1999, p. 27).
Some cultural nationalists “shared a belief that foreign influences and the
growing immigrant population posed a threat to the nation” (DeLaney, 2002, p. 625).
In the face of cosmopolitanism, cultural nationalist Manuel Gálvez championed a
return to the nation's Spanish roots, a return to “traditional Argentine virtues such as
honesty, desinterés [selflessness], and spirituality” (DeLaney, 1997). Ethnically, the
overpowering immigrant presence challenged even the most elemental construction of
an Argentine nationality based on shared ethnic traits. So diverse was Buenos Aires
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that at times in literature it was likened to a “Babel city” (Wilson, 1999, p. 8). The
foreigner arrived to the republic “speaking foreign tongues, wearing unusual clothes,
eating different foods, and engaging in all sorts of novel (and threatening) behavior
such as labor organizing” (DeLaney, 1997).
Argentine society mirrored the anxiety some cultural nationalists felt. As early
as 1882 Victor Gálvez lamented, “Argentines do not have their own identity, being an
assimilation of people from everywhere, every kind of custom...there are no national
characteristics, no nation-people, they are fragments of many people” (as cited in
Wilson, 1999, p. 9). In 1886, Argentinean novelist Julián Martel bemoaned “the
cosmopolitanism that is taking on such grand proportions with us, to the point that we
do not know who we are, whether French or Spanish, Italian or English” (p. 8).
But the immigrant presumably threatened more than just national identity.
Argentine elites also suspected immigrants for their unfamiliar political activities.
Notorious for their lack of formal political participation in favor of “hacer”- ing la
América—so much so that Vicente Blasco once remarked that the name Buenos Aires
made “all the desperate people in the world dream”—immigrants made up the urban
working and burgeoning middle classes (as cited in Wilson, 1999, p. 9). They were
what Wilson terms “a new urban proletariat, organized into unions, with socialists,
communists, and anarchist elements” (p. 27). Immigrants were suspected of being
“avatars of radical, foreign ideologies and as carriers of racially inferior genes”
(DeLaney, 1997). In short, Argentines feared social unrest fomented by immigrants
arriving with unwelcome ideas (and genotypes).
In contrast to those who viewed immigration as contamination of the
Argentine nationality, a minority of intellectuals “argued the immigrant would help
shape the character of the new race” (DeLaney, 1997). As the Argentine nationality
was still malleable, “it would be the contribution of working-class immigrants that
would provide the Argentine personality with its distinctive qualities” (1997). Poet
Almafuerte writes of “the beautiful blond beast that Nietzsche speaks of” taking shape
out of the “Babel” that is Argentina (and Buenos Aires as a microcosm of the
republic). He predicts that it will occur “thanks to the fusion of the bloodlines, the
atavisms, the degenerations, the histories, the diverse origins that now clash...and
repel each other” (as cited in DeLaney, 1997). For him, Argentina “is a frightful
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hurley-burley that will endure for...generations until it constitutes an organism [with
a] clearly drawn body [and an] obvious, characteristic race” (1997). Leopoldo
Marechal also embraces the melting-pot of Argentina in his 1948 novel Adán
Buenosayres. In a Buenos Aires street scene he includes characters representing the
sea of immigrant nationalities present in the capital, from Basques and Andalusians, to
Neapolitans, Turks, Jews and Greeks, to Japanese, Dalmations and Syro-Lebanese (as
cited in Wilson, 1999, p. 7).
In the same vein, a healthy number of cultural nationalists and Argentines
reckoned immigration inevitable. That if it could not be halted, immigrants would
conditionally become an integral piece in the evolving Argentine race. Yet, an
acceptance of immigration as inevitable did not automatically mean the end of antiimmigrant sentiments. DeLaney (1997) reminds us that
cultural nationalists and their sympathizers accepted, albeit at times
begrudgingly, that immigration was inevitable and believed that the incoming
masses should be assimilated or "Argentinized" as completely as possible. For
these individuals...cultural nationalism represented a means of integrating the
immigrant into the national community without disrupting existing political
practices or social hierarchies. What cultural nationalism offered Argentines
was a nation-building project based on the evolution of a putative Argentine
race, rather than on political participation and the civic incorporation of
immigrants.
What were the implications of equating race and nationality for the lessdesirable immigrant generally, and the Syro-Lebanese particularly? DeLaney argues
that in most nations with high rates of immigration, ethnicity cannot be the basis for
nationality. 19 Once ethnicity becomes central to national identity, the foreigner is
never fully integrated into society (DeLaney, 1997). 20 Civantos echoes these concerns
when she poses the questions: “If one is considered part of a nation by origin—by
language, culture, or ethnicity...[w]hat occurs...in a case such as Argentina's in which

19 In current academic terms, race and ethnicity are not the same. (See chapter two for a discussion of
their differences.) However, because cultural nationalists saw race as “cultural and historical, rather
than biological,” this understanding of the term most closely corresponds to the present -day's accepted
definit ion of ethnicity.
20 For an interesting discussion on what constitutes nationality in the modern wo rld, see the BBC's “On
Air: Ho w Do you Define Nat ionality?” at http://worldhaveyoursay.wordpress.com/2008/ 08/ 26/on-airhow-do-you-define-nationality/. It is part of its “World Have Your Say” segment.

28

immigrant assimilation is the means of forming the b ulk of the national community—
when the national subject is not necessarily born an Argentine, but becomes
one?”(Civantos, 2006, p. 156). The operative word in Civantos's inquiry is
“assimilation”. Rather than relegating the “other” to the fringes of Argentine society,
cultural nationalists and subsequently, the Argentine state and society during this
period sought to mold the immigrant to fit their vision of the ideal Argentine race
(DeLaney, 1997). Assimilation and discrimination were the primary tools.

Discrimination and Assimilation Against the Syro-Lebanese in Argentina
Klich says the pervasive anti- foreigner sentiment—which did not “spare Spaniards
and Italians”—was considerably more vitriolic towards the “least desirable”
immigrants (Klich, 1992, p. 261). “Least desirable” usually referred to “Semitic
immigrants—whether Christian Arabs, Eastern European Jews, Muslim Arabs, or
Arab Jews” (Civantos, 2006, p. 8). This deprecating categorization had the most
profound impact on the ways in which the Syro-Lebanese adapted to Argentine
society. According to Carl Solberg, Argentines in the early 1900s looked upon Syrian,
Jewish, and other immigrants from the Middle East “with a dislike approaching
disgust” (p. 9). Civantos says newspaper articles at this time frequently condemned
these groups as “inherently disease-ridden, immoral, and lazy”, persons who “had
deteriorated biologically to such low levels that they could contribute nothing to the
improvement of the mestizo” (p. 9). Government officials sometimes echoed these
racist sentiments using harsh descriptions for Arabs, such as “dirty and ragged”,
unrepresentative of “an efficient socio-economic factor”, a people who contributed
minimally to national consumption, and whose production was even less (Klich, 1992,
p. 262).
In addition to verbal attacks, the Argentinean state openly discriminated
against immigrants from the Middle East. Juan Bautista Alberdi, a prominent liberal
of Generation '37, 21 a political theorist and proponent of immigration to Argentina for

21 Civantos says, “[t]he Generation of '37 was a group of young writers and intellectuals who held in

common the desire to rid the Argentine provinces of Rosas and the caudillo system in general”
(Civantos, 2006, p. 33).
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the nationalist project, at one time advised refusal of entry to those immigrants from
Asia, Africa and—what he deemed—less favorable regions of Europe (Klich, 1992, p.
260). No formal legislation was ever created to specifically ban Arab immigrants'
entry to Argentina; yet in 1910, the Senate passed a resolution to require more
stringent immigration legislation to, as Klich suggests, “among other things...deny
entry to the Syro-Lebanese” (as cited in Civantos, 2006, p. 12). Instead, Arab
immigrants were denied entry to Argentina on such grounds as carrying trachoma.
Some Argentine consulates abroad were also instructed to restrict “unwanted
immigration” by way of reference to Article 3 of Law 817, which “restrict[ed]
'dissolute or useless immigration'” (Civantos, 2006, p. 12). And if “undesirable”
foreigners were suspected of militancy or fomenting unrest, they could have been
deported under either the Residence Law of 1902 or the Law of Social Defense of
1910 (DeLaney, 1997).
What is more, the Argentine government did not subsidize Syro-Lebanese
emigrants’ travel from Lebanon, did not offer them accommodation at the Immigrants’
Hotel upon arrival to Argentina, or free passage to their final destination once in
country (Klich, 1992, p. 268). However, such services were afforded Italian, Spanish,
German, and other European migrants by the Migration and Colonization Law No.
817. It was not until 1939 that the Syro-Lebanese could actually use facilities for
Europeans, because immigration by then had slowed down considerably (p. 315).
Civantos (2006) also notes that “[t]he benefit of equal protection under the law was
also routinely denied to the Syro-Lebanese” (p. 11). She explains that the number of
murders of Arabic speakers in Argentina increased in the early 1900s, and the
perpetrators of these homicides were often given impunity (p. 11).
Where the Argentine state did not discriminate against the Syro-Lebanese, it
employed assimilationist policies to force cultural integration. Argentine assimilat ion
was predicated on the notion that “an ethnocultural community equated nationality
with a bundle of cultural or ethnic characteristics” (DeLaney, 1997). Foreigners could
not pledge their allegiance to the nation through a political commitment, such as t he
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process of naturalization. Instead, they had to acquire Argentine-ness, assuming the
unique and organic “spirit” of the land. DeLaney says, “Argentinization entailed a
process more akin to a spiritual transformation by which the immigrant became—
through some mystical process—bound to the nation” (1997). Education to inculcate
the foreigner was hardly “mystical”, yet “elites focused on patriotic education as a
means of converting immigrants - or at least their children - into loyal Argentines”
(DeLaney, 2002, p. 639).
The period during which positivist Ramos Mejía presided over the Consejo
Nacional de Educación (National Council of Education) (1908-1912), Argentine
schools utilized texts authored by Argentines only, adopted a daily pledge of
allegiance, and frequently held civic festivals (DeLaney, 2002, p. 641). The newly
adopted curriculum in schools focused on “Argentine history, the Spanish language,
Argentine literature, Argentine geography, and moral instruction, and [sought] to
inculcate in all immigrant children a love for the nation and an understanding of
Argentine traditions” (DeLaney, 1997). Cultural nationalist Ricardo Rojas espoused
such an educational reform, as he believed it to be “instrumental in the effort to
'define the national conscience' and bring about a 'real and fecund patriotism'” (1997).
Valverde (1992) informs us that “all non-Spanish speaking migrants had to learn the
language and forget their own” (p. 319). For many cultural nationalists, assimilation
was the only acceptable way in which immigrants joined the Argentine race. A
representative in the 1890 Congress of Argentina commented
I do not mean to say that foreigners should not come, but that respecting the
national spirit, he should leave out the passions that he had there in the home
country and that he should not come here to carry out double politics [;] we
shall not consent to a man having two homelands [;] they should learn, when
they choose the noble appellation of Argentine, that this homeland should be
loved with exclusivism. (as cited in Civantos, 2006, p. 157)
The Syro-Lebanese Response to Discrimination and Assimilation
If we consult the work of Ignacio Klich (1992), collectively the Syro-Lebanese
submitted gracefully to the two- fold pressure of conformity. Concerns that the
“'ferocious individual and barbarian'” was incapable of bending to the will of the
Argentine nation were unfounded (p. 267). Klich says Syro-Lebanese assimilation to
Argentine society was rapid and successful, perhaps owing in part to the high number
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of Christians arriving from Greater Syria, the high frequency of exogamous marriage,
and Middle Easterners' resemblance to Mediterranean immigrants (p. 253). Valverde
(1992) offers that “[t]he assimilationist policy made the migrants feel inadequate in
their own ethnicity [and [t]o keep the external markers of ethnicity meant to keep their
most obvious differences” (Klich, 1992, p. 253; Valverde, 1992, p. 320).
Thus, early immigrants translated, Romanized or approximated in Spanish
their last names: Habib became Amado, Harb changed to Guerra, Said to Felix, or
Farah to Farías. Muslims embraced Catholicism and baptized their children, giving
rise to the term católico musulmán (Catholic-Muslim). Use of the Arabic language in
the capital was slowly replaced with communication entirely in Spanish. Orthodox
Christians attempted to downplay that priests within their faith could marry, and other
churches changed their name to some version of a “Catholic” moniker, such as the
Holy Eastern Orthodox Church of Antioch, which became the Catholic Apostolic
Church of Antioch (Klich, 1992, pp. 255-258). Iglesia San Marón (the Church of
Saint Maroun), which I visited during my research in Buenos Aires, is one of many
iglesias católicas maronitas (Catholic Maronite churches) worldwide that grew out of
the Maronite tradition in Lebanon. The church was founded by Saint Maroun at the
end of the fourth century A.D.
But the Syro-Lebanese also took steps to create a sense of community and
continuity of Greater Syrian culture and tradition in their host country. Scholar Albert
Hourani (1992) says that
As the Lebanese communities grew, they began to generate their own needs:
workshops and shops to import or produce the ingredients of the Lebanese
cuisine, and Arabic newspapers and periodicals, published in Brooklyn, Sao
Paulo or Buenos Aires, which gave news both of the 'old country' and of the
new communities, and helped to create and maintain a separate identity in
them. (p. 8)
Liliana Cazorla of Museo Roca in Buenos Aires states that “[w]hile the Spanish and
Italian immigrant groups organized ethnic institutions shortly upon their arrival, the
Syrian-Lebanese took some time” (p. 1). Once they did begin setting up cultural
organizations, however, first they founded ethnic newspapers (e.g. As-salam and
Jaridat ar-rabita al-wataniya as-suriya), and later civic societies for charity or joint
aid, such as Fundación Sirio Libanesa para la Salud and Hospital Sirio Libanés (pp.
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1-2). In 1928, the Syro-Lebanese community created the Patronato Sirio-Libanés
(Syrian-Lebanese Board), which dealt with community issues and served as a liaison
between the Syro-Lebanese group and greater Argentine society (Valverde, 1992, p.
315). During the early years, some of these organizations were the domain of men
only. Syro-Lebanese women then founded their own organizations, such as Damas de
la Misericordia de San Marón (Sisters of the Mercy of Saint Maroun) and Asociación
Ortodoxa Femenina de Beneficencia (Women's Orthodox Association for Charity).
Organizations also began exclusive to Syro-Lebanese immigrants, and later opened to
the children and grandchildren of these members (Cazorla, p. 3). In addition to civic
organizations, Syro-Lebanese newcomers could look to their settled counterparts for
loans and apprenticeships in trades they would later take up as livelihood in
Argentina. Sometimes the new foreigners were given merchandise along with a
kashshi to sell in ambulatory occupations (Valverde, 1992, p. 315). Thus, why did the
Syro-Lebanese assimilate? Klich (1992) perfectly captures the essence of this
collective decision: “Assimilation would allow offspring to aspire to leadership of the
country” (p. 253).
And what does it really mean to assimilate? The Syro-Lebanese assimilated to
Argentine society by Romanizing and translating their last names, denying the use of
Arabic and instead using Spanish and modifying their religious beliefs, among many
other ways. These are the outward manifestations of assimilation. Yet, on a
fundamental, personal level of identity, assimilation means distancing oneself from an
ethnic discourse (to claim another or perhaps, none at all). Effectively, assimilation
can be interpreted as the divorcing of oneself from an ethnicity one claimed once
upon a time. What then, is ethnicity?
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Chapter Two: What is Ethnicity?
Examining ethnicity begs first defining the concept. In exploring how one forms an
ethnic identity in a global context, I draw from theories by Max Weber, Stephen
Cornell and Douglas Hartmann, Eugene E. Roosens, Fredrik Barth, Jean Comaroff
and John Comaroff, among other social scientists. I conclude the theoretical tour
ethnic identity with the assertion that identifying oneself in ethnic terms is not
necessary—that other identities, such as nationality and race, may suffice. Prevalent
racial/ethnic intermixing among members of a society or even a history of
assimilation among an ethnic group can influence the ways in which one selfidentifies. Members of the Lebanese Diaspora in Buenos Aires may experience
feelings of loss, displacement and nostalgia, which inspire a strong enough emotional
motive to claim Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity. Nevertheless, a city with a history of
massive immigration and assimilationist policies, in conjunction with high rates of
miscegenation may leave many members devoid of an emotional connection to
Lebanon. They may lack any real interest or incentive in expressing LebaneseArgentine ethnic identity. I use Livio Sansone's study of Bahia, Brazil in Blackness
Without Ethnicity as a guide.

Defining the Terms
Ethnic identity is “a dynamic, multidimensional construct that refers to one’s identity,
or sense of self as a member of an ethnic group...” (Trimble and Dickson). The
operative word here is identity, which Zygmunt Bauman and Benedetto Vecchi (2004)
acknowledge as “very evasive and slippery, almost an a priori” (p. 15). Stuart Hall
(2000) addresses these complications when he offers his post-structuralist definition
of the term:
I use 'identity' to refer to the meeting point, the point of suture, between on the
one hand the discourses and practices which attempt to 'interpellate', speak to
us or hail us into place as the social subjects of particular discourses, and on
the other hand, the processes which produce subjectivities, which constrict us
as subjects which can be 'spoken'. Identities are thus points of temporary
attachment to the subject, positions which discursive practices construct for us
(see Hall, 1995). They are the result of a successful articulation or 'chaining' of
the subject into the flow of the discourse...[I]dentities are never unified and, in
late modern times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but
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multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic,
discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical
historicization, and are constantly in the process of change and transformation.
(p. 19)
According to Hall (2000), identity is the dynamic seam at which we align ourselves
with external discourses on a plethora of stances: religion, diet, race, ethnicity,
nationality, political ideology, gender, sex, age, occupation. Such external discourses
can manifest as “veganism”, “Buddhism”, “Costa Rican- ism”, “intellectualism”,
“libertarianism”, “male- ness”, “woman-ness”, “whiteness”. We can be attracted to
these discourses or be the subject of their projections; yet for Hall, it is only at the
point at which we simultaneously articulate our allegiance (wittingly or unwittingly)
to these particular on-going conversations that constitutes “identity”. For example,
one may have the identities of a thirty-something, Mexican-French, female and
woman engineer, of libertarian political leanings and preferences for an organic,
whole foods diet. These identities are precisely so because the subject has aligned
herself with these particular discourses, and has, in some manner, indicated her
subscription to them. 22 An indication of a subscription can be intentional or
unintentional. By virtue of having an olive complexion and brown, wavy hair, one
may unwittingly articulate allegiance to the dialogue surrounding the notion of being
“Mediterranean”.
Within the same subject/performer identities are also often overlapping—or
even contradictory. Hall (2000) says, “identities are never unified and, in late modern
times, increasingly fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed
across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and

22 It is worth pointing out that we can have discourses projected on to us; but this does not constitute a
step in identity-making. It is more a process of categorization, which does have an impact on how we
identify ourselves. For instance, race can be a discourse (and never is the discourse exactly the same): a
very simp listic idea of “b lackness” in the United States can mean brown skin, a broad nose, coiled hair,
full lips, “acting black”, innate rhythm, speaking Ebonics . On the contrary, elsewhere the basic
conversation might be of poverty, music with beats rooted in Africa, samba, kinky hair, bro wn skin. To
a large extent, our phenotype is not a choice. Thus, discourses such as race, that rely heavily on
characteristics such as phenotype are often ones projected onto subjects, whether these subjects
actively align with them or not. An Australian Aborig ine may be the subject of an imposed “blackness”
discourse, whether this is “accurate” or not.
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positions” (p. 19). More explicitly, discourses and subscriptions to discourses can be
in constant flux, both predicated on time and location. We could ponder: What was the
conversation on being Lebanese immediately after the creation of the Lebanese state
in 1943, when citizens had for so long considered themselves inhabitants of Greater
Syria? What did it mean to be Lebanese after the Lebanese civil war, which lasted
from 1975 until 1990? How does a dialogue on being Lebanese in Ghana compare
with one on being from Lebanon, yet living in Australia? A subject/performer of an
identity may subscribe to a discourse for a lifetime; yet, because this discourse
changes due to time and place, the “suture” at which they meet (read: identity) can
also change. In this light, ethnicity is a kind of identity, but how does it differ from
any other way to attach oneself and perform allegiances to a discourse? And why does
it merit its own study? Briefly recounting the evolution of the term is fundamental in
answering these questions. I begin with Max Weber.
German sociologist Max Weber (1978) provides one of the earliest nods to the
concept of ethnic identity. In Economy and Society, he introduces us to ethnic groups
when he posits
We shall call 'ethnic groups' those human groups that entertain a subjective
belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of
customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration...[i]t
does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. Ethnic
membership (Gemeinsamkeit) differs from the kinship group precisely by
being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the
latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only
facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the po litical sphere. (p.
389)
There is notable distinction between an ethnic group and ethnic membership. For
Weber, groups are intentionally cohesive units that exist for carrying out an agenda,
such as political action. The action this group takes is depende nt on group members'
active knowledge of their participation. A membership, however, is by default
inclusion in a line- up of other similar beings without any necessarily apparent cause.
Ethnic memberships can serve as the basis for an ethnic group, which, for Weber, is a
collective of people who believe they have a shared past that somehow manifests in
common present-day physical attributes, social customs and/or historical memories.
Stephen Cornell and Douglas Hartmann (1998) in Ethnicity and Race: Making
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Identities in a Changing World concur. A shared past implies group members are
conscious of a particular point (or points) in history or genealogy from which the
thread of their present ethnic identity runs (p. 17).
Eugeen E. Roosens (1989) adds that
An ethnic group is, first of all, a form of social organization in which
the participants themselves make use of certain cultural traits from
their past, a past which may or may not be verifiable historically. It
may well be that, in certain cases, the actors impute these cultural traits
to themselves...[c]ultural traits that are postulated as external emblems
(clothing, language, etc.) or even as fundamental values (e.g.
faithfulness in friendship) can thus be taken from one's own tradition or
from other people's or simply may be created. (p. 12)
Like Weber, Roosens argues that a shared past is at the root of an ethnic group, and
that this shared past manifests as present-day cultural traits. These common cultural
markers which Roosens mentions—be they customs, behavior, phenotype, dress,
etc.—echo Weber's suggestion that ethnic groups are “human groups that entertain a
subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or
of customs or both” (Weber, 1978, p. 389). What is more, “[t]he cultural traits by
which an ethnic group defines itself never comprise the totality of the observable
culture but are only a combination of some characteristics that the actors ascribe to
themselves and consider relevant. These traits can be replaced by others in the course
of time” (Roosens, 1989, p. 12). That is, an ethnic group is not encased by a fixed set
of evident cultural traits distinguishing it from other ethnic groups. Rather, the
boundaries between ethnic groups, which are composed of cultural markers, are
permeable and mutable. Ethnicity as a kind of identity is comprised of discourses
which inevitably change over time.
Roosens further adds that the shared past of an ethnic group need not be real,
or even attributable to the group which currently references it. For example, in the
case of African-Americans, slavery is still a very specific and potent historical
phenomenon that resides in collective African-American memory, and thus has the
power to link together every descendant thereafter, as well as to the wider notion of
being “African-American”. A link to this United States historical event helps create an
ethnic identity that stands in contrast to other ethnicities also “black”, such as the
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Jamaican-American ethnicity or even first generation “African”-American ethnicity,
where the parents emigrate from Africa (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, p. 19). By
contrast to an actual shared past, some pockets of African-Americans base their ethnic
identity in part on (sometimes romantic) notions of perceived “African”-ness. Their
ethnicity is a simulation of what it means to be from a specific (or sometimes more
than one) place in Africa (much like what I postulate of the construction of LebaneseArgentine ethnic identity in Buenos Aires). The Atlantic slave trade often severed all
ties to the “homeland” 23 linguistically, culturally and historically. Descendant
generations of these early African immigrants to North America—who originated
from various parts of Africa—therefore, in wanting to construct an ethnicity rooted in
“African”-ness, sometimes pull distinctive piece- meal identity markers, often from
disparate milieux: the dashiki, Swahili, the ankh, kente cloth, references to the
Kingdom of Kush, historically Muslim names (popular in Muslim- majority African
countries) and perhaps polemically, the Afro. All of these markers point to an often
hazy “past” in collective African-American memory. Africa as a notion (and any
symbols associated with Africa) represents a figurative past, because in the
chronological movement of slaves across the Atlantic Ocean, “Africa” came before
“America”. It does not matter that the specific ethnic markers of Africa that some
African-Americans reference today may only be contemporary. This phenomenon
illustrates Roosens' point that ethnicity need not stem from an actual shared past, yet,
can be constructed from historical scratch (Roosens, 1989, p. 10).
Weber (1978) goes on to say that “[i]t does not matter whether or not an
objective blood relationship exists” among members of an ethnic group (p. 389).
According to this understanding, ethnicity could be no more than social conditioning
or indoctrination. Beyond being based on biological ties, ethnic identity is a belief, a
feeling of belonging to a particular category for displaying certain attributable cultural

23 I use “homeland” to refer to the continent of Africa, as slaves in the Atlantic slave trade were sold
and taken fro m all over Africa (however, mainly fro m the West). Because many African -A mericans do
not know fro m where exactly their b lood ties originated on the continent, ethnic markers fro m any
African country are fair game. To read in greater depth on the Atlantic slave trade, Hugh Thomas' The
Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade: 1440-1870 offers a very comprehensive
examination.
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traits. As Roosens (1989) argues, “nobody could maintain that ethnic identity is a
'feeling' that is determined by genes or by 'the blood'” (p. 16). It is doubtless ethnicity
requires—on some level—conviction in the categorization, yet, is it enough to simply
“feel” included in an ethnic group in order to claim its ethnicity, or to believe to be
part of its shared past? This begs greater clarity: how does the relationship between an
ethnic group and the world beyond its boundaries help to constitute its existence? Is
ethnicity emic, etic, or both? Is it as Cornell and Hartmann claim (1998), that
“[e]thnic groups are self- conscious populations; they see themselves as distinct” (p.
19)?
Much like Weber's distinction between ethnic group and ethnic membership,
according to Cornell and Hartmann (1998), “[o]thers may assign to us an ethnic
identity, but what they establish by doing so is an ethnic category. It is our own claim
to that identity that makes us an ethnic group. The ethnic category is externally
defined, but the ethnic group is internally defined” (p. 20). Although outsiders cannot
establish an ethnic group by acknowledging the differences between themselves and
the “other”, this backdrop of awareness is a necessary foil against which an ethnic
group defines itself. Otherwise, it is like, as Bateson (1979) says, “the sound from one
hand clapping” (p. 78). Roosens (1989) agrees: “Distinction should be made between
ethnic organization of a group and the ethnic identification of individuals and, on the
other hand, the so-called objective, perceivable, investigable culture by which the
ethnic group was conceptually defined up until the late 1960s” (p. 12). Trimble and
Dickson explain that “[e]thnic identity is usually contextual and situational because it
derives from social negotiations where one declares an ethnic identity and then
demonstrates acceptable and acknowledged ethnic group markers to others. One’s
ethnic declaration often is open to the scrutiny of others who may validate or
invalidate the declaration”.
But a word about boundaries: We must reiterate that ethnic boundaries are
permeable and mutable. According to Fredrik Barth (1969) in Ethnic Groups and
Boundaries,

…boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them...categorical
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ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of mobility, contact and
information, but do entail social processes of exclusion and incorporation
whereby discrete categories are maintained despite changing participation and
membership in the course of individual life histories (p. 9).
There are two critical points to take away from Barth's quote. First, ethnic
groups are not rigid, and do not develop or exist in a vacuum. As Gregory Bateson
(1979) says, “It takes at least two somethings to create a difference” (p. 78). Roosens
(1989) may posit that acculturation erodes differences; however, new ones
deliberately emerge in their place (p. 9). Cornell and Hartmann (1998) say that “[a]n
ethnic group cannot exist in isolation[;] [i]t has meaning only in a context that
involves others—ultimately, in a collection of peoples of which it is only a part” (p.
20). Second, an initial reading of Barth's quote may render an interpretation that
ethnic boundaries are fixed, and it is the subjects/performers of ethnic identity who
are not. Instead, they move in and out of lines of demarcation that never budge. Barth
says that distinctions between ethnic categories arise from active social processes to
exclude and incorporate other participants, participation turnover notwithstanding.
Yet, ethnic identity is not only a “thing” delineated by people, it is not just a piece of
surveyed land. If we reference Hall's (2000) post-structuralist definition of 'identity',
we remember that “it is the meeting point...between on the one hand the discourses
and practices which attempt to 'interpellate'...and on the other hand, the processes
which produce subjectivities, which constrict us as subjects which can be 'spoken'” (p.
19). From this perspective, we can view ethnic identity as we would light according to
the theory of quantum mechanics: it is both particle and wave. Ethnicity exists within
and without people, at once impervious to time and place, yet also inextricably
chained to it. It is this dual nature that allows the propagation of an ethnic identity
through time and across distance, even when members of an ethnic group move in and
out of its boundaries. Likewise, this duality gives flexibility to the expression of the
ethnic identity itself, hence its mutable and permeable borders. Jean Phinney shares a
similar understanding of ethnicity when she asserts that “[ethnic identity] is not a
fixed categorization, but rather is a fluid and dynamic understanding of self and ethnic
background. Ethnic identity is constructed and modified as individuals become aware
of their ethnicity, within the large (sociocultural) setting” (as cited in Trimble and
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Dickson). Likewise, Sansone (2003) offers that “[e]thnic identity is...a never-ending
story”, and that “[p]erhaps one should use the term 'ethnicization', instead of
ethnicity...which stresses that we are dealing with a dynamic rather than an entity” (p.
3).
But ethnic peripheries are not only the product of their subjects/performers.
Roosens (1989) informs us that “for the vindication of the ethnic group, it is sufficient
that a social border be drawn between itself and similar groups by means of a few
cultural emblems and values that make it different in its own eyes and in the eyes of
others” (p. 12). These “few cultural emblems and values” are markers of an ethnic
group given significance by the recognition of both members and non- members.
Ethnicity is then, both emic and etic; however, perhaps not equally so.
Yet, what happens when members of an ethnic group are physically separated
from their original context and situation, such as those Lebanese and their progeny in
the diaspora? How do they negotiate and demonstrate their ethnic identity via
reference to ethnic markers in a new and often diverse cultural environment?
According to Livio Sansone, the key is in understanding globalization.

Globalization and Ethnicity
Livio Sansone (2003) cites Vermeulen when saying that “globalization enables the
worldwide dissemination of symbols that are associated with a number of local
identities and individual characteristics” (p. 4). The process of Americanization is a
particularly potent example of this argument. Once purely American symbols, the
golden arches of McDonald's, as well as the white cursive against red of the CocaCola logo are now ubiquitous. However, symbols need not be only visual or even
aural. Cultural markers can include the ways in which we relate to others, our eating
habits or ideologies. Sansone attributes this phenomenon to what Jan Nederveen
Pieterse has termed “global memory”, where pockets of disparate world populations
reference similar ethnic discourses which manifest as symbols from “the same symbol
bank” (p. 5). Sansone argues that ethnic identity no longer has to correspond to certain
areas on the map: “nowadays, black, Muslim, and Indian identities can no longer be
perceived independently of globalization” (p. 5). They are no longer location-specific.
Certainly, globalization plays a profound role in democratizing access to the
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now worldwide symbol bank. Yet, humans have always moved about for reasons
such as trade, displacement from natural disasters or the need to escape religious or
ethnic persecution. Cases- in-point: The Silk Routes in use from the first century BCE
until approximately 1400, which laced together parts of Asia, Africa, the
Mediterranean and Europe; the eruption of the Soufrière Hills volcano on the island of
Montserrat in 1997, which led many to flee to the United Kingdom; and the expulsion
of the Moriscos from Spain into North Africa by King Phillip III in 1609 are three
such examples from history. However, the 21 st century world as a network of nationstates is particularly marked with human uprootedness and transplantation. Citizens
become refugees in countries of asylum (or simply emigrate) as a result of failed
states and civil wars (e.g. Lebanon, Somalia and Bosnia); multinational corporations
send management from the Global North into the Global South (e.g. Shell/Royal
Dutch, IBM and Nike); and the ill vestiges of colonialism, neo-colonialism and neoimperialism, such as political instability and economic stagnation, encourage massive
immigration to mostly Western countries (e.g. Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian
immigration to France and other European countries; Mexican immigration into the
United States; and Jamaican immigration to the United Kingdom, the United States
and Canada). That is not to mention more temporary forms of relocation, such as
tourism and study abroad.
Still, globalization goes beyond the increased shuffling of human bodies. The
transfer of human bodies means the transfer of ethnic symbols that once corresponded
most specifically to a concrete location. And although the debke will always be tied
to Lebanon, it is not necessary to have lived in Lebanon (or even to have visited), in
order to claim this ethnic marker that demonstrates membership with the Lebanese
ethnicity. This phenomenon is only intensified by the rapid- fire exchange of
information on the Worldwide Web, where in an instant the global symbol pool is
digitally lain before us. (Claiming certain symbols does not necessarily amount to
appropriating the corresponding ethnicity in its entirety, however. Trends in fashion
prove this: Aztec designs are currently all the rage for the young and “hip” in the
United States. A few seasons prior, Native American moccasins and African tribal
prints were la moda. Wearing any of these does not amount to a shift in ethnic
identity.) Instantly, one can learn how the youth of Beirut dress, or how they make
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use of their vernacular. The pace and scale of this global cultural reorganization is
what is most notable about globalization: The “fundamental changes in the spatial and
temporal contours of social existence, according to which the significance of space or
territory undergoes shifts in the face of a no less dramatic acceleration in the temporal
structure of crucial forms of human activity” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2012).
Yet, if globalization allows nearly indiscriminate access to ethnic symbols
regardless of location, then in theory, populations not traditionally linked with certain
emblems should be able to claim them in all fairness. 24 Or populations spatially or
even temporally separate from an ethnic source may claim its symbols. Such is the
case with some diasporic groups, such as the Lebanese-Argentines, in which some
members may “reclaim” ethnic emblems after several generations of suppression as a
response to assimilation or acculturation. In the case of the Lebanese-Argentines of
Buenos Aires (as well as other ethnic groups in other Latin American countries), I
posit that miscegenation in greater society could play a heavy role in whether group
members opt for ethnic expression. I agree with Sansone's theory that ethnicity is not
essential; that it has always been a choice, and one that depends on environment (e.g.,
where one lives, the history and current state of ethnic/racial relations of the location,
the ethnic/racial makeup of the location, etc.). 25

24 The process of “claiming” ethnic emblems does not always work out so smoothly, however. Ethnic

emb lems are t ied to the culture and history of a people, and in situations of ethnic or polit ical struggle
can prove incendiary, as both sides vie for the right to call these emb lems their own . Consider Dr.
Saad’s point of “the bitter struggles over Hu mous and Falafel between Israelis and Palestinians”. Even
in less inflamed circu mstances, claiming ethnic symbols can lend a sense of pride: e.g., Who was the
first to discover “America”? Where is John the Baptist’s head buried? Where are Christopher
Colu mbus’ remains—the Do min ican Republic or Spain?
25 I do not argue that the world is necessarily less ethnically diverse for globalization. Consider Nathan
Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's 1960s influential study on ethnicity in the United States. Their
final published conclusions in Beyond the Melting Pot: the Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and
Irish of New York City state that the idea of the “American melting-pot” is a fallacy. Rather, the U.S. of
A. is more accurately a smörgåsbord, where differences in ethnicity have sparked greater awareness of
“us” and “them”, instead of blurring the lines of demarcation. They explain that ethnicity is co mmonly
emp loyed in choosing a spouse, looking for a job, or deciding where to live
(http://folk.u io.no/geirthe/Ethnicity.html).
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Ethnicity as a Non-Essential Identity
Daniel Bell surmises that more people today choose to claim and express an ethnic
identity than in years past, because membership in an ethnic group allegedly provides
more stability on a macro level than other identities—especially in this time of
authoritative decline (as cited in Roosens, 1989, p. 17). Additionally, according to
Roosens, an ethnic identity can provide “psychological security...a feeling of
belonging, a certainty that one knows one's origin, that one can live on in the younger
generations of one's people who will carry on the struggle...”(p. 16). Barth offers
somewhat of a counterargument. He states that a preference to claim ethnic identity
waxes and wanes in accordance with the need to defend one's social or economic
interests: people make ethnic claims if it is economically advantageous (p. 13). We
could qualify Barth's position by stating that a public expression of ethnicity could be
predicated on the social and economic climates in which group members find
themselves. Less “rational” motives, however, may influence whether this identity is
completely expressed, expressed in private or expressed in environments in which
there are only other group members. Nostalgia is powerful.
Michael Humphrey (2004) insists that the diaspora always carries a
connotation of nostalgia, loss and displacement:
Today the use of diaspora refers to a sense of exile, the feeling of wanting to
return home but being unable to because of exclusion by politics or history.
One is made an outcast because of present need or fear, or because
generational distance makes it impossible to find one's way back home. But
diaspora 26 is not merely understood as banishment or being made an outcast
from one's home society but from all society.
The word diaspora is loaded. Michael Humphrey (2004) says that “[d]iaspora refers to
a form of social relations produced by the displacement from home...the persistence
of tradition (identity) despite its displacement from place of origin”. In other words,

26 A term that was once emp loyed to refer to the dispersion of Jews throughout the world fro m their
“homeland”, diaspora today is generally used for any significantly sized population living away fro m
their place of origin, either temporarily or permanently (Suleiman, 1999, p.127). And that the
population living abroad is large indicates an exodus most likely for trau mat ic reasons, such as civil
war, poor economic conditions , or political upheavals.
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diaspora is a live entity in flux and in constant communication with its source through
visits, letters and remittances sent back to relatives. Political alliances forged ab road
with impacts felt at home constitute “social relations”. Diaspora is how those away
view and interact with those at the place of origin, and how they hold and maintain
the continuum from home to host country.
Vincent Crapanzano (2010) concurs: “Like all immigrants and exiles the
diasporic Lebanese are caught in an in-between. They are at once Lebanese and
American, Canadian, French, or Australian...They have continually to bargain their
identity—or better their identities...Double or multiple identities can be painful,
especially in prejudicial situations” (p. xi). This internal identity conflict is not an
issue for every immigrant, however. Motives for leaving “home”, how much time has
elapsed from the time of departure (or generations have been born), integration in the
host country, as well as the social and cultural environment of the host country all
matter. Some of the conversations I shared with Argentines evidenced a casual
personal attitude about the participants' heritage—whether of Lebanese descent or
some other ancestry. I would ask where a person's family is from, and more often than
not he or she would reply with an unemotional “Italy, on my father's side”, or “I have
Syrian blood on the part of my grandfather”, or “I think I have some English
somewhere in there”, or “My mother is Spanish and my father is Argentinean”. In
most of these cases, the participants' families have already lived in Argentina for some
generations. But Crapazano and Humphrey's point is well taken. If the bonds to the
home country and the pain of departing are still fresh, living in the diaspora can feel a
bit like being orphaned: “Where are my roots and do I belong here?”
“Home”, then, can represent authenticity of self and community, the original
source of a particular ethnicity, a language, a nation, an approach to the world—and
more. Crapanzano (2010) asserts Lebanon “is far more than a place, a space of origin,
a country, a village, a family home, a family, it is also, and perhaps foremost for
diasporic Lebanese, but for resident Lebanese as well, a space of memory” (p. x). It is
also a space of imagination, for what is memory but imagination of the past? Michael
Humphrey (2004) makes an excellent point that those in “Lebanese diaspora
communities [do not] conceive of the 'imagined present' or 'past' in the same way”.
Like feelings of nostalgia, the very mental construction of home depends on a number
45

of factors, from the period in time of departure, to the current political climate of the
homeland, to the extent of relations back home, and the environment of the host
country. Within the same diasporic community these ideas of “home” may differ, and
these differences dictate how members interact with their place of origin, or whether
they do at all. For example, those Lebanese in the diaspora who fled because of the
Lebanese civil war of the 1990s have a very different understanding of “home” to
those Lebanese who left their country in the 1940s. These perceptions would differ
even more drastically from those Lebanese who emigrated at the turn of the 20 th
century. And such discrepancies do not even begin to touch upon the variations in
political, religious, social, economic and regional experiences of many of these
immigrants who come from a country that has been referred to as “a state without a
nation”. Yet, what is significant here is that there even remains an idea of “home”,
although members of a diaspora could be very well settled into their host country or
have never even been to Lebanon.
For those living in the diaspora, “home” sometimes evokes longing—even if
one has grown up only in the host country and has never been to the place of one's
heritage. One participant expressed that although he has never been to Lebanon he
really wants to go, but for now, the idea of his “homeland” is hazy. He has nothing
tangible with which to construct an understanding of the “land of the cedars” aside
from stories and pictures that are not his, but belong instead to older family members
in Buenos Aires. He told me that some of his Lebanese relatives have been to the
Capital Federal, but visits such as those are always difficult because there is the
language barrier. He never learned Arabic (his father thought English would be more
useful); his relatives from Lebanon do not speak Spanish. In spite of all this, he knows
Lebanon is home and that he will get there one day—how ever far away the idea still
is.
The construction of an ethnic identity rooted in home as its source is very
much tied to the existence of nostalgia, loss and displacement—or their absence. If
there is no emotional bond to one's ancestry (or even basic interest), it is even less
likely one would choose to align oneself with an ethnicity discourse. So what does it
mean that several generations have passed since the first Syro-Lebanese immigrated
to Argentina, the Lebanese have culturally assimilated in Buenos Aires and
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exogamous marriage is a frequent reality?
Like Livio Sansone, I posit that a person need not identify themselves in
ethnic terms—even if ethnicities provide a sense of stability and psychological
security. Sansone (2003) says
...many people can live quite happily without such things as ethnicity. There
are certain people who do not identify with a single given ethnic identity...
[t]hey are mainly found in modern cities, where increasing numbers of
inhabitants form part of more than one subculture, thereby creating a multilayered social identity of which ethnicity is just one of many components (p.
7).
Sansone emphasizes that modern cities are frequently the sites where people are least
likely to identify themselves ethnically. Many modern cities also tend to be highly
diverse because of globalization (recent and not so recent), where people from all over
the world interact in close quarters. In some places, they also often intermarry. Think
of Buenos Aires, Sao Paolo, Toronto, New York, London, Johannesburg, Berlin.
According to Harry Hoetink, generally throughout Latin America “inter-ethnic
relations and the racialization of social groups” have followed a similar pattern, where
that pattern “is characterized by a tradition of widespread intermarriage between
people of different phenotypes...” (as cited in Sansone, 2003, p. 8). Given the fortyfour immigrant groups the government's cultural organization, El Observatorio de
Colectividades, specifies to have immigrated to Argentina (from Japanese, to
Croatian, Swedish, Cape Verdian, Austrian, Jewish, Bolivian, Korean, Dominican,
Armenian and beyond), 97% of the population of Argentina considers itself (or is
considered) white, according to the CIA World Factbook. The remaining three percent
is either mixed with Amerindian, or belongs to another non-white group. Statistics do
vary slightly according to sources, however. The website World Statesmen puts
Argentina's ethnic/racial population at 86.4% for whites, 6.5% for mestizos, 3.4% for
Amerindians, 3.3% for Arabs, and 0.4% for other groups (World States Men, 2012). A
Maimonides University study render results of an even less homogeneous populace. A
team of biochemists, biologists, anthropologists and archeologists concluded that
Argentina's racial/ethnic makeup is closer to 65% European, 30% Amerindian and 5%
African (Argentina Investiga). These three studies point to two possible conclusions:
one, Argentina's population has mixed considerably throughout the decades such that
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the largest immigrant groups have nearly absorbed the smaller ones; and two, in the
absence of very detailed surveys on ethnicity and race, many Argentines self- identify
as white—perhaps because many do have Spanish and Italian blood (two of the
largest immigrant groups to the country). 27 This phenomenon is undoubtedly related
to the assimilationist discourse in Argentina and Latin America just a century before.
Sansone (2003) says that “[a]ll over Latin America we not only come across similar
patterns in race relations, but also similar official and popular discourses as to color.
These discourses tend to praise miscegenation and the creation of a new (Latin) race,
rather than ethnic separateness” (p. 8). If we recall our discussion on cultural
nationalism in chapter one, the goal of the cultural nationalist intellectual movement
was to define the ideal Argentine race and effectively coax the many different
immigrant groups into fitting the mold.
In this vein, in the early days of the republic, assimilation encouraged the
Syro-Lebanese and other less desired immigrant groups to ideologically self- identify
as “Argentine”. “Argentine” most often constituted a Spanish-speaking, Catholic, fairskinned national. In his 1963 work El gaucho, Lebanese-Argentine author Ibrahim
Hallar states that “the only immigrant groups who mixed with the natives were
Spaniards, Italians and Arabs”. As Civantos (2006) points out, including Arabs with
the Spanish and Italians who married and procreated exogamously implies Hallar's
Lebanese claims to European-ness at the least, and whiteness at the most (p. 65).
But miscegenation further facilitated this process. Hallar (1963) acknowledges
interethnic/interracial mixing in Argentina saying, “We are, save rare exceptions, a
mish- mash of Arabo-hispanics, blacks and Indians, in the historical initiation of South
and Central America. A new race that should move us to be proud of such a
remarkable conglomeration” (p. 46). He also buys into the idea of a new Argentine
race. Inhabiting an interethnically/interracially mixed and highly diverse society,

27 Although these three studies break down the population of Argentina into different categories —
white/Amerindian/non-white vs. wh ite/mestizo/Amerindian/Arab/other vs.
European/Amerindian/African—the conclusions still hold true. If anything, these criteria strengthen
both claims. That, for instance, the Arab category is present in one study and not the other two, could
imply that Argentines of some Arab ancestry are choosing to identify with another racial/ethnic
category, or that it is more d ifficult to distinguish among those who have mixed considerably within the
Argentine population.
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Argentines of Lebanese descent have been freed up to self- identify in other ways than
ethnicity. For one reason, as Sansone says, in Latin America highly diverse societies
were discouraged from ethnically aggregating. For another reason, exogamous
marriages between Argentines of Lebanese ancestry and not of Lebanese ancestry
have meant that Lebanese ethnicity is not the only way in which progeny may form an
ethnic identity. Another side of this phenomenon is that because many people are
mixed, ethnic group boundaries lose some of their importance. It is no longer a matter
of full-blooded Syro-Lebanese and full-blooded Italians vying for the same economic
and social resources. Demarcating ethnic territory is no longer critical. Additionally,
ethnic groups among very mixed populations are more difficult to detect from the
outside. Miscegenation makes distinguishing members based on ethnic symbols alone
a sticky task; no one set of ethnic markers corresponds to a “group”. And logically,
highly mixed societies hardly ever produce enough members to correspond to exact
ethnic ratios. It is rare to find a large enough population consisting of the same mix of
ethnic proportions to constitute a new ethnic group (although ethnic groups are also
determined by the ways in which people identify themselves and people may choose
to identify with one ethnicity over another).
And thus, having an ethnic identity is not essential. Late 19th and early 20th
century Argentina saw a massive influx of immigrants, whether from Greater Syria,
Italy, Poland, Spain, England or France. This hodge-podge of ethnic and racial
identities, in conjunction with the country's policy of assimilation and the
phenomenon of frequent miscegenation, has today rendered ethnicity quite optional
for citizens. Yet, if individuals opt out of aligning with an ethnic discourse, what are
other ways in which they may choose to identify themselves?

Race and Nationalism as Alternatives to Ethnic Identity
Race and nationalism are two very powerful alternatives of self- identification to
ethnicity. In Race, Language and Culture, Franz Boas (1940) gives a rudimentary
definition of race, one which still reflects a commonly acc epted understanding of the
term in current popular culture. For Boas, a race is “a group of people that have
certain bodily and perhaps also mental characteristics in common” (p. 4). Hair texture,
skin color, intelligence, and nose shape are such characteristics. According to the
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Stanford Online Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the formation of racial groups has
historically (and polemically) been based on five criteria: one, that they are founded
on biology; two, that this biological foundation creates distinct racial groups wherein
all members of each group have the same set of biological characteristics not found in
other groups; three, that these biological characteristics are propagated throughout
generations; four, that racial groups correspond to certain geographical locations (e.g.
Africa, Europe, Asia, North America and South America); and five, that biological
foundations essentially show up as both physical phenotypes, such as hair texture,
skin color, eye shape, and behavioral phenotypes, such as inte lligence. Cornell and
Hartmann (1998) delineate race as “a group of human beings socially defined on the
basis of physical characteristics”, where “which characteristics constitute the race—
the selection of markers and therefore the construction of the rac ial category itself—is
a choice human beings make” (p. 24).
The validity of race as a concept has been debated in academia and the
scientific community ad nauseum. One argument is that we must use new criteria in
establishing boundaries between racial groups, so that the original four racial
categories of Asian, Native American, African and Caucasian are subdivided to yield
more accurate groupings that account for greater physiological variations among
humans. This notion, however, does not consider that “the extent of genetic variation
among individuals within supposed racial groups typically exceeds the variation
between the groups” (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, pp. 22-23). Another argument
proposes that after much research on what biologically constitutes race, the genetic
differences between groups are so miniscule and inconsistent that they render the
concept of race unfounded. Races do not really exist. That it has thus far been
impossible to reach a consensus on the number of racial groups in the world is telling.
Biological anthropologist Janis Hutchinson says that, “When you begin to understand
the biology of human variation, you have to ask yourself if race is a good way to
describe that” (RACE: Are We So Different?). Cornell and Hartmann (1998) maintain
that “the persistence of the idea of biologically distinct human races owes more to
popular culture and pseudoscience than to science, and the idea's pedigree is not
scientific but historical” (p. 22). Instead many scholars purport that race is a social
construct, whereby humans invent categories in which we place other people based on
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certain physical characteristics. We then attach social significance to these invented
groups “to the extent that we use them to organize and interpret experience, to form
social relations, and to organize individual and collective action” (p. 24). Yet,
although many scholars consider race a social construct, they do acknowledge that the
notion is a powerful one with real consequences in human lives.
Sansone (2003) says that the processes of racialization (coming to be
classified as a race) and ethnicization (the making of an ethnic group) work at times in
tandem, or in succession. For example, race is one way to experience ethnicity, where
the accent is on physiological traits—meaning, once a race has become an ethnicity,
or vice versa. What then, is the relationship between race and ethnicity? Race is a
socially constructed category assigned to a group of people, and based on physical
traits. Ethnicity is identification rooted in common ancestry, a perceived shared past
and recognizable ethnic symbols. Both are dynamic terms that have been constructed
in diverse human contexts. Cornell and Hartmann (1998) say that while ethnicity and
race cannot be equated, they are not mutually exclusive either. Sometimes they
overlap; at other moments they are completely separate. Historically, whereas race has
typically been assigned to individuals—and thus the classification is external,
ethnicity has tended to be self-asserted (although it can also be assigned as a category)
(p. 25). The very ability to designate race is, according to Cornell and Hartmann, “an
assertion of the power to define the 'other' and in doing so to create it as a specific
object” (p. 28).
Race as a concept is weighty; there is little wonder as to why individuals may
choose to identify themselves according to race over ethnicity if it proves
advantageous or practical. In the early years of Jewish, Irish and Italian immigration
to the United States, all three groups were classified as non-white. Eventually
acquiring status as white meant an end to discrimination and an induction into the
hegemonic racial group of the U.S. (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998, p. 32-33). In her
book Between Arab and White, Sarah M. A. Gualtieri (2009) discusses the very
crucial decision pre-World War II Syrian immigrants to the U.S. had to make in
defining themselves ethnically and racially. In the Jim Crow south, falling on the
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“wrong” side of the color line could end in being “strange fruit”. 28 Context matters.
Even in post-assimilation era, highly diverse and very interracially/interethnically
mixed Argentina, context matters. That the three aforementioned studies on race and
ethnicity in the Argentine state render quite different results hints that Argentines
could be self- identifying according to their environment. Racial and ethnic diversity,
existing racial or ethnic hegemony and history of a location qualify self- identification.
These are social negotiations, and these negotiations a mount to politics of identity.
Given the collective circumstances of a place, individuals choose how best to identify
themselves according to their values, necessities and ambitions.
Nationalism is yet another compelling option for self-classification. Like race,
nationalism shares some commonalities with ethnic identity. Howard Wollman and
Philip Spencer (2002) explain in Nationalism: A Critical Introduction that a multitude
of nationalisms exist in the world, but fundamentally are all “an ideology which
imagines the community in a particular way (as national), asserts the primacy of this
collective identity over others, and seeks political power in its name” (p. 2). In other
words, nationalism is a set of ideas about a collective identity which corresponds to a
certain group of people (nation), and hovers a level higher than other identities in a
quest for power. Cornell and Hartmann (1998) describe it as “the expressed desire of a
people to establish and maintain a self- governing political entity” (p. 34). Both
definitions explicitly state power as an objective of the unit; in modern days this
typically manifests as the state, one half of the term “nation-state”. Yet, what is the
nature of the bond that links together a group of people such that they collectively
desire to seek self-determination, and in some cases, disregard other identities vis-àvis nationalism?
Nationalism is a politically charged form of identity. At its crux lie three key
themes: autonomy (the power to act independently), unity (co hesion among members
within marked boundaries, whether imaginary or geo-political) and identity
(distinctiveness). Ethnicity may become nationalist in agenda, and nationalism is
often built on real or imagined ethnic ties, but they are not the same (Cornell and

28 “Strange fruit” was a term given persons who had been hanged to death from a tree.
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Hartmann, 1998, p. 37). When an ethnic group becomes nationalist the identity of the
collective is rooted in common ancestry, is based on a shared past and is
distinguishable by particular ethnic symbols. This identity facilitates unity (and by
extension, loyalty). The goal of the ethnic group thereafter, is to obtain the right to
self-govern. For instance, the Tibetan Independence movement seeks political
separation from People's Republic of China on the assertion that Tibet's unique ethnic
identity and culture are being squelched beneath China's autocratic policies. What is
more, supporters claim that twice in the past Tibet has been an independent and selfgoverning nation. In this case, ethnicity has become politicized in the quest for selfdetermination. In his article entitled “Ethnicity versus nationalism”, Thomas Hylland
Eriksen (1991) further explains the relationship between ethnic identity and
nationalism:
Nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents, and by
implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become
outsiders. The distinguishing mark of nationalism is by definition its
relationship to the state. A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be
coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not
demand command over a state. When the political leaders of an ethnic
movement place demands to this effect, the ethnic movement therefore by
definition becomes a nationalist movement. Although nationalisms tend to be
ethnic in character, this is not necessarily the case”.
By contrast, when nationalism is not constructed from ethnic ties, then a
common “history” must be manufactured, along with a unique identity compelling
enough to elicit member loyalty to the collective (and most likely, state). This loyalty
must supersede other loyalties (e.g. ethnicity, in the case that the nation's borders
encompass more than one ethnic group, or race, in the case that racial tension is a
concern within the nation's borders). Eriksen concurs with Anthony D. Smith (1986)
in that “'the multi-ethnic' or 'plural' state is the rule rather than the exception”. Yet,
Eriksen (1991) adds that cultural plurality can be “reconciled with nationhood and
nationalism”, or “evaporate historically”, leading to the creation of new nation-states,
interethnic conflicts or ethnic and state conflicts. It is imperative to remember that
nationalism “is not a natural phenomenon, despite the fact that the object of every
[brand of] nationalism is to present a particular image of society as natural.
Nationalism is ever emergent and must be defended and justified ideologically”
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(Eriksen, 1991).The United States of America provides a brilliant case of a persuasive
nationalism rooted in a carefully fabricated identity and “history” to manage its
cultural plurality. As a country of immigrants, ethnic groups abound and at times
racial tension has been rife. Yet, in the American narrative it is precisely these
hardships and clashes that make the American nation worthy of preservation at the
highest cost. This narrative relates that although United States nationals can be
drastically different in ethnic and/or racial background, fundamentally we are all the
same. There is a desire for freedom and a willingness to work hard for the c hance at a
better life that indiscriminately threads together everyone in the “imagined
community”. As the story goes, these sentiments are greater than any rifts incited by
racial or ethnic differences. Lee Greenwood (1984) sings it best in “God Bless the
U.S.A.”:

If tomorrow all the things were gone
I'd worked for all my life
and I had to start again
with just my children and my wife
I'd thank my lucky stars
to be livin' here today
‘cause the flag still stands for freedom
and they can't take that away
And I'm proud to be an American
where at least I know I'm free
And I won't forget the men who died
who gave that right to me
And I gladly stand up
next to you and defend her still today
‘cause there ain't no doubt I love this land
God bless the U.S.A.
Like race and ethnicity, nationalism is an unnatural construct and a product of
diverse social environments on a global scale. For race and ethnic identity to exist
they require a contrasting unit, a backdrop against which they can be differentiated. In
the case of ethnicity, although self-assertion is essential in the formation of an ethnic
group, such a group can only really manifest in the presence of another, distinct ethnic
identity. Likewise, race may be a social construct assigned by one group to another
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based on physiological dissimilarities, yet the need for contrast remains. Nationalism,
nonetheless, is an inherently power-seeking construct in the seemingly zero-sum
game of international politics. A contrast then easily becomes an antagonist.
As Eriksen (1991) maintains, nationalism can have both socio-culturally
integrating and disintegrating ramifications. At once it is capable of enclosing swathes
of people—often of disparate backgrounds; yet also in so doing it creates huge
numbers of outsiders. This process of “shutting out” non- members of the nation is
often enforced through geographical borders, as well as political and economic
policies.
Curiously, it is precisely that nationalism can so effectively unite members
within borders while keeping outsiders at bay that proves highly attractive as a form
of identification. Provided that the nation (and state if it corresponds to the nation) is
fairly stable, claiming nationalism can lend a sense of belonging, protection and
security on a grand scale. In the case of diasporic, immigrant and refugee populations,
embracing nationalism of the “host” country may mitigate confused feelings of
betrayal or fear about the “home” country if reasons for departure included dangerous
or unfavorable circumstances, such as civil war, ethnic or religious conflict, or paucity
of economic opportunities. In less ethnically diverse countries, transplanted
individuals may choose to defer ethnicity to nationalism in order to show loyalty to
their new “home”. Or if high levels of interracial/interethnic mixing have occurred
within a nation, choosing an ethnic identity may be difficult. Rather, nationalism may
become a default category.
Although cultural nationalists spoke in terms of an Argentine “race”, the
driving concept of the intellectual movement was more or less the creation of a
homogeneous populace who placed allegiance to nation above allegiance to any
deviant ethnic background. This speaks to the idea of an ethnic nationalism
manufactured from a fabricated history and ethnicity. I asked Jose Sahyoun whether
he felt distinctly Lebanese; he told me he felt Lebanese and wholly Argentine. 29 There

29 Although I did not delve mo re into this subject, what constitutes being Argentine today? Sahyoun
did say that “everyone is welcome in Argentina; it’s a friendly country”. But does the fair-skinned
Argentine archetype still prevail? If so, could it be that Lebanese-ness is now equated with being
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was no conflict between the two. He continued that Argentina is a country whose
doors are open for everyone, and everyone gets along. An Argentine is an Argentine.
But is this a case of one’s simultaneously embracing one’s ethnicity and
Argentine nationalism? Or do such sentiments spring from a cultural nationalist
understanding of ethnic nationalism, that the people of Argentina are one Latin race
where imaginary ethnic boundaries have been blurred—even erased? In the instance
of Sahyoun, I would venture to guess he embraces both his Lebanese roots and the
nationalism of Argentina. During our conversation he spoke of the Lebanese as a
bounded group in Buenos Aires, with its own distinct history and customs. He
asserted that he is a member of that bounded group; yet, likewise, is also Argentine.
However, for those Lebanese (and other Argentines) who opt out of selfidentification with any ethnic group, I hypothesize that cultural nationalist
understanding of ethnic nationalism is a plausible option. Because in this theory
“ethnicity” has been expanded to squarely superimpose nationalism which
corresponds to Argentine state/political borders, there is no difference between the
two. Ethnicity and nationalism are then woven into one, more complicated narrative.
It is worth stating that ethnicity, race and nationalism are not mutually
exclusive: An individual may claim one, two or all three identities simultaneously or
in succession. However, political, historical, economic, ethnic, and racial contexts do
matter. It also matters with whom people are interacting, where and for what purpose.
And yet, there is no set formula for how individuals negotiate their identities, save to
say according to whichever expression meets their needs at any given time. In other
words, identity politics. 30

“Argentine”?
30 I am not suggesting that people are calculat ing through and through. Emotions such as pride,
nostalgia, love, admiration, disgust, and betrayal play as much of a ro le in how people choose to define
themselves, as the potential benefits to be garnered fro m identity choices. On the contrary, I am
offering that one of the ways in wh ich we all navigate this world teeming with the unknown, the
foreign, and the unsavory is through predicting how we might be affected by them and acting
accordingly.
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Conclusions on Ethnicity
Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff (2009) summarize ethnicity best in Ethnicity, Inc.
Ethnic identity is
neither a monolithic ‘thing’ nor, in and of itself, an analytic construct...‘it’ is
best understood as a loose, labile repertoire of signs by means of which
relations are constructed and communicated; through which a collective
consciousness of cultural likeness is rendered sensible; with reference to
which shared sentiment is made substantial. Its visible content is always the
product of specific historical conditions which, in variable measure, impinge
themselves on human perception and, in so doing, frame the motivation,
meaning and materiality of social practice...Cultural identity appears ever
more as two antithetical things at once: on the one hand, as a precipitate of
inalienable natural essence, of genetics and biology, and, on the other, as a
function of voluntary self- fashioning…It is, in other words, both ascriptive
and instrumental. Both innate and constructed. Both blood and choice.
(pp. 38, 40)

Everything that Comaroff and Comaroff describe is optional to claim. As Roosens
(1989) states, “In certain types of society, individuals may, for their entire lives or for
very long periods, assign only limited value to, or may ignore altogether, what would
theoretically be their ethnic allegiance, and their social environment can support them
in this” (p. 16). Ethnicity then, is like a garment. The question then becomes, in the
case of later generations of Lebanese-Argentines desiring to express their Lebanese
ethnic identity, how do they do so after assimilation, miscegenation and the passage of
time?
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Chapter Three: What is Simulation?
Chapter three is brief, and lays the theoretical framework for the discussion of how
the Lebanese-Argentines of Buenos Aires construct a Lebanese ethnic identity. I
hypothesize that Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity is a simulation (dynamic simulacrum)
of the ethnic identity of Lebanon. I look at three post- modern interpretations of
simulacrum: first, Klossowski's notion of “phantasm”; second, Deleuze's take on the
Platonic “idea”; and third, Jean Baudrillard's three orders of simulation, beginning
with simulacrum and ending with simulation. I primarily look to Deleuze and
Baudrillard's theories in examining the construction of ethnicity among the LebaneseArgentines of Buenos Aires; Klossowski's interpretation of simulacrum provides a
springboard from which to start.
According to one's understanding of what it means to be of Lebanese descent,
one references and performs ethnic symbols associated with Lebanon. Such symbols
could be the Arabic language (strategically utilized to emphasize ethnicity or solely as
a means of communication), 31 Lebanese cuisine, Lebanese music, references to
Phoenicia, cultural elements of the Maronite, Druze or Islamic faiths, Lebanese
cultural arts, following or participating in the politics of Lebanon or displaying actual
symbols, such as the Lebanese flag. In essence, Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity is
a dynamic reflection of the collection of ethnic emblems of Lebanon. It is a living
mirrored image that assumes its own authenticity through its connection to its source,
and subsequently creates a cultural continuum, an imagined para-national Lebanese
ethnic community.
Simulacrum is “an image, likeness, or reproduction”, a term dating back to
Plato's Republic, in which he considers art as mimesis 32 (Taylor and Winquist, 2002,
p. 367). In his work entitled Sophist, Plato (360 BCE) introduces us to the notion that
a copy of an original may manifest in one of two ways: either as an honest attempt at

31 An email I received fro m J.U.C.A.L. Argentina began with “Kifak, Kifik...!”; what followed was in
Spanish. Likewise, the first message on the Islamic Cu ltural Center's answering mach ine is in Arabic;
the second is in Spanish.
32 Mimesis is “the art of imitation” (Tay lor and Winquist 249). See Matthew Potolsky's Mimesis fo r a
more in -depth exp loration of the concept.
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representing the object of imitation (eikastic), or as a perverse reproduction fashioned
to simulate the original from a certain vantage point, thus appearing “real” on some
level (phantastic). Coke bottles are an example of eikastic images, where every bottle
is an exact replica of the one that came before. By contrast, phantastic images “distort
their physical form, diverging from the exact details of the original to correct for the
limitations of vision”. The statues in Greek temples proportioned to account for the
viewer's eye level are such an example (Potolsky, 2006, p. 151). Because of their
colossal size, the statues' upper sections are enlarged to give the appearance of
proportion. It is these phantastic images which Plato finds suspect. In a Critical Terms
for Art History article titled "Simulacrum", similarly Michael Camille says, “The
simulacrum is more than just a useless image, it is a deviation and perversion of
imitation itself—a false likeness” (as cited in Sandoz, 2003). The simulacrum is
troubling because—unlike the honest eikastic—it presents illusion as truth. When
seen in its entirety at eye level, an enormous statue in a Greek temp le is grossly
disproportioned. For Plato, the phantastic image shuns the natural rank of original and
copy. It does not respect the secondary place of derivative, whose value is only
determined by its connection to a source. Instead, because it inspires similar
emotional experiences without possessing the form of the original, it potentially rivals
the model in value.
French essayist, thinker and artist Pierre Klossowski utilizes Plato's theoretical
foundation of simulacrum, but bases his interpretation on the notion of phantasm. All
humans are uniquely characterized by “internal 'impulses'” of ever changing
intensities (from the highest of highs to the lowest of lows). Together these result in
an image Klossowski terms phantasm. More precisely, phantasm is “an obsessional
image produced instinctively from the life of the impulses, which is in itself
incommunicable and nonrepresentable” (Taylor and Winquist, 2002, p. 367).
Phantasm hints at the existence of a unique formulation and pulsation of energy in all
human beings, one that cannot quite be wholly qualified. For Klossowski then, a
simulacrum of the phantasm is “a willed reproduction of a phantasm (in literary,
pictorial or plastic form) that simulates this invisible agitation of the soul” (p. 367).
Yet, actualization of the simulacrum of the phantasm is betrayal, a perversion—as its
very “incommunicable and nonrepresentable” essence has just been communicated
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and represented by a falsified reproduction.
Philosopher Gilles Deleuze builds on Klossowski's understanding of
simulacrum as the copy of an original; yet, argues that, like Plato, a reproduction of an
idea can be either a true copy or a false simulacrum. Copies are legitimate
representations of an idea for their internal resemblance to it in size, proportion and
color; they are an honest attempt at an accurate impression of the model. For example,
counterfeit designer handbags are (ironically) honest efforts to replicate a demanded
model on the market. As Potolsky (2006) says in Mimesis, they “want to be confused
with the original, for their value derives from precisely this confusion” (p. 152).
Simulacra, however, achieve duplicated effects through “ruse” and “trickery”. Aspects
are adjusted according to the perspective of the viewer. The above example recounts
where upper parts of Greek statues are augmented and lower parts are scaled down to
appear more in proportion to the viewer from eye level.
However, counter to Plato's suspicions of simulacrum for its deceptive
constitution, as well as his insistence that it has no value beyond that which is granted
by its association with the original, Deleuze posits that simulacrum is not the anticopy, nor a distorted icon. Instead, it is “an image that has broken free from any single
original. It appeals to the contingent and historically grounded condition of the
viewer, not to an abstract and purely rational conception of truth” (Potolsky, 2006, p.
151). The simulacrum is powerful: from certain angles it appears identical to the
original, yet is not. This is significant in that the viewer's perspective becomes the
focal point in the interaction, rather than the object itself. A skillful representation, the
simulacrum has the power to inspire the same emotional experience a viewer has with
the original idea. So long as the reaction is identical, the simulacrum could
theoretically be anything at all. A two-dimensional murder scene in a film has the
power to evoke sensations of fear, anxiety and terror; audience members may feel as
though a homicide were really taking place before their eyes. The ruse is evident, yet
the physical and emotional reactions are quite real.
Deleuze insists that simulacra have autonomy of their own, because they are
fundamentally distinct creations. Thus, they should “rise and affirm their rights among
icons and copies” (Potolsky, 2006, p. 152). And Camille concurs: “The simulacrum is
not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the
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copy, the model and the reproduction...There is no longer any privileged point of view
except that of the object common to all points of view” (as cited in Sandoz, 2003).
Jean Baudrillard (1994) entertains the dichotomies of “original” and “copy”
from a postmodernist posture. Perversion and purity are inconsequential. Ultimately,
he collapses the notion of original and copy, insisting that in today's world there exis ts
no distinction between the real and its duplicates: “It is no longer a question of
imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is rather a question of substituting signs
of the real for the real” (p. 2). Baudrillard offers as explanation three orders of
simulation: counterfeit, production and simulation. We currently live in the final order
of simulation—the order of feigning possession of what one does not really have. It is
the order where simulation blurs the lines between “'true' and 'false', between 'real'
and 'imaginary'” (p. 5).
Counterfeit is the period in which simulacra reference an original, such that a
copy is a reproduction of a model. A replica of Leonardo da Vinci's The Last Supper
is an appropriate example. Production entails the mechanization processes of the
Industrial Revolution, whereby simulacra of the same value—such as clocks—are
produced on the assembly line. Simulation is the third order in the postmodern era
(which could extend to the present, although the postmodern period ends in the
1990s). It is a period of mass media and information in which simulations are realer
than real and have no original reference, nor need for one. Simulations mimic not just
objects, but situations, experiences and interactions. The contemporary world of
“cybernetization”, where a “cybernetic model of simulation” has supplanted the
“(Marxist) model of production”, is such that reality and simulation become
indistinguishable, and the latter actually becomes “hyperreal” (Taylor and Winquist,
2002, p. 368). Effectively, Baudrillard is referencing not only the recreation of the real
world on the Worldwide Web in cyberspace, but also all the other many automated
and simulated interactions that pervade “real” space. On the internet we have online
identities, belong to online communities, conduct business online and carry out
conversations with other cyber identities. In real life we have fire drills and flight
simulators (Sandoz, 2003). Automatic teller machines, Coke machines and drone
missiles are also examples of common cybernetic models of simulation interwoven in
today's world. These machines have been programmed to simulate one half of an
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interaction between two human beings, an interaction that can produce very human
results. In a simulation all of the components are present save what was once reality: a
fire, being in the air, receiving money or a Coke from a human, or engaging in hand to
hand combat with another soldier. But now simulations are just as “real” for the
similar emotional and physical experiences they produce.
Baudrillard looks at simulation with an alarm that mirrors Plato's wariness of
simulacra. He rationalizes that effective simulations threaten, and in some instances
supplant reality. Simulation is the “process through which reality is usurped”.
(Sandoz, 2003). Like the distorted reproduction of the original which appeals to the
viewer's position by ensuring a particular experience from his or her vantage point,
simulation gives the subject all of the sensation of a real encounter without the “real”
encounter. But what constitutes “real”? For Baudrillard, simulation is actually “realer
than real”, because it has erased the memory of what it once referenced and replaced.
It no longer relies on the original, and thus, has the power to reduce “reality” to a
system of signs devoid of meaning. (Imagine existing only in cyberspace, where every
daily interaction which is normally carried out face-to-face has been reduced to an
essentially two-dimensional world of signs.)
Simulation is total mediation without meaning. That is to say, we live in a
hyperreal world where everything is mediated, where a medium is understood as a
window onto a vision or experience (Sandoz, 2003). Whereas, in the first order of the
counterfeit, the simulacrum existed as a medium to transmit a mimicked experience to
the viewer from his or her perspective, the pervading simulations of today consist of
all the signage of an original, yet transmit no truth. They exist to exist. And yet, these
media are not confined to their own spaces, they are interlaced in our daily
experience, such that we cannot distinguish between “real” and “simulated”.
According to Baudrillard (1983), in our world today what is mediated is simulated,
and that which is simulated is also mediated. The consequences are grave:
When the real is no longer what is used to be, nostalgia assumes its full
meaning. There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality; of
second- hand truth, objectivity and authenticity. There is an escalatio n of the
true, of the lived experience; a resurrection of the figurative where the object
and substance have disappeared. And there is a panic-stricken production of
the real and the referential, above and parallel to the panic of material
production: this is how simulation appears in the phase that concerns us—a
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strategy of the real, neo-real and hyperreal whose universal double is a
strategy of deterrence. (pp.12-13)
Baudrillard's quote is reminiscent of Humphrey and Crapanzano's words on nostalgia
in the Lebanese diaspora. They posit the diaspora always has connotations of exile
and loss, and Lebanon has come to represent a “space of memory”, a way of life and
being. Chapter two establishes that assuming a Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity is
not essential for every person of Lebanese ancestry in Buenos Aires—race and/or
nationalism may suffice. Yet, for those who do claim the ethnicity, nostalgia can be a
powerful factor. Without the severity of Baudrillard's argument on nostalgia, Lebanon
does come to represent the “real”, the “true”, the “lived experience”. It is the origin of
all emblems potentially construed as ethnically Lebanese. Spatial and temporal
separation in the diaspora then incite “production of the real and the referential”, a
piece- meal construction of Lebanese ethnic symbols according to one's understanding
of what it means to be Lebanese. This construction is precisely a simulation of
Lebanese ethnic identity. It is a “re-living the situation 'in their shoes' 33 or from their
point of view”, because “[u]nderstanding others is achieved when we ourselves
deliberate as they did” (Topor, 2002; Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 351).
Essentially, my understanding of simulation as it applies to the LebaneseArgentines of Buenos Aires is a marriage of points from both Deleuze and
Baudrillard's theories. I argue that those who choose to claim and express a LebaneseArgentine ethnicity in Buenos Aires create a simulacrum of ethnicity in Lebanon.
Ethnicity is signified by identifiable ethnic markers performed by dynamic beings; the
simulacrum of this must be dynamic, too—hence, use of the notion of simulation.
However, I reject Baudrillard's fear that simulation supplants the truth and signifies
the death of meaning. Instead I align with Deleuze's argument that the original can

33 This is an interesting phrase on which to deliberate, because the diaspora can have a way of making
members of populations feel disconnected from “home”, so that “their shoes” could be more apt of a
phrase than “our shoes”. The generations that have lived and been born abroad may feel a strong
connection for Lebanon; however, there is always a nagging feeling that there is some d ifference
between themselves and those back home. Perhaps it is the way they pronounce Arabic, or wh ich
hymns they sing at church, how they prepare a traditional dish or dance the debke. This is profound,
because it is precisely these ways in which they are connected to home, it is t he claiming of these
emb lems that signifies an allegiance with this ethnic discourse.
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still exist, and that simulation may serve as a gateway to new truths and
understandings. To replace the original suggests that simulated ethnicities in the
diaspora negate the existence of the ethnicity in the home country. It also implies that
an imitation is devoid of meaning or truth, that it lacks authenticity. In the case of
ethnic identity, when one aligns oneself with an ethnic group, expresses the
appropriate ethnic markers and is recognized by non-group members as belonging to
the intended ethnicity, authenticity is established. Time and distance become
irrelevant.
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Chapter Four: How is Lebanese-Argentine
Ethnicity a Simulation of Lebanese Ethnic
Identity?
Chapters two and three lay the theoretical framework to discuss how I hypothesize
Lebanese-Argentines in Buenos Aires construct their ethnic identity. There are two
components of this construction: the simulated and the simulation. The first part of
chapter four gives a picture of Lebanon (the simulated), by offering a brief historical,
political, religious and cultural snapshot of the country. It is important to note that part
one is in no way a definitive interpretation of Lebanon’s history, culture and politics,
for as the saying goes, “There are three sides to every story: yours, mine and the
truth”. As there exist numerous (differing) narratives on Lebanon’s past (and present,
for that matter) it is necessary to start somewhere. Therefore, part one merely offers a
basic context from which to situate part two of chapter four (the simulation), which
details my ethnographic experience in the Argentine capital studying the LebaneseArgentine population. With this point established, everything in, of or from Lebanon
is a potential ethnic emblem which members of the Lebanese diaspora may reference
in their expressions of Lebanese- ness.
And this conversation is particularly salient, because it addresses how
members of a population may achieve (relevant) ethnic continuity despite spatial and
temporal separation from its source. Examining the Lebanese-Argentines of Buenos
Aires provides a case study of a group which has undergone increasingly common
circumstances germane to globalization: assimilation (or its less severe cousin,
acculturation), miscegenation and the inevitable forward-ticking of time.

Part I: Lebanon as “Home”, the Simulated
History and Geography Infused with Politics
The present-day state of Lebanon is a minuscule parcel of land smaller than the
United States state of Connecticut; it covers only 4,036 square miles. To the west of
Lebanon lies the Mediterranean Sea. To the north and east is Syria, and Israel is to the
south. The terrain varies from coastal plain, to the fertile Bekaa valley, to the arable
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Lebanon and snow-capped Anti-Lebanon mountain ranges. The Litani is Lebanon's
most important river, running a length of approximately ninety miles from south of
Baalbek to slightly north of Tyre, and supplying much of the country’s water.
Beirut is the capital of Lebanon, and the city whic h the New York Times
placed atop its list of “44 Places to Go in 2009” (New York Times). It is a major sea
port resting at the foot of the Lebanon Mountains, with approximately 1.57 million
people inhabiting the capital, and another 2.1 million living in surrounding areas.
Once dubbed the “Paris of the Middle East” where many inhabitants do speak French
in addition to Arabic, Beirut is first mentioned in the Amarna Letters from the 15 th
century BCE. Today, it is a place of happening nightlife, international festivals (e.g.
Beirut International Film Festival, Beirut International Jazz Festival), museums (e.g.
Sursock Museum, National Museum of Beirut), universities (e.g. American University
in Beirut, Lebanese University), cafes, markets, restaurants, natural spaces and
cultural diversity.
Yet, Beirut has also been called “the city that would not die”, for its colorful
and tumultuous past (a name it shares with London, Manchester, Bradgate, Iowa,
U.S.A. and surely other towns and cities worldwide). Its history is as multilayered as
the compounded vestiges of Phoenician, Roman, Mamluk, Crusader, Abbassid,
Umayyad, Byzantine, Persian, Canaanite and Ottoman civilizations unearthed in the
capital’s downtown area. But in recent times, Beirut has been marred with c ivil war,
internal fighting often among religious groups that has prompted the exodus of nearly
one million Lebanese. The Lebanese Civil War lasted from 1975 until 1990,
concluding with the Taif Agreement of 1989. The Hundred Days’ War of 1978 and the
1982 Lebanon War erupted amidst the on- going fighting. During the 2006 Lebanon
War between Hizbollah and the Israeli military, Israeli warplanes bombed south
Beirut.
Aside from Beirut are other relevant and less contentious Lebanese cities, such
as Tripoli (the country's second major city and also an important sea port), Tyre
(capital of the ancient Phoenician empire), Sidon (which contains Phoenician burial
sites and was the site of one of Jesus Christ’s sermons) and Jbayl (ancient Biblos, and
perhaps the oldest town in the world, as well as the site of the first Crusader castle).
Modern-day Lebanon (and the Levant) can be traced back to the ancient
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civilization of Phoenicia—perhaps “the first known commercial empire on earth”
(Sheehan and Latif, 2008, p. 20). Tyre was the capital of the empire, which reached as
far west as the Strait of Gibraltar and included the famed city of Carthage. The
Phoenicians traded metal, linen, wood, glass, precious stones, and ivory with
communities from what are today Jordan and Syria. They also invented the first
known alphabet, on which the Arabic, Latin and Hebrew alphabets would later be
based. In 64 BCE Phoenicia fell to the Romans under Pompey the Great, and became
the major supplier of timber for the ships and buildings the Romans constructed
throughout their empire. In A.D. 630, what is Lebanon today came under the
Umayyad caliphate at the helm of the expanding Muslim empire. The Abbasids
supplanted the Umayyads in A.D. 750, and the Abbasid caliphate caved to the
Mamluks in A.D. 1250.
Under Muslim rule Christians were still allowed to practice their faith, and
Mount Lebanon became a safe haven for persecuted religious minorities. It is here the
Maronite community settled in the seventh century, and the Druze in the 11 th century.
In 1099, a band of Christian French, German and English soldiers known as the
Crusaders arrived to the Levant with the aim of propagating Christian influence in the
Muslim-dominated eastern Mediterranean; they remained there until the 14 th century.
Two centuries later the Ottomans overthrew the Mamluks.
Under Ottoman rule Lebanon was divided into vilayets, over which powerful
local families were put in charge. These families became dynasties, which later
aligned with Muslim and Christian groups—most notably the Druze and Maronites.
Switching allegiances over time led to political instability, and these districts became
hotbeds of bloody conflict of a seemingly religious nature. Riding beneath the facade
of religious difference, however, was an undercurrent of outrage over economic
disparities between the groups. In 1858, civil war broke out in Lebanon; it was during
this time many (Syro-) Lebanese also immigrated from Greater Syria (see chapter one
for an explanation of the migration of Syro-Lebanese from Greater Syria in greater
detail). Ottoman and European troops established a new government in 1859 which
ensured a Christian ruler. This arrangement lasted until the end of the First World War
when the Ottoman Empire also fell.
The newly established League of Nations in 1919 partitioned Greater Syria
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into Palestine for the British, and a separate Lebanon and Syria for the French. After
much struggle with the French, what would become Lebanon finally gained its
independence on November 22, 1943. The country drafted the National Pact, which
“was designed to ensure that Lebanese independence would be complete, with
Christians promising to cut connections to Christian Europe, and the Muslim groups
promising not to seek ties to the Arab world” (Sorenson, 2010, p. 13). It also
“sanctified the confessional system of the 1926 Constitution, distributing power on
the basis of the 1932 census with its six-to- five ratio of Christians to Muslims” (p.
13). Lebanon is richly religiously diverse; there are Maronites, Shiite and Sunni
Muslims, Druze, Melkites, Greek Orthodox, and Catholics, among other groups. Such
diversity coupled with political and economic disparities, confined within tiny borders
has often spelled out serious turmoil.
The current political regime termed a “confessional system” is confounding;
political power is apportioned according to religious presence in the country
(Sorenson, 2010, p. 69). Demographically Lebanon is without one clear majority (no
census has been conducted in Lebanon since 1932), thus feasibility of such an
arrangement is dubious at best, disastrous at worst.
In addition to political troubles, Lebanon has had a history of economic
turmoil. In recent decades the country has suffered tremendously from civil war and
recessions, requiring international assistance to recover.

Major Religious Groups
Islam and Christianity are the two major religions in Lebanon; various divisions
comprise both religious groups. The Maronite, Eastern Orthodox and Armenian
Apostolic Churches, as well as the Assyrian Church of the East are the dominant
Christian confessions. Islam is split between the Sunni and Shiite denominations, and
there are also some adherents to the Druze faith in Lebanon.
As Maronites were the largest religious group to immigrate from Greater
Syria to Argentina, a brief look at the Maronite faith in Lebanon is helpful when
considering the religious factors which act on Lebanese ethnicity and culture.
Christians are thought to make up roughly forty percent of Lebanon's religious
population, and Maronites are the largest group of this religious belief system.
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The origins of the name “Maronite” are not definitive. In his work Tarikh alTa'ifa al-Maruniyya, Patriarch Istefan al- Duwayhi purports that the Maronites took
their name from a monastery in Syria named Marun for Christ. Jabra'il Ibn al-Qila'i
suggests the Maronites derived their name from “the pious Marun,” the “Patriarch of
Great Antioch” (Moosa, 1986, p. 12). The first Maronites lived in the valley of the
Orontes, as well as inhabited other northern parts of Syria, including parts of Mount
Lebanon. By the end of the eleventh century they had settled on Mount Lebanon as
their home where they established themselves as agriculturalists (Fawaz, 1994, p. 11).
A visit to “The Maronite Eparchy of Our Lady of Lebanon” website reveals that
Maronites are one of six major traditions of the Catholic Church (Alexandrian,
Antiochene, Armenian, Chaldean, Constantinopolitan (Byzantine), and Latin
(Roman)). Catholic Christians are Uniates or followers of the Roman Catholic
Church. However, there is some dispute as to whether Maronites have always aligned
with the Holy See. Matti Moosa says, “[b]y faith, liturgy, rite, religious books, and
heritage, the Maronites were of Syrian Orthodox (Jacobite) origin until the very end
of the sixteenth century when they became ultramontane followers of the Roman
Catholic Church” (Moosa, 1986, p. 1).
In A.D. 451, Emperor Marcian convened the Council of Chalcedon with the
approval of Pope Leo the Great. This council established the 'Chalcedonian
Definition,' which defined the nature of Christ as dual: one in person, one in
hypostasis. The East-West Schism (also The Great Schism) of A.D. 1054, then
formally divided the church of the Roman Empire into the Roman Catholic Church
and the Eastern Orthodox Church on grounds of theological discrepancies and
ecclesiastical differences. The Eastern Orthodox Church adhered to the Chalcedon
Definition. Some research suggests the early Maronite church was a part of the early
Eastern Orthodox Churches, which Rome cast aside as being schismatic. The
Maronite faith may have evolved from Monothelitism, which instructs that Jesus
Christ had one will and two natures (as opposed to dyothelitism, which specifies that
Jesus had both divine and human will, as well as two natures). According to Leila
Fawaz, “…it is commonly believed by other Christians and by Muslims that the
Maronite church was established as Syrian Monothelete in 680, and that it abandoned
Monothelism in the twelfth century, when it recognized papal supremacy without
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giving up its own Syriac liturgy and priesthood” (Fawaz, 1994, p. 11).
Eventually the Roman Catholic Church—in conjunction with the French
some time after—would provide the structure needed for Maronites to become a
cohesive community in Lebanon. Maronite clergy would then help steer the
community in the direction of an “ethnic mold” with Lebanon as the homeland. And it
was “[t]he connection to the Latin Church directly, and the French indirectly, [that]
gave Maronites the notion that they are a people apart (or “chosen”) from those in the
immediate environment” (Hagopian, 1989, p. 108). According to this belief, the
mission of the Maronite is to introduce progress to those of the Arab East. And it is
precisely because “Maronites insist they have a commitment to universalism (respect
for all while keeping their own identity and values)” that they are equipped to carry
out such a mission (p. 108). The ultimate goal is to shed “enlightenment and openness
that they have gained by bridging the Western and Eastern worlds” (p. 108).

Music, Literature, Gastronomy and the Debke
On November 19, 2010, Lebanese-British singer Mika performed at the Hot Festival
in Buenos Aires. He is famous for such songs as “Love Today” and “Grace Kelly”. On
some sites announcing his impending concert, users expressed unrestrained glee:
“OMG OMG OMG OMG OMG” (“Oh My God Oh My God Oh My God Oh My
God Oh My God”). “Ahhhhhhh! Me muero, me muero, me muero! (“Ahhhhhhh! I’m
dying, I’m dying, I’m dying!”). Another user even said it was the happiest day of
his/her life.
Mika (born Michael Holbrook Penniman, Jr.) is one of millions in the
Lebanese diaspora, the progeny of a Lebanese mother and American father. He was
born in 1983 in Beirut, but left with his family at about one year-old because of the
Lebanese Civil War. Lebanon has a lengthy record of exodus; by some accounts, there
are 14 million Lebanese in the diaspora (The National). The well- loved singer
Fairouz, however, is one notable exception: Although she often performed abroad
during the Lebanese Civil War, she continued living in her homeland, and refused to
side with any of the factions (National Public Radio). Fairouz (born Nihad Haddad) is
one of Lebanon’s most famous singers, and has also acquired an impressive
international following. National Public Radio (NPR) in the United States named her
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one of its “50 Great Voices”, saying that “[p]art of Fairuz's appeal was her music's
accessible themes, such as village life in the mountains of Lebanon — songs about
nightingales, drunken neighbors, the smell of jasmine, fig trees and vineyards and a
bus ride from the village of Himalaya to Tanourin” (National Public Radio). In a
country with a rocky history, music has oft-served as a balm to soothe weariness:
Fairouz’s "Behebak Ya Libnan” (“I love you, Lebanon”) was musical solace during
the Lebanese Civil War, as was “Ana Mosh Kaafir” (“I’m not a Heathen”) by Ziad
Rahbani. “Faris Odeh” by Rim Banna, “Hareb” by Kazem el Saher and “Quds al
Atika” (“Old Jerusalem”) by Fairouz are other popular songs by Lebanese artists,
which speak to tragedies in the Middle East. Other popular musicians of Lebanon—
contemporary and of yore—include Philimoun Wahbi, Nancy Ajram, Tawfeeq
Albasha, Haifa Wehbe, the Rahbani Brothers, Myriam Fares, Najah Salaam, Ziad
Rahbani, Sabah, Nasri Shamsiddeen, Zeki Naseef, Sister Marie Keyrouz, Julia
Boutros, Marcel Khalife and Wadii Alsafi.
Yet, as fundamental to Lebanese culture and tradition as music is the debke,
Lebanon’s national dance, and one it shares with neighbors Syria, Israel/Palestine,
Jordan and Iraq. It is most popular in the mountainous regions of these countries. As
the story goes, the debke's origins are in the aouna, the tradition in which villagers
would gather in an arc to help new homeowners tamp their mud roof by stamping on
it. Eventually, music was added to the process to entertain the participants and incite
them to liveliness in the cold. Today, the debke manifests in manifold rhythms, steps,
tunes and melodies, and is a staple dance at weddings, festivals and other celebrations.
And just as Lebanon's national dance has criss-crossed the globe in the
Lebanese diaspora, so too has its cuisine. In general, food is a hugely important angle
through which to explore an ethnicity, because of its subtle commentary on the people
who created it, their environment and history. Gastronomy reveals the geography of a
people (climate and landscape), available resources (beasts of burden or smaller
animals, plentiful water or lack thereof, arable land coupled with the skills to cultivate
it), history (traditions of fine wine- making, etc.) as well as belief systems and values
(the requirement of kosher or halal foods, the sanctity of certain animals, such as
cattle, the forbiddance of wine, particular foods included in religious or secular
ceremonies and celebrations, etc.).
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In light of these considerations, Lebanese cuisine is more than telling: It is a
savory blend of Mediterranean and Middle Eastern kitchens. Kibbeh (minced lamb,
bulgur wheat, pine nuts and minced onions), chicken with rice, fish with tahina and
grilled lamb or chicken skewers are typical main dishes. Mezzes normally precede the
main course, and can be hummus (ground chick peas with olive oil and spices), baba
ghanouj (puréed aubergine), tabbouleh (a salad with parsley, minced vegetables and
cracked wheat), dolma (stuffed vine leaves), fatayer (ground meat or spinach stuffed
and cooked in triangular dough) and lebneh (a yogurt- garlic dip). The mezzes usually
come with warm pita bread, olive oil and fresh herbs. Finally, the meal may be
rounded off with a succulent dessert, and if the occasion requires—wine. Baklava is a
popular traditional dessert, a sweet pastry made of phyllo dough, honey and crushed
pistachios. Most traditional desserts contain dried fruits, jam, honey, molasses or
syrup and/or nuts. As the area that is now called Lebanon has produced wine for more
than 4,000 years, the drink is frequently included in Lebanese meals. Coming mainly
from the Bekaa Valley, three prominent wines in Lebanon are Châteaux Ksara,
Kefraya, and Musar. Yet, curiously, the national drink is arak, an anise- flavored liquor
(Lebanon Embassy United States).
Gibran Khalil Gibran is arguably Lebanon’s mo st widely-known
contemporary literary figure. Author of The Prophet, Gibran was an artist, novelist,
mystical poet and philosophical essayist. In 1883, he was born to a Maronite family in
the northern area of Bsharri in Lebanon. As his family was poor and his father
consistently plagued with debt, Gibran received no early formal education. Instead, a
local village priest taught him the Bible and religion, Syriac, Arabic, history and
science. Around the age of twelve, Khalil, his mother and three siblings immigrated to
the state of New York in the United States. Three years later he returned to Lebanon in
order to study Arabic and French at College La Sagesse in Beirut. In 1904, he
published his first set of poems to be known as “A Tear and a Smile”, and after a few
years relocated to Paris for artistic training. Eventually, Gibran settled in New York,
and established a literary society named al Rabitat al Qalamiya (The Pen-bond
Society), in conjunction with other Lebanese and Arab writers and poets in the United
States. The Prophet was published in 1923, and eight years later Gibran died in a New
York hospital. Although he may be the most recognized of contemporary Lebanese
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authors, others such as Amin Maalouf, Hanan al Shaykh, Elias Khoury, Mikhail
Naimy, Grace Halabi and Karim el Koussa are notable names in literature.
Examining the music, literature and gastronomy of Lebanon is paramount
when discussing the construction of Lebanese ethnicity in Buenos Aires and the
diaspora, because these ethnic emblems are powerful, yet easily accessible and
duplicable references. Lebanese history and culture are embedded in each,
irrespective of time and distance (and even if they exist only in collective memory or
imagination). In other words, they are what they are precisely because they originated
in Lebanon, and although time passes, Fairouz will always be Fairouz, and Gibran,
Gibran. For an ethnic group that has dispersed to every corner of the globe, and for
which every subsequent generation may speak a little less Arabic (or none at all) and
visit Lebanon a little less often (or not at all), it is simple to pick up a cook book of
Lebanese cuisine, or dedicate oneself to studying the works of Amin al Rihani.

Part II: Buenos Aires as Home, the Simulation
Lebanese-Argentine Ethnicity in Buenos Aires
Enter 2011: Estela Valverde says that Argentina is no longer a popular destination for
Lebanese emigrants; the last immigration wave occurred in the 1980s due to the
Lebanese civil war (Valverde, 1992, p. 314; Civantos, 2006, p. 7). Instead, only
poorer laborers from surrounding Latin American countries cross into Argentina, such
as from Bolivia, Peru or Uruguay. Today the Lebanese-Argentine population is
sprawled across Buenos Aires' 48 districts in 15 communes. This is a fa r cry from
Calle Reconquista, around which most Syro-Lebanese immigrants clustered in the
early waves of migration. Today Reconquista Street is a bustling, hip strip of brick
traversing through the wealthy neighborhoods of Retiro and San Nicolás, with
perfume shops, Pura Vida, the popular fresh juice and wheatgrass bar, fashionable
ladies' boutiques, as well as intriguing restaurants and bars with plenty of outdoor
tables. Reconquista is also at the heart of the city's financial district.
The CIA World Factbook estimates Argentina's population to be 42,192,494 as
of July 2012, and 12,988,000 of those inhabitants live in Buenos Aires capital.
Civantos puts Arabs as currently “the fourth largest immigrant group in Argentina”, a
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title which encompasses Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians, Egyptians, Moroccans,
Iraqis and any other immigrants from the Arab world (Civantos, 2006, p. 7). Cazorla
says that Arabs make up roughly one-tenth of the nation’s population, where the
majority of these migrants settled in Buenos Aires and the northwestern region of
Argentina (Civantos, 2006, p. 7). What follows next in the chapter is a written walkthrough of my ethnographic observations and experiences, as well as conclusions I
have drawn from additional research. The second section also details how I came to
formulate my understanding of the construction of Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity in
the capital of Argentina.
Upon arriving to Buenos Aires and getting situated on the ground, I detected
tell-tale signs of an Arab presence or at the very least, an Arab influence:
advertisements for belly dancing lessons, the Arabic last name Haddad on real estate
signs, a shop for Arabic delicacies. And fortuitously, I met a helpful staff member at
Hostel Arrabal where I stayed during my first two weeks in Buenos Aires. When I told
her I was conducting research on the Lebanese population, she passed along the
contact information for both locations of Club Sirio Libanés. She had studied Arabic
in the past, and to my delight, also regularly attended belly dancing classes at the
school to attend for aficionados in Buenos Aires, the Amir Thaleb Belly Dance
School. 34 Yet, these fantastic leads did not exactly yield a pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow. Out of naïveté I believed that—like in Chicago, New York, London or
Madrid—I could follow my nose or the writing on the wall or some other indicator of
Lebanese- ness to a concentrated origin or community. After all, Syro-Lebanese had
poured into the port city by the tens of thousands at the turn of the last century.
Instead, I found what seemed to be desultory ethnic emblems up for grabs, but
emblems that hung in a still, thick historical silence. This lapse went something like
this:

34 A mir Thaleb was born in Mar del Plata, Argentina, and is of Syrian descent. Well-known in the belly
dancing world, he runs a tight ship. The dance school consists of five one year-long levels, offers
Arabic language classes to dancers, regularly hosts workshops, and has a bazaar which sells books,
DVDs, CDs, and specially crafted sandals for dancers. There is also a dance company which tours
internationally. Together with the friendly receptionist and a fello w Kiwi hostel guest, I sweated
through an intermediate beginner's class of DOOM-tacca-tacca-DOOM-tacca-DOOM-DOOM
combinations across the dance room floor.
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Telling Random Encounters
I had just finished “the Hundred”, and my Pilates teacher at Domus Dance Studio in
historic San Telmo asked why I had come to Buenos Aires. I replied I was conducting
research on the Lebanese-Argentine population.
“There is a Lebanese population in Buenos Aires?”, inquired another Argentine
student.
“Claro que sí (Indeed)”, I retorted to a mum, but attentive group. I gave a bit of
background on the population I had come to study.
Quite a knowledgeable man as I would later discover, my instructor of Italian descent
responded by saying there were lots of both Syrians and Lebanese in Argentina, and
really they were one in the same.
“Really…”, I pondered.
He then proceeded to tell me how awful and corrupt of a president Carlos Menem had
been—an opinion of the former Argentinean president of Syria n descent others would
share with me time and again.
But the above account of a brief random conversation I had in Domus Dance
Studio was not just a one-off experience. Instead, it was a hint that an ignorance of
Syro-Lebanese immigration to Argentina could be more prevalent than just among the
Pilates-goers of my class. In fact, when telling Argentines of my reasons for crisscrossing the globe I was often met with, “Oh. So, are there a lot?” Although some
estimates place Argentines of Arab descent (Lebanese included) at roughly ten percent
of Argentina's population, of the many Argentines I met, only a handful were aware
that there were even that many, if any.
Thus, I set out to see if Buenos Aires duplicated this historical silence
elsewhere. A visit to the National Library yielded two general books on immigration
that perhaps included something on the Syro-Lebanese waves of immigration, the
librarian told me. All the other titles the system generated were about other specific
groups—the Spanish, the Italians, the French, the British, for instance. The Cómic
Cultural (Cultural Comic) series book La inmigración en la Argentina: Los que
fueron llegando (Immigration in Argentina: Those Who Continued Arriving) co-
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authored by Oche Califa 35 and Diego Parés (Félix Luna) gives a brief overview of
immigration to Argentina in general. It devotes fewer than two full pages to the Arab
immigration waves (Syro-Lebanese included). The book recapitulates the Ottoman
origins of early Arab immigrants, as well as their rapid adaptation to Argentine culture
(such as with the consumption of yerba maté so much that those re-emigrating to the
Levant continued the drinking tradition). Further, it touches on their early ambulatory
hawking occupations, the location of most Arabs around Calle Reconquista and the
origin of the misnomer turco. 36 The second book—La inmigración en la Argentina
(Immigration in Argentina)—had developed sections on the immigration of Italians,
Sephardic Jews and the French, yet nothing on the Arab migration waves. All other
immigrant groups to Argentina were also excluded.
I turned to the internet. Biblioteca Nacional de Maestros (National Library of
Teachers) returned 29 titles of digitized books for inmigración (immigration) to
Argentina, zero for inmigración árabe (Arab immigration), zero for inmigración
libanesa (Lebanese immigration) and nil for inmigración siria (Syrian immigration).
So, I visited bookshops. I browsed for titles on Syro-Lebanese immigration to
Argentina, as well as looked for dictionaries and workbooks on the Arabic language.
Trips to used, university, chain, foreign language, specialty, independent second- hand
discounted shops for university students and liquidating bookstores rendered few
results. I frequently found at least one title on Jewish immigration to Argentina, at
least one book on general immigration and several on the gaucho culture. El Ateneo,
one of the largest bookstore chains in Buenos Aires, had in stock one title on
immigration to Argentina in its popular Calle Santa Fe store: Historias de
inmigración: Testimonios de pasión, amor y arraigo en tierra argentina (Tales of
Immigration: Testimonies of Passion, Love and Roots in Argentina), by Lucía Gálvez.
In it there were stories from immigrants of various populations that had arrived to

35 Califa is the Spanish word for “caliph,” which is derived fro m the Arabic word “khalifa”

)

36 Professor Liliana Cazorla also said early Syro-Lebanese immigrants first lived around Calle
Reconquista; however, a v isit to the Buenos Aires government page for El Observatorio project of
immigrat ion appreciation in the Argentine capital says this group first settled around Calle Alem. Calle
Alem runs parallel to Reconquista, and is two streets over. It curves at one point, at which the two then
intersect.
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Argentina, such as Czech, Irish, Greek, Italian, English, Spanish, etc., and one from
the Syro-Lebanese population.
Some occasions proved fortuitous, however. Those of Lebanese, SyroLebanese, Syrian or even Arabic descent are well-woven into the Buenos Aires
demographic. They are there, and in a matter of weeks, I randomly met several.
Serendipitously, the eye- glass specialist who attended me while I replaced my broken
specs was of Greater Syrian heritage. I handed over the optical prescription I had
gotten at the German-Egyptian Eye Care Center in Maadi, Cairo. The heading on the
card was in Arabic.
“This is in Arabic.”
“It is! I study in Cairo, but I'm here conducting research for the summer.”
“Anda! (Ohh!),” she responded. “What do you study in Cairo and what is your
research about here?”
I replied that I was pursuing a Master of Arts in Middle East Studies, and explained
that in Buenos Aires I was researching the construction of ethnicity among the
Lebanese-Argentine population. She looked at me somewhat quizzically. Her
grandfather had immigrated from Greater Syria to Argentina, she offered. She
continued: In the past she had studied Arabic until the pursuit demanded too much of
her time. It is a complicated language, she opined, but perhaps, one day she would
pick it up again. She spoke matter-of-factly, objectively, yet fondly. After a few
minutes, we went back to discussing the frames I had chosen. Likewise, my landlady's
partner was also of Greater Syrian descent. Like the eye- glass specialist's grandfather,
his grandfather had also immigrated to Argentina.
I was walking through the wealthy neighborhood of Recoleta one evening
from Roca Museum, and spotted a restaurant of Arabic cuisine. I entered, introduced
myself and explained my research topic. “Excuse me, are you the owner?” I said I
would be much obliged to ask the man in the white apron a few questions about the
establishment and his background. Both he and the woman behind the counter
regarded me with some suspicion. Although they declined to give me specific answers
beyond “Sí, somos Árabes” (“Yes, we're Arabs”), they did graciously allow me to
photograph some of the gastronomical selection in the shop. The woman chatted me
up while I ate kibbeh and sambousek, asking friendly questions about my background
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and what I was doing in Cairo, Egypt.
“Where are you from?”
“What's your religion?”
“Are you married?”
“No? It's better that way. Go and explore the world first, that's a beautiful thing.”
And in the neighborhood, Once, I found a small bookshop going out of
business. The selection of reading material there targeted a surprisingly eclectic
clientele. There were English language edition Elle magazines from the nineties,
horror books in German, Bibles, books in French on how to stay slim. I thoroughly
combed shelves and milk crates until I settled upon a small stack of dusty books and
magazines in Arabic. Their pages were frayed and yellowed: religious texts, social
commentary and other subjects I could not make out for my want of Arabic
vocabulary. I purchased a magazine originally from Saudi Arabia entitled El Dars El
Watani from 1404 AH, which I used to study the language. I was intrigued by the
colorful maps and pictures of rockets, ships, spaceships, tanks, helmeted soldiers and
men's sports teams.
I supplemented my Saudi Arabian periodical with a book of Arabic grammar
exercises by a professor at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Alhamdulilah
and gracias a Dios! It turned out to be the only book on Arabic language instruction
that I found while in Buenos Aires, aside from one at the university bookstore at
Centro Universitario de Idiomas (University Language Center). I immediately
purchased Árabe para extranjeros (Arabic for Foreigners) for over 40 USD (perhaps a
testament to the scarcity of its kind in the city, or just to the rapid decline in value of
the Argentine peso). Until that point, I had been looking to enroll in Arabic language
classes in order to meet porteños of Lebanese descent. There was Centro
Universitario de Idiomas, whose classes I could take as a student at University of
Buenos Aires. Both Asociación de Beneficencia Drusa (Druze Charitable
Organization) and the Mezquita de Palermo (the Mosque of Palermo) also offered
Arabic language classes that began in August and ran for three months. Then there
was the book. I deferred to the option of the grammar book from Spain.
I was surprised to find either of the books. The first of these two gems could
very well have come from a member of the Lebanese (or Arab) population itself. The
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small stack of social, cultural and religious reading material in Arabic at the
liquidating bookstore almost surely belonged to owners who could understand their
contents. That they were used, of a high level of Arabic and deposited at an obscure
second- hand bookshop indicates a definite purpose for their presence. This is not the
same as a copy of Harry Potter on the shelf of a major bookstore that may or may not
sell. The book of Arabic grammar exercises was one of a pair; the other was a
recapitulation of grammar rules (I did not buy this one). They were the only of their
kind at this used bookshop close to the University Language Center (which offered
beginning Arabic language classes). And this was the only bookshop I found that
carried materials on (or in) the Arabic language out of those I visited in Buenos Aires.
As the books were from Spain, I postulate they could have been property of a Spanish
student studying Arabic in Buenos Aires, who perhaps, off- loaded them before
returning home.
On another occasion, I decided to take a guided morning tour of the famous
Recoleta Cemetery, final resting place of several Argentine presidents and Nobel
laureates, Eva Perón and many another notable Argentine. While briefly explaining
the early history of Argentina and why some headstones were in Italian or a language
other than Spanish, the tour guide remarked that the country was one of immigrants.
She said most were Mediterranean from Italy or Spain; the others emigrated from
other European countries, save for a few outliers. I engaged her in a short dialogue on
Arab immigration to Argentina: “What about the Syro-Lebanese? Or other Arab
groups?” She thoughtfully replied that they came in small numbers. Later, she added
that perhaps somewhere outside of Buenos Aires was a Muslim cemetery. Curiously,
Lebanese-Argentine author Ibrahim Husayn Hallar was well aware of this blind spot
more than half a century ago. In his 1959 Descubrimiento de América por los árabes
(Arab Discovery of America), he says that “The Arab is here incognito, diluted,
unrecognized, but he is here” (Hallar, 1963, p. 11).
Professor Liliana Cazorla’s early experience in her field speaks to the same
issue of a nation overlooking part of its population. When she bega n working for the
Roca Museum Institute of Historical Research, she specialized in Spanish
immigration to Argentina. After learning that none of her colleagues studied the
hardly- touched research area of Arab migration to the Republic, she switched her
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specialization to fill in the gap. She found no archives, so she began her own—the
majority of which are in her home. She visited organizations tied to the SyroLebanese population in Buenos Aires and interviewed Syro-Lebanese immigrants of
older generations. Many gifted her with their mementos, such as Arabic language
newspapers. Cazorla says that today there are more specialists in the field, and greater
overall interest in Arab immigration to Argentina. In 1989, for example, the
University of Buenos Aires created the Cátedra en Iberoamérica de Arquitectura
Islámica en la Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo (Chair in IberoAmerica of Islamic Architecture at the Faculty of Architecture, Design and Urban
Planning) to study an arguably neglected portion of the nation’s population.
On a more upbeat note, however, the creation of this position precedes what
seems to be a fairly new, but growing trend on the part of the city of Buenos Aires to
recognize its diversity, a mélange of people which includes the Lebanese population.
Take for instance the young, up-and-running project called El Observatorio de
Colectividades (The Observatory of Populations). Its aim is “to reveal the histories
and cultural, social and institutional contributions of the distinct migratory waves that
arrived to the city” (Observatorio de Colectividades). For this initiative, the
government spotlights forty- four immigrant groups to Buenos Aires: Senegalese
populations, to Bulgarian, to Austrian, Korean, Swiss, Cape Verdean, Croatian,
Japanese, Syrian and Lebanese (these two populations are treated as one group,
although the project acknowledges that Syria and Lebanon are now two independent
countries) and on the project goes. The site details basic facts about the groups, and
offers examples of how they have contributed to the capital's rich culture and history.
There are videos and lists of cultural institutions, as well as the names of pertinent
monuments, plazas, streets and neighborhoods around the city. El Observatorio
website acknowledges that
The ways in which the distinct waves of immigrants have influenced
the city are evident in our streets, neighborhoods, monuments,
buildings, gastronomical selection, manner of speech, customs and
many of the milieux and institutions with which we daily interact. All
of this forms part of the porteña identity and is the bedrock of this
Observatory...We define the city of Buenos Aires as a mosaic of
identities, a city that offers multiple approaches to living, a city that
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pulsates and vibrates to the rhythm of thousands of sounds which
comprise its melody. (author's translation from Observatorio de
Colectividades).
To formalize its dedication to celebrating Buenos Aires' diversity, the government has
signed an agreement with institutions representing immigrants and their descendents
“in protection of the values of coexistence, mutual respect and peace—characteristics
of our uniqueness” (El Observatorio de Colectividades). April 19 of every year has
been designated “Day of Coexistence in Cultural Diversity”, and April 24 is “Day of
Action for Tolerance and Respect Among People”. For the Syrian and Lebanese
populations, per Law Nº 2.559, the government of Buenos Aires—in conjunction with
La Confederación de Entidades Argentino Árabe (the Confederation of ArgentineArab Bodies)—has named the third week of April “Semana de la Cultura de los
Paises Árabes” (“Arab Country Culture Week”), in which there are cultural activities
to celebrate the Lebanese and Syrian populations (Observatorio de Colectividades).
Returning to the notion of a historical silence on the Lebanese-Argentines of
Buenos Aires, however, a random sampling of bookstores and libraries for titles about
(Syro-) Lebanese immigration to Argentina and Arabic (whether in or about the
language), as well as a historical tour of an aspect of Buenos Aires' history sheds
some light as to what the general populace has exposure. This includes LebaneseArgentine and non-Lebanese descendents alike. The availability of books o n certain
topics can speak to people's general interest, or it can provide commentary on what
they might be taught. For instance, a multitude of titles on the gaucho culture could
reflect a high interest in the subject, or could indicate a wider trend of educating the
populace on the same—for whatever motive.
But situating the idea of a historical silence in the context of ethnicity, how
could a long-standing lack of general attention to the Lebanese-Argentine population
in Buenos Aires affect the construction of a Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity? And
what does this lapse even say? First, I interpret the lapse I detected to mean that early
assimilationist policies actually worked, that what need not have been remembered
was not necessarily remembered, save for by those for whom it was significant.
Argentina—especially Buenos Aires—is a nation of peoples who have melded
considerably. As the Latin phrase goes, E pluribus unum (Out of many, one). While
81

certainly a far cry from an indiscriminate Latin race, at least from my observations,
everyday interactions do not require a constant reminder of one's ethnic and/or racial
identity.
In light of this fact, some members of the Lebanese-Argentine population of
Buenos Aires have nevertheless made considerable efforts to keep Lebanese culture
alive in the diaspora. There are and have been a solid number of organizations and
institutions that facilitate contact with and travel to Lebanon, or provide programs and
courses for participants to become more familiar with Lebanese culture in Buenos
Aires today. Some have been around for decades. There are non- governmental
organizations such as FEARAB Argentina: Confederación de Entidades Argentino
Árabes (Confederation of Arab-Argentine Organizations), Unión Cultural Argentino
Libanesa (UCAL) (Lebanese-Argentine Cultural Union) and its branch for younger
members of the Lebanese diaspora, JUCAL. There is also the World Lebanese
Cultural Union. These institutions organize trips to Lebanon, conduct seminars on
Lebanese culture, post historical articles on immigration and provide updates on
publications, television programs and radio broadcasts of interest to the LebaneseArgentine population and beyond. There are social clubs, such as Club Libanés
(Lebanese Club), Club Los Cedros (Cedars Club) and Club Sirio Libanés (SyrianLebanese Club), which are today, reminiscent of once recreational spots for members
of the Syro-Lebanese population to gather and play cards, eat and discuss current
events. Then there are other resources, such as Revista Árabe (Arabic Magazine), that
cover topics on Lebanon, Radio Splendid 990 AM, which plays Arabic music for two
hours on Sunday and Radio Monte Líbano 103.9 FM, which advertises itself as an
international station. Its objective is “to spread Lebanese traditions, customs, values,
history, geography and contributions around the globe” through music, poetry and
spoken word (Radio Monte Líbano). From 2003 until 2011, Desde El Aljibe (From the
Well) aired on Channel 7. Starring Lebanese Maronites, the program introduced the
national Argentine audience to Arab culture, language, cuisine, history and politics.
Alternately, Fundación Los Cedros (Cedars Foundation), Misión Libanesa Maronita
(Lebanese Maronite Mission), Oficina de la Cultura y Difusión Islámica (Office for
the Diffusion of Islam and Islamic Culture), Organización Islam (Organization of
Islam), Mezquita de Palermo (Mosque of Palermo), Asociación de Beneficencia
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Drusa (Charitable Association of the Druze) and Fundación Sirio Libanesa (SyrianLebanese Foundation) provide more particular entrances to aspects of Lebanese and
Arab ethnicity, whether through religion, language or culture.
Those interested in learning more about Lebanese (and Syrian) culture can
also attend conferences, shows and cooking courses. Club Sirio Libanés offers Arabic
cooking classes every Thursday, and there are occasional advertisements for private
cooking classes posted around Arab-related locales, such as the Church of San Marón.
What is more, to commemorate the independence of Lebanon, every year in
November porteños are invited to attend an elaborate celebration of Lebanese culture
called El Festival Libanés (“the Lebanese Festival”), complete with dancers,
orchestras, singers and traditional folkloric groups accompanied by a show of lights
and video. Organized by la Juventud de la Unión Cultural Argentino Libanesa (Youth
of the Lebanese Argentine Cultural Union), “it is a meeting filled with tradition,
music and dancing for members of every institution in the community, from the 'land
of the cedars'”. Since the festival's inception in 2008, more than 2,000 people have
attended the show at Teatro ND Ateneo (Observatorio de Colectividades).
Additionally, the Recoleta Cultural Center hosts a week of tribute to Arab c ulture,
replete with installations of photographs, art work and crafts. The center also offers
Arabic workshops, lectures on the work of such poets as Khalil Gibran and Mahmud
Darwish and a cooking class which demonstrates how to make traditional dishes from
the Middle East. A series of Arabic movies, short films and documentaries are shown
everyday of the week, and there are nightly musical and dance performances by wellknown artists, Arab orchestras and dance troupes (Revista El Abasto).
But I draw a second conclusion on how an apparent lack of attention towards
the Lebanese-Argentine population in Buenos Aires may influence the construction of
a Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity. A climate of acknowledgment or lack thereof created
by non- members of an ethnic group can contribute to whether ethnic group members
feel comfortable expressing their ethnicity. For example, those who are proud of their
heritage and sense that others around them know very little about their culture may
showcase ethnic symbols if they are in a non-threatening environment. On the
contrary, if the environment is less-than-welcoming towards a particular ethnic group
and there is no need to broadcast one's origins (such as in competition for resources),
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group members may choose to do so inconspicuously. Another possibility is that even
in a non-threatening socio-cultural environment, a lack of acknowledgment of one's
identity components by outsiders may indicate to ethnic group members that it is
easier to keep such information to oneself. What is the point of showcasing ethnic
symbols if few outsiders recognize them anyway? Especially if it is possible to
navigate the social world perfectly well without them. Expressing ethnic identity in
private and amongst other fellow ethnic group members may suffice if there is a
desire to feel close to one's roots. If there is a time-space disconnect, LebaneseArgentines may forgo expression altogether, whether in public or private. But as
illustrates the aforementioned list of resources, media, institutes, religious
organizations and clubs established to celebrate or disseminate the Lebanese culture,
there are Lebanese-Argentines who actively choose to align with and express their
Lebanese ethnic identity. The following section highlights some of these instances,
and explores how those of Lebanese descent in Buenos Aires reference ethnic
emblems from Lebanon to fashion a legitimately recognizable Lebanese-Argentine
ethnicity, a simulation of Lebanese- ness.

Specific Examples of Referencing Lebanese-ness in Buenos Aires
Catedral de San Marón (the Cathedral of Saint Maroun) is located on Paraguay Street
in the center of the Capital Federal. Some of the bricks on the tower facade are tan
and white, arranged in the ablaq pattern common in Islamic architecture. In the center
of the facade is a tri- lobed arch typical of the Fatimid style—I had seen this before in
Cairo. At the very top, in the center, rests a concrete inset of a cross pattee. To the left,
the wall of the church building perpendicular to the to wer boasts the details of the
services beneath the declaration, culto católico (Catholic worship), and a picture of
the patron saint adorns another space along the brick wall. A little farther down sits a
large seal: Misión Libanesa Maronita en la Argentina: 1901 Centanario 2001
(Lebanese Maronite Mission in Argentina: 1901-2001). As of the time I had visited,
the Church of Saint Maroun had existed in Buenos Aires for 110 years. But much of
the church's current building is relatively new. The construction of the sanctuary
concluded in 2001—one year after it began. Curiously enough, the architecture of the
church, its inside décor and the rituals of service reveal ways in which members of the
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church have created a unique amalgam of Lebanese ethnic emblems which speaks to
the church's origins, yet comfortably situates it within Buenos Aires' distinct Latin
American culture. After all, the church explicitly states that this was by design: “La
Iglesia San Marón fue diseñada y construida para que sobreviva a las generaciones
de feligreses que componen la gran familia maronita, fuerte y resistente como las
piedras y perenne y perdurable como los Cedros del Líbano” (“The Church of Saint
Maroun was designed and constructed to survive the generations of parishioners that
compose the expansive Maronite family, as strong and resistant as the stones, and as
eternal and everlasting as the Cedars of Lebanon”) (Mision Libanesa).
The architecture of La Iglesia de San Marón is intentionally historically,
ethnically and regionally appropriate. The construction of the church was monitored
by three Argentine architects, two of whom traveled to Lebanon to visit local places
of worship. While there, they also met with Lebanese craftsmen and expert
stonemasons. In turn, seven Lebanese builders traveled to Buenos Aires to oversee the
project, the final product a nod to the Monastery of Saint Anthony of Qozhaya located
in the Qadisha Valley of northern Lebanon. And the stones used in the construction of
the church are even “authentic”. Roughly 520 metric tons of stone were transported
by boat from the Lebanese Mountains to Buenos Aires, the altar stones originate from
five different quarries in Lebanon and inside of the sanctuary is made up of stones
from each of Lebanon's provinces.
While most of the church's building materials are from Lebanon, so is much of
the language on display inside. I was surprised by the Arabic script on the altar cloth,
as by the names of important religious figures in the Maronite faith. (But how many
parishioners can read Arabic script?) And the mission's publication, El Misionero (The
Missionary), although mostly in Spanish, has subtitles and phrases in Arabic.
Tellingly, a portion of the periodical is devoted to helping Lebanese-Argentines visit
Lebanon and learn about it, as well as locate and contact their relatives there. There is
even the suggestion to obtain Lebanese citizenship. The April 2010 issue addresses an
apparently common question among Lebanese-Argentines confronted with this
provocation by Misión Libanesa Maronita: Why would I want Lebanese nationality?
The publication offers the motivations of sentiment and belonging, but also details six
practical justifications for pursuing legal status in Lebanon: the right to vote in
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Lebanese elections, the right to own real estate in Lebanon, the possibility to enter and
stay in the country indefinitely and without visa, the possibility to visit Syria sans
visa, to establish a file with the Embassy of Lebanon in Buenos Aires that could serve
future Lebanese-Argentine descendents in their interactions in Lebanon, and to
receive periodical updates on the goings-on in Lebanon from its embassy in the
Capital Federal.
And there are parallels between the Church of Saint Maroun and La Catedral
de San Jorge (the Cathedral of Saint George), another important ethnic and religious
fixture among the Lebanese (and Syrian) population of Buenos Aires. Iglesia San
Jorge is an Apostolic Catholic Orthodox Church founded in 1923 in Buenos Aires by
Lebanese and Syrian immigrants. Located in the upscale neighborhood of Palermo, it
was designed by the architect Kirilos Nasif and consecrated in 1946. According to the
church's website, the cathedral was “Construída en un estilo puramente oriental,
adornada con íconos y vitrales que le otorgan un toque de distinción especial y
particular” (“Constructed in a purely oriental style, decorated with icons and stained
glass windows, giving it a unique touch”) (Arqudiocesis de Buenos Aires y toda la
Argentina).
Although the majority of the religious institution's priests are not of either
Lebanese or Syrian descent, Archbishop Siluan Muci is of Lebanese heritage (born in
Venezuela). He was placed in the Argentine capital in 2006, years after completing his
secondary and tertiary studies in Lebanon, and theological studies in Greece. The
parishioners of the church are a mixed bag: There are those Argentines of Lebanese
and Syrian descent, and those of other ethnic backgrounds. And the nature of the mass
respects this diversity, with nearly all of the service being conducted in Spanish, save
for some hymns, which are sung in Arabic.
In the instances of the Churches of Saint Maroun and Saint George, members
of the Lebanese (and Syrian) populations have mirrored actual tangible Lebanese
ethnic emblems in aligning with a Lebanese ethnic discourse. Physical emblems, such
as stones from Lebanon, Lebanese and Islamic architecture and even ways of human
interaction, whether through language or custom/ritual, provide visual cues that can
announce allegiance to Lebanese-ness to those inside and outside of the ethnic group.
They also help to reinforce and contextualize the intangible aspects of Lebanese
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ethnicity—the stories, the memories, the knowledge of Lebanon's history and politics.
But beyond just the architecture, décor or rituals of the church, confession of
the Maronite faith also serves as a way to reference Lebanese-ness in Buenos Aires.
Religion can be a slippery component to any ethnicity, because religious confession is
not necessarily a matter of blood, history, culture or location. Humans subscribe to
religious discourses because on some level they believe they are “true”. However, the
“truth” of a religion is often heavily contextualized within one's history, blood, culture
and location (although globalization has considerably shaken up this pattern—think of
Catholicism and Christian missionary work that are “true” and “successful”
completely outside of the environment in which they developed). For instance,
Hinduism (in its various traditions) is a religion (or way of life) originating in India (a
vastly ethnically diverse country), and is inextricably tied to its history, politics and
culture(s). Yet, it is the world's third largest “religion” after Christianity and Islam.
Practitioners inhabit very disparate countries, from Belize to Oman to Fiji, Nepal and
Trinidad and Tobago. So, whereas the culture, politics and history of India are
inherently bound up in Hinduism, one does not need to be from India or have Indian
blood to accept the way of life. However, for those people who are of Indian heritage,
subscribing to a Hinduist discourse automatically allows expression of some facets of
Indian ethnicity, as these facets are inherently interwoven in the spiritual experience.
Although Hinduism manifests as manifold belief systems of slight or major variance,
born of very different circumstances and milieux, there are distinctively Indian
features among them all: Sanskrit, pilgrimages, mythology and food habits, for
example. Such is the case with the Maronite faith. As part one of chapter four details,
the Maronite church was born out of the Levant, as were its rituals, the architecture of
its buildings (although not a requisite for practicing the faith), language, etc. Maronite
history is also inextricably linked with the history of Lebanon, its present day
confessional system, its civil wars and waves of emigration.
Any Argentine of non-Lebanese descent can accept and subscribe to the
Maronite faith. Doing so and singing hymns in Arabic, reciting liturgies in Aramaic,
praying to Saint Maroun and celebrating Maronite holidays does not constitute
inclusion in the Lebanese ethnic group/category. However, being of Lebanese descent
in Buenos Aires and confessing the Maronite faith does mean expressing and claiming
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Lebanese- ness, if but for the Lebanese influences intrinsic in the Maronite discourse.
What is more, the modern Maronite community in Lebanon is distinguished
from other socio-religious identities in the Arab world for its French and Catholic
influences. This distinction can extend to the diaspora as well. Chapters one and four
detail some history of the Lebanese Maronite population, its relationship with the
French after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, conflicts with the Druze, immigration to
other countries and Lebanon's status as a French protectorate. Subsequently, one of
the most distinguishing characteristics of being Lebanese Maronite is a(n) (often
seemingly) more Westernized background than other groups in Lebanon and other
Arab populations in the region. José Sahyoun described Lebanon as the most
Westernized and Western country in the Middle East, because it was a protectorate
under France. Even the Arabic spoken there is different due to French influences, he
said.
But religious confession as an expression of Lebanese ethnic identity is not
only limited to the Maronite faith—there are Lebanese-Argentines claiming and
expressing their Lebanese- ness through alignment with Druze and Muslim discourses,
too. The November 2011 Festival Libanés boasted numerous stands along the streets
around which the event was held; they were stocked with Lebanese food and
handicrafts for sale. El Centro Islámico Argentino (The Islamic Center of Argentina)
set up one stand in a design “inspired by Islamic architecture”, with books on Islam
for sale. The director of the center Fabian Jatib shared that the stall was meant to
introduce non-Muslim Argentines and foreigners to Islam and Muslim culture, which
are often negatively portrayed in various med ia. He emphasized that
Todos los musulmanes que habitamos este país bendito somos gente de
trabajo y de paz, somos una comunidad que apoyó muy fuerte el crecimiento
de la Argentina, con dos olas de inmigración muy fuertes, la primera en la
década del 20 del siglo pasado, y la segunda en la del 40...Hay rasgos de la
presencia musulmana en Buenos Aires en distintos lugares, cómo la
concentración de la colectividad en el centro comercial de San Cristóbal, o
los diseños islámicos en la decoración de varias estaciones de la línea E de
subtes.
All of the Muslims living in this blessed country are hardworking, peaceful
people. We are a community that strongly supported the growth of Argentina,
with two strong waves of immigration: the first in the 20s a nd the second in
the 40s...The Muslim presence is in different places in Buenos Aires, such as
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the concentration of the group in the San Cristobal commercial center, or the
Islamic designs in the various stations of the E subway line (La Arena).
Just as with the Maronite faith, the practice of Islam has cultural and ethnic features
intrinsically integrated within its fabric. The religious doctrine and rituals associated
with Islam must remain intact irrespective of one's location on the globe: Shahada,
zakat, salat, sawm of Ramadan, Hajj, (etc.) do not change. Neither does location
change that the Qur'an was revealed in Arabic, and thus Arabic is the language of
Islam, of Islamic prayer. The very fundamentals of the religion are the same whether
one reads or understands its language. And although practitioners do modify their
manner of worship according to environment—whether by using a different language
of instruction (such as Spanish) or adapting to the length of day for fasting (in the
Southern Hemisphere), for example–the Arabian culture in which it began remains
fundamentally implicit in practice. As Lebanon shares aspects of Arabian culture
which are interwoven in the practice of Islam in Lebanon, and because Islam has
thoroughly penetrated and influenced Lebanese culture, history, politics and language,
the practice of Islam in Buenos Aires can and does propagate Lebanese-ness.
Institutions such as the Islamic Center of Argentina may not be exclusively ethnically
Lebanese, yet they serve as conduits for propagating Lebanese ethnic emblems.
One Thursday morning, I met with a small group of Argentines outside of the
Islamic Center of Argentina in Palermo. It is home to the King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz
Al Saud Mosque, along with an Islamic elementary schoo l, library and cafeteria.
There are guided tours every Thursday where curious people, such as the students and
retired couples we were, can learn the basics of Islam and tour an impressive
compound that dreamily felt as though I were back in Cairo. We entered. A solitary
star-shaped fountain stands among marble tiles leading to ablaq-decorated archways
above three gates. These wrought- iron gates are configured into the geometric
patterns of stars—four points, six points, eight points, too many points to co unt. It is
very quiet inside the gated compound with green, green lawns and swaying tree-tops;
I stop to read a sign in both Arabic and Spanish. A woman in hijab nearby cleans the
floor. We visitors congregate around the tour guide, a man in a galabiyya who looks to
be in his late forties. He explains the germination of the center from an idea in the
1970s to provide Muslims in Argentina with a place to worship, study and spend time
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together. He walks us through the foyer, the cafeteria, the school area, the courtyard
and we stop in front of the prayer hall. Two monitors display prayer time at Al- Masjid
Al-Haram in Mecca. There are a few men inside. He ends the tour in the library,
where there is a sizable collection of books in Arabic, volumes announced in
calligraphy. We ask questions; the tour guide patiently answers, explains and informs
us.
The Islamic Center is not by any means solely Lebanese; it is the brainchild of
a Saudi Arabian king. When I asked about the number of Lebanese Muslims who visit
the mosque, the tour guide was unable to give me a definitive answer. However, the
language, the architecture and the religious practices all speak to a Lebanese
discourse, such that those Argentines of Lebanese descent attending the mosque
would express some facets of Lebanese-ness by default. Such is the case with the
Maronite faith.
But there are other ways in which some Lebanese-Argentines choose to
reference their Lebanese- ness aside from religion. Claiming Phoenician roots can and
does serve as a bedrock for some interpretations of Lebanese-Argentine ethnic
identity—albeit, more on a macro level. 37 Phoenicia preceded modern day Lebanon
and Lebanon is the origin of the Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity, therefore, LebaneseArgentines can fairly claim Phoenician heritage and all the connotations affixed to the
label. 38 In discussing the immigration of Lebanese to Argentina, the Embassy of

37 By “mo re on a macro level” I mean that I observed references to Phoenician roots fro m the
“mouthpieces” (for lack o f a better word) of the Lebanese-Argentine population in Buenos Aires
(and elsewhere in Argentina): the Maronite church, the Embassy, scholarly works.
38Phoenicianism refers to the theory that modern-day Lebanese are descendents of the peoples of the
vast marit ime emp ire of Phoenicia, rather than being of Arab descent. Lebanese scholar and professor,
Akram Khater, said in a 2012 lecture at Duke University that “the Phoenician merchant identity …arose
in Beirut in the late 19th century follo wing archaeological discoveries of ancient Phoenician artifacts”
(Duke Today, 2012, para. 3). According to Khater, soon thereafter, Lebanese Christian scholars claimed
these archeological discoveries as part of their own heritage, thus making them ‘heirs to the Phoenician
nation’ (Du ke Today, 2012, para. 3).
But according to Kamal Salibi (2003), author of A House of Many Mansions: The History of
Lebanon Reconsidered, Phoenicianists have drawn considerable crit icis m in asserting that “Phoenicians
were the originators of Liban lumineux—a luminous Lebanon which…has forever radiated thought and
enlightenment to the world in the East and West”, precisely because history has shown otherwise (p.
174). Salibi says that for Arab nationalists, Lebanon was uneq uivocally present in the “intellectual
vanguard of the Arab world”, but prior to was inhabited by primarily “illiterate goatherds and peasants
who made no recognizable contributions to world knowledge or culture” (p. 174). According to some
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Lebanon relays the story of migration by equating Phoenicia and Lebanon: “El
Líbano, la antigua Fenicia, madre del alfabeto, el comercio y la navegación...”
(“Lebanon, ancient Phoenicia, mother of the alphabet, trade, and navigation...”)
(Embassy of Lebanon Online). In such wording, Lebanon is Phoenicia reincarnated
and thus, is everything that Phoenicia was—mother of the alphabet, trade and
navigation. Or as Misión Libanesa Maronita explains, “La costa libanesa recibirá
más tarde el nombre de Fenicia” (“the Lebanese coast will later receive the name
“Phoenicia”), the civilization which is the mother of all civilizations in constr uction:
During the Neolithic Period (6000 BCE), the Lebanese population was
the first to abandon caves and tents in order to construct individual
stone houses. These constructions were erected at a time in which
Egypt and Chaldea—equally splendid civilizations—used only brick
or common wall. This is to say that during this period, the Lebanese
coast had already significantly progressed in order to extract the hard
rock for the construction of houses...The ancient Lebanese community
built houses and tombs: residences for the living and places of rest for
the dead. Thus, it appears that in construction Lebanese civilization is
the foundation of all civilizations (Misión Libanesa).

Arabists, if any Lebanese had legitimate claims to Phoenician roots, it would be the Sunni Muslims of
coastal towns in Lebanon, who considered themselves Arab.
Salibi further rebuffs Phoenicianis m by offering that the claim made by Christian Lebanese
lacked “political theory”, instead being pushed mainly by men in the human ities. Salibi says that
without sufficient records, it is impossible to reconstruct a linear relationship between ancient
Phoenicia and modern-day Lebanon. Archeological remains with some inscriptions, occasional
mentions of Phoenician cities in Mesopotamian or Egyptian records or references to the empire in
classical literature do not suffice (pp. 174-175).
Still, scholar Andrew Arsan proffers another slant on Phoenicianism, one that claims that
Lebanese intellectuals in Beirut, Paris, and Cairo claimed a Phoenician past in order to “make sense of
a troubled present” and maintain a connection with Lebanon as “home” (“Citizens of the World…Who
Stopped on Every Shore”, 2011, para. 2). That is, appropriating a p lausible historical symbol of
prosperity and progress allowed the many Lebanese in the diaspora—often afflicted with feelings of
loss, displacement and uprootedness —a second chance at a “golden age”. According to Arsan,
“Phoenician history gave thes e emigrants… a sense of cultur[al] purpose”, because they “could also
serve as a source of strength, sending home not only remittances but new ideas about culture, society,
and politics learned fro m abroad” (“Citizens of the World…Who Stopped on Every Shore”, 2011, para.
2).
For a closer look at the debate on Phoenicianism, please also see Asher Kaufman ’s 2004 book
titled Reviving Phoenicia: The Search for Identity in Lebanon.
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Lebanon, which occupies the area of the ancient Phoenician empire is then, by
extension, the foundation of all humanity in construction. And the Lebanese Cultural
Union of Buenos Aires supports the conflation of Phoenician and Lebanese identities.
It has created a documentary entitled Lebanese Contributions to Civilization, which
details the evolution of Phoenician-turned-Lebanese civilization, and the many ways
it has positively impacted the world of agriculture, law, humanities, religion, farming,
navigation and construction, among other fields. The first ten minutes of the
documentary are devoted to discussing the early origins of Phoenicia and explaining
the span of the empire, which encompasses modern-day Lebanon. “Phoenician” and
“Lebanese” are used interchangeably (Phoenicia).
But it is worth examining how Phoenician and Maronite references may fit
into the construction of specifically Lebanese-Argentine ethnic identity. There are two
external factors to consider: one, Argentina's history of assimilationist policies and
discrimination towards Arab immigrants, and two, what I found to be a current lack of
general knowledge of the Lebanese-Argentine population in Buenos Aires. Claiming
Phoenician roots and/or a Western (French) background legitimizes the importance of
Levantines in Argentina's history. Phoenicia is the bedrock of modern civilization,
with its contributions to the humanities, construction and agriculture. It was a brilliant
civilization that gave the world its first alphabet and the blueprint of a vast and
successful commercial maritime empire. For the orientalist, Lebanon is a foreign and
“exotic” country in a “mysterious” Middle East, but tempered by French culture and
education. Lebanese-Argentines may be an ocean and a continent away from what
was once Phoenicia and is today Lebanon, yet, they are still its descendents.
Maronites and Phoenicians aside, participation in festivals also proffers a way
in which to creatively reference Lebanese ethnicity in a very public way—sometimes
in tandem with Argentine ethnic references. Every year for the last six years, la
Juventud de la Unión Cultural Argentino Libanesa de Buenos Aires has held Festival
Libanés (Lebanese Festival) during the month of November. In 2012, it was located at
the Borges Cultural Center and opened with a wine tasting, in an atmosphere Laura
Nievas describes as “like the Qadisha Valley” (JUCAL). There was the darbuka
player Matias Hazrum, along with Miguel Frasca and Alejandro Coleman playing
Lebanese music infused with tango-esque accents and classical influences. Maya
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Saloum sang along with the Juvenil el Faro orchestra, performing pieces such as the
Lebanese national anthem, Fairouz's Li Beirut and Fadl Shakr's Ya Ghayeb. The
popular debke group Firqat Al Arz from Rosario also performed, and were later joined
by JUCAL members and other artists in a final show of Lebanon's national dance
(JUCAL).
Public displays of Lebanese ethnic emblems operate much in same way as
using the stones of the Church of Saint Maroun or building the minarets of the
Mosque of King Fahd: They signal alignment with a Lebanese ethnic discourse by
mirroring certain aspects of Lebanese culture and ethnicity in an entirely different
milieu separated by distance and time. 39 The songs are the same and the dance steps
identical—even in a location similar to the Qadisha Valley. Yet, it all takes place in
Buenos Aires, carried out by Argentines of Lebanese descent who may or may not
have ever been to Lebanon.
Still, the preservation of gastronomical traditions is another way in which
Lebanese-Argentines reference and express their Lebanese-ness—especially when
they are cooking for others. I walked into Restaurant Cheff Iusef one evening to the
sound of Arabic muzak. I waited to be seated. When I looked down, there was an
eight-pointed star design on the floor. A map of Lebanon was on the wall, as well as a
framed picture of a man beside a building in what appears to be Lebanon. There were
tall red, purple and orange vertically striped booths sandwiching wooden tables, and a
wide screen television was perched in a corner airing the Argentina-Venezuela soccer
match. On a brick ledge rested two used shisha pipes, and the bar was well-stocked
with wine and spirits. The restaurant is popular. After a very unscientific look at the
patrons, I concluded they resemble the mixed-bag of Argentines I normally saw
around Buenos Aires, regardless of the locale. And then my table was ready. The
Lebanese bread was good—like the bread I eat at Tabbouleh back in Cairo. Pausing

39 By time, I mean that the Lebanese-ness that those in Buenos Aires express may be chronologically
off fro m those Lebanese ethnic emb lems at work in Lebanon. For instance, if Lebanese immigrants
arrived to Argentina in the late 1800s and carried with them their knowledge of the debke, when and if
they passed down this dance to their progeny, it will most likely resemble the 1800s version—even
generations down the line. However, the debke in its place of origin will most likely continue evolving,
so that what is danced in Lebanon in 2013 may look somewhat different to what was d anced in the
same country a century earlier.
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between nibbles, I scanned a very varied menu with names of dishes in both Arabic
and Spanish: empanadas (fried breaded patties), bamia (okra), berenjenas tostadas
(roasted eggplant), baklava. I am ready now: I order stuffed grape leaves, bamia,
sambousek and baklava.
After talking to the owner of the restaurant, admittedly, he said food is the
primary manner by which he and his family have preserved their Lebanese roots. He
does not especially socialize with many other Lebanese or Syrians, does not speak
Arabic and has not been to Lebanon. But food is what takes him “home”. Certainly,
some recipes have been adapted to the region: The restaurant serves a fair amount of
pork and most ingredients come from Argentina—even some of the dishes are a twist
of Greek, Lebanese, Middle Eastern and Mediterranean cuisine. But as his Arab
clientele have told him time and again, the scents, the textures and the flavors remind
them of their grandmother's kitchen, of “home”. Food is a common, easy and tasty
way to claim and express one's ethnic identity, although food preference alone will not
buttress a subscription to any particular ethnicity. However, it does provide a sensual
thread that links together many other aspects of ethnic identity. As part one of chapter
four states, food is a hugely important angle through which to explore an ethnicity,
because of its subtle commentary on the people who created it, their environment and
history. Gastronomy reveals the geography of a people, available resources, history as
well as belief systems and values.
Finally—and there are countless ways in which Lebanese-Argentines of
Buenos Aires claim and express their ethnic identity—there is the recognition,
laudation and claiming of notable Lebanese in Lebanese history.
One day, I hit the pavement in search of tell- tale signs of a Lebanese presence
in Buenos Aires; that day, I chose the wealthy and posh neighborhood of Recoleta. All
the way up Avenida del Libertador (Avenue of the Liberator) is the Lebanese
Embassy, with its elaborate wrought- iron gate and austere decorations. Walking back
from my visit at the embassy, I fortuitously crossed Calle Líbano (Lebanon Street). A
few meters away are a brick fountain, a bronze sculpture and plaque dedicated to the
renowned Lebanese poet, artist and philosopher Khalil Gibran Khalil. There are
curved brick benches on which to sit and observe the colorful geometric designs on
the floor of the tribute. FEARAB Argentina and Fundación Los Cedros had worked in
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conjunction with individual donors to commemorate Lebanon's fiftieth anniversary as
an independent state by paying homage to one of the country's most beloved artists.
In celebrating Khalil Gibran Khalil, Lebanese-related organizations and
individual donors recognize the figure's place in Lebanese history, culture and
ethnicity. Exalting a person as a representation of a culture or ethnicity lends a very
human understanding of ethnic identity. It extends beyond food, dances, politics and
even religion in some cases, because the relationship from human to human is unlike
any relationship a human has with inanimate objects or intangible qualities. It
acknowledges the blood aspect of ethnic identity, which is at its core.

On an Imagined Para-National Lebanese Ethnic Community
In the thesis, I argue that ethnicity among the Lebanese-Argentines of Buenos Aires is
a reproduction of ethnicity in Lebanon, the original model. For diasporic populations
that have spent little to no time in their “homeland”, expressing “home's” ethnicity
requires assembling a montage of ethnic symbols that reference “home”. These could
be usage of the Arabic language, dancing the debke, learning and teaching belly
dance, maintaining Lebanese gastronomical traditions, practicing the Maronite faith,
identifying oneself with Phoenician civilization or a number of other references, so
long as they are recognizably Lebanese by those both inside and outside of the
Lebanese ethnic identity. These ethnic emblems may come from traditions propagated
through generations, romantic ideas gathered from family stories, television programs,
pictures, festivals, books, time spent at mosques or churches, the internet, etc., as well
as from visits “home” and (online or in-person) interactions with populations still in
Lebanon or Lebanese descended populations elsewhere in the diaspora.
As chapter three lays out, the relationship between “home” and “host”
ethnicities is that of model and copy. In the words of Brian Massumi, “[t]he terms
copy and model bind us to the world of representation and objective (re)production. A
copy, no matter how many times removed, authentic or fake, is defined by the
presence or absence of internal, essential relations of resemblance to a model” (Realer
than Real, 1987, para. 5). However, rather than supplanting or negating the original
(as Jean Baudrillard suggests of simulacra of the third order), like Deleuze, I assert
copies can co-exist alongside the original. Within the context of ethnic identities, in
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being so far removed in space and time from Lebanese ethnicity, Lebanese-Argentine
ethnicity has become its own authentic truth. The relationship then between the model
(Lebanese ethnicity) and copy (Lebanese-Argentine ethnicity) is elevated to a status I
categorize as model and model-copy, where the latter depends on the former for
veracity due to the nature of what it is, yet is an acceptable truth unto itself. 40
And here Benedict Anderson's notion of the “imagined community” is once
again fitting. “Imagined communities” are communities spanning wide distances,
founded more upon the imagination of cohesion rather than actual interaction and
personal bonds among community members. More explicitly, most members of a
given “imagined community” such as a nation, will never meet the majority of other
nationals, yet their sense of belonging, loyalty and togetherness in the nation is ever
strong. Each member must be capable of imagining certain (and often multiple)
binding connections: a shared history, a common language, similar gastronomy, like
aspirations (a house, car, several children, a solid Roth-IRA) or a common enemy. In
the case of burgeoning national consciousness in 16 th and 17th century Europe, the
impact of the Reformation and “the birth of administrative vernaculars” facilitated the
linking together of a wider group of people—far wider than members could actually
see or experience (Anderson, 1991, p. 41). These new connections were based on new
manners of identifying with Europeans a ways away, such as reading books in the
same vernacular on topics with which almost everyone could relate, such as religion.
Today, there are chat rooms, forums, social media, blogs, news sites, e-zines,
websites, etc. These manifestations of the internet instantaneously connect users to
each other and to the wider world of information and ideas, which, in turn, can lead to
actual physical interactions. Then there is globalization, which democratizes access to
the worldwide symbol bank, such that people all over the globe may reference the
ethnic emblems of disparate ethnic identities.
The notion of imagined communities serves us when examining the

40 Why is Lebanese ethnic identity in the diaspora a copy and not an extension of Lebanese ethnicity
fro m Lebanon? Distance, the passage of time and adaptations to “host” countries (assimilation or
acculturation) truncate direct relat ion with the milieu in which Lebanese ethnic identity began, such
that referencing it in the diaspora is often a degree or two removed, rather than a matter of direct
experience.
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relationship between model and model-copy in an ethnic identity context, because it
presents a scenario in which the two can become linked. For example, the Lebanese
ethnic populations in Lebanon, Argentina, the United States, Canada, Gha na, France
and Australia could share common feelings of belonging, loyalty and togetherness to
the notion of being Lebanese (or of Lebanese origin). This idea always springs from
identifying Lebanon as the source, but community members need not be physically
connected to “home”. Knowing that there are others elsewhere in the world who eat
similar traditional foods, maintain the same religious holidays, have family from the
same village, have the same history of persecution, dance the same dances and may
have a longing to better understand “home” can engender rapport that is real. I term
the configuration of model linked with model-copies an imagined para-national ethnic
community, because members are linked in a way that can so often transcend
nationalisms and geo-political borders. And the repercussions of such a configuration
can be major.
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Conclusion
Yet, what are the implications of a Lebanese simulated ethnicity among LebaneseArgentines in Buenos Aires? What does this mean for other diasporic populations?

Implications of an Imagined Para-National Lebanese Ethnic Community
Subscribing to the same identity discourse facilitates bridging subscriptions to other
related conversations. An allegiance to a common ethnic identity can lead to political,
and in some instances economic and religious involvement where members of this
particular ethnic group reside. Lebanon and the Lebanese diaspora proffer an
appropriate example to this point.
The population of Lebanon is roughly 4.2 million. Estimates of Lebanese in
the diaspora hover around 14 million, with seven million in Brazil alone. Argentina is
home to around 1.2 million Lebanese immigrants and their descendents. Lebanese
citizenship is passed along patrilineally, so that children auto matically have Lebanese
nationality, and non-Lebanese wives may obtain Lebanese citizenship with the
permission of their husband and completion of the proper legal steps. Lebanon does
allow dual citizenship, however. According to Naharnet and The Daily Star Lebanon,
in 2011, Article 114 of a draft law passed in parliament on August 10, 2008 specifies
that Lebanese expatriates born abroad are eligible to apply for citizenship, which will
then allow their participation in elections in Lebanon. Yet, before eve n considering the
impact such a move could make on Lebanese politics, it does well to remember that
Lebanese citizens living abroad have been returning home to vote for years. The
online newspaper, The National, says that because voting by mail is not allowed in
Lebanon, Lebanese abroad with nationality in Lebanon instead return home to vote. It
is something like “a vote and a vacation” (The National). Says Ali Fawwaz, who flew
to Lebanon in 2009 from Benin, “'I come back every time there is an election, it's like
eating or drinking...My flight was full of Lebanese'” (The National).
Keeping this information in mind, we recall from chapter one that Lebanese
Maronites were the largest group to emigrate from Greater Syria beginning in the
mid-1800s. Part one of chapter four also details that Lebanon's political system is one
termed “confessional”, where representation in government should accurately reflect
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the country's religious breakdown. Likewise, it is key to remember that Lebanon has
not carried out a census since 1932, due to the sensitivity of its political system and
the religious sectarian strife on the ground. What then, is the political impact in
Lebanon of those Maronite- majority Lebanese who return “home” for every election?
But more importantly, what will be the effect of extended citizenship, and
consequently, the right to vote, to second-, third-, fourth- and fifth- generation
Lebanese in the diaspora?
And yet, we need not frame this question in a purely Maronite context: How
does living abroad in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, the United States, Senegal
and Australia affect the way one of Lebanese descent digests the politics of Lebanon?
How do the politics, history, education, language and culture of host countries affect
how those in the Lebanese diaspora relate to “home”—even if “home” is a romantic
notion? How could feelings of uprootedness, displacement, loss and nostalgia color
how Lebanese in the diaspora view “home”, contribute to “home” and push to change
or maintain the status quo at “home”? How could the sum of these individual
relations effect change in Lebanon?
Chapter two lays out that ethnic identity is non-essential, that people can
choose to identify themselves in other ways, such as race or by adherence to a
particular nationalism. It also states that a person's subscription to an ethnic discourse
need not be consistent over their lifetime. There are a myriad of factors that contribute
to one's decision whether to claim and express an ethnic identity: sentiments such as
nostalgia, uprootedness and loss, as well as external factors, such as miscegenation
and assimilation (or acculturation) all weigh in. However, among the approximate 14
million Lebanese living in the diaspora, if even only ten percent chose to identify
themselves as ethnically Lebanese, political and economic repercussions could be
notable in Lebanon. Subscription to an ethnic discourse could easily transfer to a
concern for the politics of “home”, when the politics of “home” are so intertwined
with defining and sustaining the very idea of what makes Lebanon for those who
claim it—even if the idea of Lebanon is hazy or romantic. The politics of Lebanon
affect the country's relations with Israel (and by extension, with other countries, such
as the United States). They affect the politics of Hizbollah, and determine major
events, such as the Lebanese Civil War. They determine whether Lebanese stay at
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“home” or emigrate en masse. Politics in Lebanon create a climate either favorable or
unfavorable for economic growth, such that Lebanese within the borders of Lebanon
come to rely on remittances from abroad. According to The National, “An estimated
$5 billion flows in to the country every year from Lebanese abroad and deposits have
increased since the start of the financial crisis” (The National). In quoting the World
Bank, Aspen Institute says that Lebanese in the diaspora “contributed 8.4 billion in
remittances to Lebanon [in 2012], an increase from last year despite the economic
slowdown the country has witnessed” (as quoted by Aspen Institute).
Among the Lebanese, the politics of Lebanon matter more to those who
imagine themselves to be part of a greater community, to those who identify with
Lebanon as being their ethnic and cultural source, and who understand that their
knowledge of and connection to Lebanon matter. Their vote and pocketbooks do
matter at “home”. That is why Lebanese President Michel Suleiman's visit to Buenos
Aires (during which members of JUCAL accompanied him) and a trip 120 LebaneseArgentine youth took to the Embassy of Lebanon in Buenos Aires are notable; they
elicit reactions such as Romina Mussi's of JUCAL:
Fue un orgullo para todos poder pisar un pedacito de suelo del país de los
cedros; escuchar las palabras del Embajador Hicham Hamdan quien junto a
su señora esposa brindaron una recepción, haciendo referencia a que esa
también era nuestra casa, nos hizo sentir presentes por un instante en el
Líbano. Vivimos momentos muy emotivos y lleno de esperanzas ya que para
muchos de nosotros era un sueño imposible.
Everyone was honored to step foot on ground from the “land of the cedars”,
listening to words from Ambassador Hicham Hamdan during a reception he
and his wife held. He referenced that this was our home, too, and for an instant
we felt we were in Lebanon. We experienced emotional moments, full of
hopes that for many of us were an impossible dream (JUCAL).
And that is why initiatives, such as Project Roots of the United States and
www.vote2013.org are so important. Project Roots reaches out to Lebanese in the
United States to assist with attaining Lebanese citizenship and connecting with family
members in Lebanon. Vote2013.org aims to inform Lebanese in the diaspora of their
right to Lebanese nationality and ability to vote in 2013 elections. It also details
political decisions in Lebanon that either hinder or help this effort. Movements such
as these link together members of the Lebanese diaspora through the common theme
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of shared Lebanese ethnicity. Just as “all roads lead to Rome”, these threads begin
somewhere in the world, often with desultory groups seemingly dangling in the ether,
and pull them back to Lebanon, the source. I hypothesize that the creators of El
Misionero of the Church of Saint Maroun in Buenos Aires recognize that getting
Argentines of Lebanese descent to learn about Lebanon, visit, reunite with relatives
back home and obtain Lebanese citizenship engenders personal connection to and
investment in the imagined para- national Lebanese ethnic community. These efforts
engender a relationship with Lebanon. Such connections have the power to direct the
course of the goings-on back “home”. And this is significant.

Final Thoughts
As stated in the introduction, the final thesis is a contribution to Middle Eastern,
migration, Latin American, nationalism, multicultural, identity and assimilation
studies. It explores an interesting cultural junction, where Lebanon and Argentina
meet and get acquainted through their progeny's expression of ethnicity—or lack
thereof. This work also examines the effects of globalization, miscegenation and
assimilation on identity expression, and explores the ways in which ethnicities are
formed and evolve, and cultures “cross pollinate” each other.
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Appendix A
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
Documento de permiso para participar en investigaciones

Título de trabajo: La etnicidad casera: Como los libaneses argentinos de Buenos
Aires crean su identidad étnica
Investigadora: Bianca Kemp
1) Se pide cordialmente su partcipación en estas investigaciones sobre la construcción
de la etnicidad de los libaneses argentinos de Buenos Aires, las cuales pretenden
averiguar como se identifica este grupo y cuáles son los imágenes, experiencias,
costumbres y comportamientos que relaciona dicho grupo con el Líbano. Hay
posibilidad de que las conclusiones de estas investigaciones se incluyan en la tesis, la
cual podía ser publicada en el futuro. La duración de su participación depende del
método de investigación utilizado puede ser de una ó dos horas.
2) Los siguientes son los métodos posibles de investigación:
a) Observación: Los participantes realizan actividades cotidianas relacionadas con el
tema del trabajo mientras se les filman. De vez en cuando se toman apuntes.
b) Entrevista: Entrevistas informales y voluntarias tienen lugar en sitios públicos.
Consisten en una serie de preguntas preescritas sobre la inmigración libanesa y la
identidad étnica libanesa argentina, la cual puede abrir la conversación a cualquier
otro tema relacionado. Se graban todas las entrevistas por grabadora de voz digital.
c) Encuesta: La encuesta se trata de la manera de identificarse en terminos étnicos.
3) Estas investigaciones son poco invasivas, y no son sensibles por naturaleza.
Tampoco involucran a los participantes en riesgos ni en molestias. Los participantes
reciben un regalito, no hay otros beneficios de participar en el estudio.
4) Como participante Ud. tiene el derecho de anonimato tanto durante las
investigaciones como en la tesis final. Además, su información permanece en
posesión exclusiva de la investigadora.
5) Participación en estas investigaciones es por elección propia. Es decir, en cualquier
momento antes, durante o después tiene derecho Ud. a rechazar la participación sin
ninguna consecuencia negativa. Se desharán todos los datos particulares conseguidos
de los que optan por terminar participación en el estudio.
6) Por último, se guarda la información de las investigaciones hasta que se defienda
con éxito la tesis. La fecha de la defensa provisionalmente será a principios de
diciembre de 2011.
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Para realizar las investigaciones se utilizan los siguientes materiales: un cuaderno, un
portátil, un disco rígido externo, una cámara y una grabadora de voz digital. Los datos
son confidenciales, solo tiene acceso a ellos la investigadora.
Si Ud. tiene alguna duda ó pregunta, póngase en contacto con Bianca Kemp:
¡Muchísimas gracias de antemano por su participación!
Firma

________________________________________

Nombre y

________________________________________

apellido

Fecha

________________________________________
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Appendix B
1) How did you become interested in Arab immigration to Argentina? Are you of Arab
descent? If so, when did your family first migrate to Argentina and why?
2) About how many Lebanese Argentines would you say live in Buenos Aires? Is it a
population or a community? Where are they located?
3) What is the relationship between those of Syrian descent and those of Lebanese
descent? 4) What exactly is your specialization within Arab immigration? How does
Arab immigration fit into the history of immigration to Argentina as a whole?
5) Could you tell me a little about Museo Roca?
6) Do you consider yourself Lebanese-Argentine? Lebanese first, Argentine first or no
real order? Do
you feel you have to choose?
7) Have you ever been to Lebanon? If not, would you like to go? If yes, how often do
you go? What do
you do while there?
8) Do you or does anyone in your family speak Arabic?
9) What images, people, activities or memories do you associate with Lebanon or
being of Lebanese
descent?
10) Is there any special status that comes with being of Lebanese descent in Buenos
Aires? Is there a
positive, negative or neutral connotation with having Lebanese origins?
11) Do you or does your family practice any traditions or customs from Lebanon?
12) Do you share similar opinions about Lebanon and your Lebanese ancestry as your
parents and
grandparents?
13) What does being Lebanese-Argentine mean to you?
14) Do you stay current on events going on in Lebanon? How do you receive your
information?
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